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Abstract 
Since the late 1970s, the US electric power industry has been undergoing major changes. The electric 
utility industry had mainly consisted of highly regulated, vertically integrated, local monopolies, 
providing customers with all electric services at rates determined by the state regulatory agency. 
Deregulation and restructuring in the power industry triggered a transition towards competition in 
electricity generation, due to the formation of competitive markets at the wholesale level - in some states, 
at the retail level as well. Since utilities can no longer price at cost-of-service rates, investors in electric 
generation capacity, like nuclear power, will face a different set of financial risks. 
Moreover, the economic context of volatile coal and gas prices, increasingly stringent NOx, SO2 and 
mercury regulations, and growing support for C02 regulations will likely positively impact the value of 
nuclear capacity. Conversely, unresolved issues in the nuclear industry inherent to radioactive waste 
disposal, decommissioning and public opposition related to security concerns will likely penalize the 
building of new nuclear capacity. More importantly, regulatory delays in construction, mainly caused by 
the plant approval process by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, undoubtedly negatively affect nuclear 
power because of its capital-intensiveness. 
This thesis evaluates the main drivers impacting investments, and especially new investments, in nuclear 
power technologies to meet the increase in electricity demand in the United States. For that purpose, the 
ongoing change in the electric power sector and the potential evolution in all regulations concerning 
nuclear energy are assessed. The new risk factors facing investment in nuclear power, as well as the 
possible financing options, are examined. The company characteristics that most favor investment in new 
nuclear power plants in the United States are sketched. 
The specific issue of plant construction, regulations and licensing is considered with closer attention. An 
analytic investment model in power generation estimates the impact of the extended construction time 
caused by regulatory delay in licensing on investment in nuclear power in a context of uncertainty on 
demand. The case study compares the dynamics of investment in nuclear power plants with gas-fired 
power plants - which have a much shorter construction time. 
Thesis Supervisor: John E. Parsons 
Senior lecturer in the Sloan School of Management 
Executive Director of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research 
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Introduction 
After the rapid expansion of the nuclear fleet in the 1970s and 1980s that has substantially 
incorporated atomic energy into the electricity generation portfolio, no nuclear power plant has been built 
in the United States since 1990. Yet, although nuclear power programs in the Western world appear to 
have slowed down in recent years, the nuclear option is still wide open. Developing countries in Asia 
have significant objectives to develop their nuclear capacity, and some constructions of nuclear facilities 
are currently taking place in Europe. 
Various elements contribute in explaining the absence of new nuclear builds in the past fifteen 
years in the United States. The electric power sector in the United States is undergoing a transition in 
which the traditional power companies, vertically-integrated monopolies, are being replaced by a 
collection of firms providing electricity services to consumers. After the deregulation and restructuring of 
the electricity sector, power generation companies are now privately owned and operated, and they face 
intense competitive pressure. Unlike regulated companies, they cannot pass excess costs onto consumers, 
and they are constrained to maintain their generation costs at low levels for fear they might have to shut 
down. 
In this context, the nuclear industry has considerably improved its operational performance. 
Nuclear power plants have become safer than ever, and operators have managed to drastically lower 
production costs. However, the lifetime of a power generation facility is limited, and ultimately the 
currently operating units will be decommissioned. Absent new investments in nuclear power facilities, the 
nuclear capacity will eventually decrease to zero. 
The purpose of this study is to understand the main factors that drive potential new investments in 
nuclear power. There are risks and uncertainties related to the market environment and specific to nuclear 
energy that shape the future of nuclear energy in the United States: those will be characterized and 
carefully assessed. We will also intend to analyze the recent changes in regulatory framework and 
legislative context to understand to what extent they might trigger a new wave of investments. We will 
also ask how the future investments in nuclear power plants will be shaped and what ownership and 
financing options will be considered. 
Ultimately, in a context of uncertain demand for electricity, we will identify a cost that traditional 
financial analyses omit to consider: the cost associated with construction time, i.e. the cost of delay 
associated with uncertainty. 
Part I will assess the current situation of the nuclear industry in the United States. We will analyze 
how deregulation impacts the nuclear industry, how nuclear power compares to other baseload electricity 
generation technologies, and assess the performance and future of the existing nuclear fleet. 
Part I1 will list and analyze the risks and uncertainties related to electric power generation, 
especially those inherent to nuclear power. A simple financial model will evaluate the impact of some of 
these risks on the competitiveness of nuclear power. An analysis of the current regulatory and legislative 
evolution will evaluate whether the uncertainties adverse to new investments have been overcome, and 
appraise the possibility of new nuclear investments in the United States in the coming years. 
Part 111 will present the recent structural evolution of the nuclear industry, exposing the trend 
towards consolidation. Building upon this movement, we will discuss the realistic options for new 
investments in nuclear power generation. 
Part N wiIl introduce the cost of construction delay in an uncertain environment. After describing 
relevant dynamic equilibrium investment models, an analytic model will be developed to determine the 
cost of time-to-build for an electric generator facing uncertain and volatile demand. 
PART I: Current situation of the US nuclear 
industry 
1. The US nuclear power program in the 70s and in the 80s 
1.1. Brief history of the nuclear expansion in the US 
The United States nuclear power program dates back to December 1951, when an experimental 
nuclear reactor managed to first produce electric power and light four light bulbs. After President 
Eisenhower's Atoms-for-Peace program, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 announced the beginning of the 
development of civilian nuclear energy. In 1957, the Sodium Reactor Experiment at Santa Susana, 
California became the first civilian nuclear unit to generate power. 
At the end of 1957, the first full-scale nuclear power plant at Shippingport, Pennsylvania, went 
into service, reaching 60 MW (megawatts) of electricity in twenty-one days. 
In the 1960s, the US nuclear power program continues at an accelerating pace. In 1973, President 
Nixon creates a regulatory agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), to regulate civilian use of 
nuclear materials. 
The 1970s and 1980s were the most intensive years of the US civilian nuclear energy program. 
After the creation of the NRC, US utilities order a record of 41 nuclear units. 
However, a major accident occurred at Unit 2 of the Three Mile Island nuclear plant near 
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania on March 28, 1979. Fortunately, damage only happened inside the reactor, and 
no one was injured. This event turned out to be a milestone for the US nuclear industry, and orders for 
new reactors have been significantly slowed down for a number of years. The Institute of Nuclear Power 
Operations (INPO) was also created in late 1979 to address issues of safety and performance. 
The poor economic conditions in the US at the end of the 1970s, along with the accident at Three- 
Mile Island caused a number of orders to be cancelled. Although 46 units have entered service during the 
1980s, the U.S. nuclear program never really regained momentum after three-Mile Island, and there have 
been no new orders since that time. 
Of the nuclear fleet currently in operations, all power plants have come online before 1990, 
except the 1,150 MW Comanche Peak Unit 2 in Glen Rose, Texas which saw its construction delayed and 
entered service on April 6, 1993, and Tennessee Valley Authority's Watts Bar 1 nuclear power plant 
which was connected to the grid on February 9, 1996. By granting a license to this last unit, the NRC 
brought the number of operating nuclear units in the United States to 1 10. 
1.2. Status of the current US nuclear fleet 
There are now 104 fully licensed nuclear power reactors in the USA, of which only 103 are in 
operation1. Four more reactors are partly built and have valid construction licenses. 
All US nuclear power plants are either Pressurized Water Reactors (PWR - 69 units, 65,100 MW) 
or Boiling Water Reactors (BWR - 35 units, 32,300 MW), all generically known as Light Water Reactors 
(LWR). 
At the end of 1991, prior to the Energy Policy Act of 1992, the operable nuclear generating 
capacity in the United States was 97,135 MW. In March 2004, the operable capacity had evolved to 
97,452 MWe. Major changes are concealed by this apparently marginal increase: 
The premature shutdown of 8 nuclear reactors occasioned a decrease of 5,709 MW; 
Power uprates are responsible for a net increase of 3,810 MW; 
The start-up of two new reactors - Comanche Peak 2 and Watts Bar 1 - brought an additional 
2,3 15 MW online. 
As of the end of 2004, the US nuclear capacity was 99,209 MW. 
Figure 1 - Net US Nuclear Capacity, 1973-2004 
Source: Energy Information Administration, 2005' 
' Tennessee Valley Authority's Browns Ferry 1 has been shut since 1985. Refurbishment is currently being 
performed and operations should resume as early as 2007. 
EIA, 2004a 
2. Deregulation and restructuring of the electric power sector in the United States and its consequences 
for nuclear power 
2.1. Deregulation and restructuring of the U.S. electric power sector 
2.1.1 .Situation prior to deregulation 
Since the 1930s, the US electric utility industry has consisted of regulated companies that were 
monopolies with exclusive franchises allowing them to sell electric power within their service territories 
at prices determined by state regulatory agencies.3 In 1997, ~ o s k o w ~  described the sector as consisting of 
investor-owned or publicly-owned utilities that had de facto exclusive franchises to sell electricity to retail 
customers in specific geographic areas. The Investor-Owned Utilities (IOUs) accounted for as much as 
75% of retail electricity sales. 
Moreover, US electric utilities were typically vertically integrated companies, engaged in the 
business of generating electricity, long-haul transmission, and local distribution5: 
The generation of electricity entails the creation of electric power using falling water, internal 
combustion engines, steam turbines powered with steam produced with fossil fuels, nuclear 
fuel and various renewable fuels, wind driven turbines and photovoltaic technologies; 
The transmission of electricity entails the use of wires, transformers and substation facilities 
to effect the high voltage "transportation" of electricity between generating sites and 
distribution centers; 
The distribution of electricity to residences and businesses at relatively low voltages requires 
wires and transformers along streets and other paths. The distribution function is generally 
linked to the retailing functions (arrangements for power supply, metering, billing and 
demand management). 
NEI, 2000 
Joskow, 1997 
Joskow, 1997 
2.1 .2.Deregulation and restructuring of the power sector 
2.1.2.1. PURPA and the introduction of competition in wholesale electricity markets 
In 1978, following the energy crisis of the 1970s, Congress passed the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act (PURPA) which laid the principles of deregulation and competition by opening wholesale 
electricity markets to non-utility producers of e l e ~ t r i c i t ~ . ~  
The intent of PURPA was to encourage more efficient use of oil and natural gas through 
cogeneration. Many large industrial companies used their own boilers with oil or natural gas as a way to 
produce steam for manufacturing operations. One of PURPA's provisions allowed companies to build 
cogeneration plants - producing steam for both manufacturing and electricity - and required regulated 
electric utilities to buy that electricity. As a consequence of PURPA, the barriers of entry to small 
generators were lowered. PURPA helped lay the foundations for a competitive generation sector, and 
independent power producers (IPPs), a form of company that was not affiliated with regulated utilities, 
emerged. 
Traditionally, electric utilities planned and built new power plants when new capacity was needed 
for their service area. In the 1980s, most states started to require competitive bidding for new supply. As 
PURPA had lowered the barriers to entry in electricity generation, competition to supply electricity 
became in ten~e .~  In the period between 1984 and 1996, U.S. electric utilities requested bids for 38,122 
MW of new generating capacity, whereas bids came from IPPs for 11 times that amount (420,124 MW). 
As a result, independent, non-utility producers built almost half of all new generating capacity in the 
United States between 1985 and 1995. 
In the early 1990s, independent power producers did not yet have ready access to the transmission 
system: they were not always able to access potential customers. In 1992, Congress removed this major 
obstacle and passed the Energy Policy Act. The Act mandated competition at the wholesale level and 
required electric utilities to allow non-utilities open access to their transmission lines.8 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) implemented the intent of the Act in 1996 
with Orders 888 and 889. The objective was to "remove impediments to competition in wholesale trade 
and to bring more efficient, lower cost power to the Nation's electricity  customer^".^ Order 888 
commanded competition among wholesale electricity suppliers (10 percent of the electricity sold in the 
United States) and open and equal access to jurisdictional utilities' transmission lines for all electricity 
EIA, 2003 
' NEI, 2000 
NEI, 2000 
EIA, 2003 
producers, thus facilitating the States' restructuring of the electric power industry to allow customers 
direct access to retail power generation. 
As a result, the electric power industry has been transitioning from highly regulated, vertically 
integrated, local monopolies towards competitive companies that provide the electricity while utilities 
continue to provide transmission or distribution ser~ices.'~ 
2.1.2.2. Status of retail competition in power markets in the US 
Retail competition, however, was not part of the Energy Policy Act of 1992, as the decision was 
left to states. Most observers at the time believed wholesale competition was a first step that would soon 
be followed by retail competition, under the impulse of industrial, commercial and residential users. The 
states, which regulate distribution services and retail rates for electricity within their borders, individually 
decide whether deregulation is in their interest. 
Figure 2 - S us of I ddty Markc )en to Retai 
Source: MCEnergy, Inc., 2005 
ompetition 
Virtually all states now have regulatory proceedings under way, or are considering legislation, to 
restructure their electric utilities and require full competition. Some members of Congress think the 
federal government should intervene in the process by setting a timeline for attainment of full competition 
and establishing rules to manage the transition and restructuring of the electric power industry." As of 
today, no legislation has passed. Almost half of the States have passed major legislation and/or 
regulations to restructure their electric power industry (see map). 
California, Pennsylvania, New York, and most of New England, have historically had higher 
prices than the US average. As a result, they chose to open their retail electricity markets to competition, 
thereby allowing customers to choose their power supplier. Indeed, one of the major goals in restructuring 
the power sector is to lower the price for electricity. According to industry analysts, Pennsylvania is the 
most successful state in achieving its goals in restructuring.12 
The principle of state restructuring legislations and regulations was to require or encourage the 
divestiture of generation assets. The purpose of the divestiture was to foster competition among 
generating companies and to prevent market power. Also, divestitures were a condition to the recovery of 
costs incurred by utilities for power plants and contracts under a regulated environment that may not be 
recoverable in a competitive market (known as stranded costs). 
States in the Northeast, Texas, and the Midwest have been the most committed at conducting 
restructuring, and should continue towards implementing the necessary market reforms.13 California, after 
the shock of the electricity crisis of 2000 and 2001 has reversed its initial deregulation plans, and is 
uncommitted to any clear long-term electricity strategy. A majority of the remaining states, in the 
Southeast, the South, and the West, have cautiously suspended or altogether rejected restructuring and 
competition initiatives. Having low retail prices, they are unwilling to take the risk of an electricity crisis 
similar to the Californian crisis. 
At the end of 2000, approximately 16 percent of US electric utility capacity had been either sold 
to unregulated companies, or transferred to unregulated subsidiaries selling their electricity in a 
competition environment as opposed to cost-of-service regulatory setting. 
Deregulation gives way to significant competitive pressure on the IOUs. In order to gain 
operating efficiencies and economies of scale, usually achieved by larger companies, the number of 
mergers has been increasing since 1995 - FERC has indeed approved 50 mergers. As a result, the 
number of electric utilities has been brought down from 98 in 1995 to 65 by the end of 2005, thereby 
decreasing the number of utilities by 33.7%.14 
" NEI, 2000 
l 2  EIA, 2003 
l 3  Joskow, 2003 
l4 EEI, 2005 
Consolidation of the US electric utility industry is expected to continue in years to come, and 
three mergers had been announced by the end of 2004. 
2.1.3.Broad consequences and issues in the power sector 
The main objective of the deregulation of the electricity sector is the pursuit of greater economic 
efficiency. The pressure from electricity market competition provides strong incentives to reduce costs 
and increase productivity. In such a context, low-cost power producers will thrive while high-cost plants 
either reduce their costs or are forced to cease operating. 
Broadly, the electric power sector responds to competitive markets with innovation and 
improvement in performance and business practices. '' Power companies put increasing effort into service, 
marketing, and focus more on profitability. Generally speaking, management, staffing policies, 
investment policies, customer relations, and relationships with stakeholders evolve under a competitive 
environment. 
As a consequence of deregulation, electricity prices are made more flexible to reflect market 
conditions. In addition, electricity prices are generally expected to decrease following deregulation. 
However, under a regulated system, despite the uncertainty about future electricity demand power 
producers have had protected markets for their outputs and assured rates of return in traditional markets. 
In a regulated environment, financial and market risks are allocated to customers: the cost incurred by a 
utility due to poor forecasting is passed onto customers through higher electricity prices, thereby 
minimizing the economic penalty to the utility for over-investment. Competitive markets radically change 
this situation. 
Also, in a competitive market, power generators may see their customer base evolve. Contracts 
are based on the market price and the customer has the option to switch suppliers. This new market risk 
for power producers is especially large when there is a surplus of generating capacity and slow demand 
growth. Utilities run the risk of not selling their full output capability unless their marginal costs are low 
enough, or unless they have managed to negotiate long-term contracts. 
As a result of competition, power generators might not be able to pay off their debts, especially if 
they have high marginal costs. These unrecovered capital costs, incurred within the regulated setting and 
threatened by a planned deregulation, may become stranded costs. 
Additionally, deregulated environments give birth to a variety of electricity markets: contract 
markets (both long-term and short-term), future and hedging markets, and spot markets. If such markets 
l5 NEA, 2000 
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are efficiently implemented, prices will reflect the balance between demand and supply. The balance is 
highly dependent upon the conditions of supply and demand, and electricity prices will reflect the 
balance. 
Moreover, investment decisions for power plants with high capital costs or high risklreward will 
evolve. Utilities are now required to bear greater performance, financial and market risks than in the past. 
Requirements on the initial capital outlay will become more stringent, along with requirements related to 
payback period and cash flows to secure debt and equity capital. Investors choose profitable options and 
are reluctant to invest in capital-intensive power plants, in particular those with long pay-back times, such 
as nuclear power plants. 
2.2. The investment decision in a competitive marketplace 
Before deciding to pursue a power generation project, investors analyze its economics to assess 
profitability. 
Prior to deregulation in the United States, electricity rates were set by regulators using cost-of- 
service regulation. Power prices were determined in order to provide the utility with revenue equal to the 
revenue requirement, i.e. the revenue required to compensate for all expenditures associated with a power 
generation investment during construction, operation, and possibly decommissioning. The return was set 
so as to take into account the cost of financing capital. 
The most popular method for determining the value of an investment is the discounted cash flow 
analysis (DCF). The DCF approach consists in discounting to present value all the future cash flows and 
in summing them up to find the net present value of the investment (NPV). The NPV rule is generally 
presented as the key to making investment decisions: any investment with a positive NPV is a good 
investment and should be pursued. If several mutually exclusive investment opportunities are competing, 
the option with the highest NPV should be chosen. 
In order to assess the economic competitiveness of alternative generating technologies, a tool that 
is widely used is the real levelized cost of electricity production: "the real levelized cost of a project is 
equivalent to the constant dollar ("real") price of electricity that would be necessary over the life of the 
plant to cover all operating expenses, interest and principal repayment obligations on project debt, taxes 
and provide an acceptable return to equity investors over the economic life of the project. The real 
levelized cost of alternative generating technologies with similar operating characteristics (e.g. capacity 
factors) is a metric used to identify the alternative that is most e~onomical."'~ 
The levelized cost of electricity requires taking the following steps: 
Estimating capital costs, operating and maintenance costs, and fuel costs; 
Estimating technical availability in order to evaluate the average annual energy production 
from the power plant; 
Calculating expected annual cash flows from the power plant. 
Discounting the stream of cash flow at rates sufficient to satisfy interest and principal 
repayment obligations to debt investors and the minimum hurdle rate (cost of equity capital) 
required by equity investors, to estimate its present value; 
Revising the electricity price estimate to reach a value that brings the NPV to zero. 
The value reached above will be the levelized cost of electricity production. 
l6 MIT, 2003 
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2.3. Power plant characteristics relevant to the investment decision 
There are a number of factors that affect the economics of a particular technology as well as the 
decision to invest in that specific technology for electricity production. The following sections summarize 
the features that have the most significant impact on the investment decision. 
2.3.1 .Capital costs and construction time 
Electricity generation requires significant initial investment in capital equipment. For some 
technologies like nuclear power, the capital investment represents the largest cost component over the 
lifetime of the power plant and takes decades to be recovered. According to EIA estimates, 80% of the 
levelized cost of electricity from future nuclear plants will come from capital costs. Consequently, capital 
costs hold a significant part in the investment decision. 
Moreover, the necessity of economies of scale require that units are rather large (sometimes 
above 1,000 MW), thereby requiring billion-dollar initial investments. Not only are capital costs a major 
cost item of nuclear power relative to other cost items, but in absolute nuclear investments require very 
large capital outlays. 
Last, construction time is also a very important element in the investment decision. Large base- 
load plants can take several years to build, even absent regulatory or litigation delays. Especially when 
capital costs are high, long construction times can have significant impact on the value of a project, since 
capital has been invested but the plant is not yet in operation to provide revenue. 
As we will discuss later as well, a long construction period increase the chances that the market 
conditions will have evolved between the time of investment and the time at which the plant eventually 
enters service. Consequently, there is a major competitive advantage for technologies with short 
construction times. 
2.3.2.Economic lifetime 
Power plants are built to operate for long periods of time. This is especially necessary for capital- 
intensive technologies to allow initial outlays to be recovered. Conversely, as a power plant ages, the 
operating costs might increase, and additional capital expenditures might be necessary to continue 
operations. Moreover, unless the discount rate is very low, extending the lifetime of the plant beyond a 
certain point will have a small impact on its present value. Those effects must be taken into account when 
considering the economic lifetime of a unit, i.e. the period over which to levelize electricity costs. 
Generally, the actual average lifetime of a power plant is largely superior to its economic lifetime, but 
reducing the economic lifetime allows offsetting the risk in the ultimate years. Then, if the plant is not 
profitable, the consequence of an early retirement is lower. 
2.3.3. Operating costs 
Technologies with high capital costs like nuclear power tend to have relatively low and stable 
operating costs. The operating costs are generally separated into two categories: operation and 
maintenance costs (O&M) and fuel costs. 
For a natural gas combined cycle power plant, fuel cost may account up to half of the levelized 
cost of electricity production. Consequently, high volatility of natural gas prices will be detrimental to the 
cost of producing electricity. 
2.3.4.Discount rate and risk premium 
The finance literature has very little quantitative guidance regarding the relationship between risk 
and discount rates. Power plant risk, like nuclear plant risk, is to a large extent idiosyncratic, i.e. it is 
specific to each plant, rather than market related. Generally, the financial community agrees that 
idiosyncratic risk should be priced at the risk-free rate. Conversely, industry practices seem to account for 
risk in the choice of the discount rate, increasing the market rate by several points depending on the 
nature of the project considered. 
2.4. Competing technologies for electricity generation 
The present study focuses on new investments in nuclear power generation to meet electricity 
demand in the United States. Gas and coal are also considered as the major baseload competitors to 
nuclear power. Consequently they will receive the focus of the competitiveness comparison in this study. 
The following sections are a reminder of the assumptions used in the MIT study17 for the levelized cost of 
electricity calculations. Those will later be used in a similar spreadsheet model to analyze the importance 
of a number of factors. 
Parameters 
Financial Inflation rate 
parameters US Treasury security yield 
Cost of debt capital 
Required net return on equity 
Debt fraction 
Project Plant net capacity 
parameters Capacity factor 
Plant life 
Heat rate 
Capital costs Overnight cost18 
Construction Time 
Decommissioning fund 
Cost of incremental capital 
Fuel costs Unit cost of fuel 
Fuel escalation rate 
Waste Fund 
O&M costs Fixed O&M 
Variable O&M 
O&M escalation rate 
Unit 
%/year 
%/year 
%/year 
%/year 
% 
MW 
% 
Year 
BTUIkWh 
$/kW 
Year 
$million 
$/kW/year 
$/MMBTU 
%/year 
mills/kWh 
$/kW/yr 
mills/kWh 
%/year 
Nuclear 
3.0% 
5 .O% 
8.0% 
15 .O% 
50.0% 
1,000 
85% 
40 
10,400 
$2,000 
5 
$350 
$20 
$0.47 
0.5% 
1 .o 
$63 
0.47 
1 .O% 
IGCC 
3.0% 
5 .O% 
8.0% 
12.0% 
60.0% 
1,000 
85% 
40 
7,800 
$1,550 
4 
$0 
$15 
$1.20 
0.5% 
0.0 
$33 
0.80 
1 .O% 
CCGT 
3.0% 
5.0% 
8.0% 
12.0% 
60.0% 
1,000 
85% 
40 
7,200 
$500 
2 
$0 
$6 
$3.50 
1.5% 
0.0 
$16 
0.52 
1 .O% 
Figure 3 - Parameter assumptions for levelized cost of electricity calculations 
Source: MIT, 2003 
2.4.1 .Nuclear power 
Specific nuclear technologies will be discussed in subsequent sections. 
Similarly to other technologies, there is high uncertainty on capital costs, especially for designs 
that have not yet been built. The MIT study uses recent international experience to use overnight capital 
l7 MIT, 2003 
l 8  The overnight cost is the amount that would be paid out if all capital expenses occurred simultaneously 
(immediately before start-up), excluding interest charges 
costs in the range of $2,000 1 kW, and the units could require construction times of four to five years. 
Joskow underlines that nuclear construction costs generally largely exceed initial estimates.'' However, 
under competitive market conditions, merchant plant owners will be directly affected in the case of cost 
overruns, because the costs will not be passed onto consumers. 
Construction time is highly uncertain due to the prospect of delays. Many nuclear constructions 
have been delayed beyond twelve years. Most nuclear units are above 1,000 MW. 
It will be discussed later that operating costs for nuclear power plants have significantly decreased 
over the past 15 years. The economic lifetime of nuclear power chosen by the MIT study is 40 years, 
which corresponds to the duration of the initial operating license issued by NRC. However, most plants 
will be extended to 60 years. This has no effect on the levelized cost of electricity as the economic 
lifetime is not affected. 
2.4.2. Coal 
Pulverized coal combustion (PCC) is the most common coal combustion technology recently 
constructed in the United States. The interest in this technology has been motivated by its improved 
environmental performance. Integrated coal gasification combined cycle (IGCC) is also attractive from a 
thermal efficiency and emissions perspectives but will likely be too expensive for near-term construction 
in the United States. 
Overnight capital cost estimates in the MIT study for pulverized coal are $1,350 /kW when 
including environmental compliance equipment. IGCC has capital costs of $1,500 kW.  The construction 
time assumed is four years, making coal technologies clearly less capital-intensive than nuclear power. 
Indeed, at equal overnight costs, interest expenses will be lower with a shorter construction time. 
2.4.3.Combined cycle gas turbine 
The primary gas-fired technology for new baseload electricity generation is gas turbine combined 
cycle (CCGT). CCGT technology has brought natural gas to the baseload market, and most of the new 
capacity installed since 1996 consists of CCGT power plants. Modern gas turbine plants operate at 
thermal efficiencies between 55% and 60%. 
l9 Joskow, 2005 
Overnight capital costs are here assumed to be $550 IkW, and the construction time is around two 
years. CCGT plants generally have capacities above 500 MW, and have shorter operational lives than 
coal or nuclear. 
The major cost item for CCGT plants is fuel. Natural gas price trends will be discussed in 
subsequent sections, but it should be said that fuel costs can represent as much as half of the cost of 
electricity production. 
3. Current competitiveness of nuclear energy 
3.1. Comparative costs of generating electricity 
3.1.1 .Comparative levelized costs of electricity - MIT study 
Technology Real Levelized Costs ($/MWh) 
Nuclear 67 
Coal 42 
Gas (low) 38 
Gas (moderate) 41 
Gas (high) 56 
Figure 4 - Comparison of levelized cost of electricity for different technologies and scenarios 
Source: MIT, 2003 
The following values for levelized cost of electricity are given by the MIT study. I will make my 
own calculations later in this study. 
"Nuclear power is not competitive in the current situation". The comparison of levelized costs of 
electricity suggests that nuclear power is much more costly than coal and gas, even in the high gas price 
cases. In the low gas price case, CCGT is cheaper than coal. In the moderate gas price case, coal and gas 
costs are comparable. Under the high gas price assumption, coal is significantly cheaper than gas. Of 
course, the dramatic increases in natural gas prices since 2003 would change these conclusions. 
3.1.2.Nuclear versus fossil plants: economic advantages and disadvantages 
Nuclear power has several advantageous economic characteristics, but also suffers from a number 
of disadvantageous characteristics, which seriously impact its cost-competitiveness. 
Advantageous economic characteristics are as follows: 
Low and predictable fuel and operation and maintenance (O&M) production costs 
o The volatility of nuclear production costs is low because the primary energy 
source, uranium ore, represents a very small fraction of the total production cost. 
o The cost of the primary energy source in fossil-fired plants is a large fraction of 
the production cost. 
High capacity factors 
o Capacity factors for nuclear plants in the United States average around 90%. 
o For competing base-load gas-fired combined cycle plants, the projected capacity 
factors are in the range of 80% to 85% when averaged over the plants' lifetimes. 
Long operating lifetime 
o Operating lifetime licensing extensions have been obtained in the U.S., and the 
new designs project a 60-year life. 
o For competing base-load gas-fired combined cycle plants, lifetimes are not 
expected to exceed 25 years. 
Disadvantageous economic characteristics of nuclear power are: 
Large plant size 
o The size range of most new nuclear power plants is approximately 1,000 to 1,350 
MW, in order to reduce the capital costs per kW through economies of scale. 
They thereby encounter the risk of exceeding demand growth. 
o Base-load gas-fired combined cycle plants are in the range of 500 to 600 MW. 
Large capital outlay 
o The overnight capital cost range of new nuclear plants is estimated around $1,000 
to $1,800 per kW. For a 1,350 MW plant at $1,600 per kW, an investment of 
$2.16 billion can be required, excluding interest costs. 
o Total overnight costs for base-load gas-fired combined cycle plant are in the $450 
to $650 per kW cost range. A 600 MW combined cycle plant at $650 per kW 
would require an investment of less than $0.4 billion. 
Long construction time 
o The already optimized construction time for new nuclear plants is around 3 to 4 
years. 
o For gas-fired combined cycle plant, construction time is approximately 2 years. 
3.1.3.Split of full generation costs 
In order to understand the reason for nuclear power not being cost-competitive, it is relevant to 
take a look at the split of full generation costs under the base-case scenario considered above. The cost 
split turns out to be very different from one technology to the next, as displayed in the following figure: 
Split of full generation cost! 
I
Nuclear Coal 
Fuel 
Capital 
Figure 5 - Split in N1 generation costs 
Capital costs of nuclear generation account for about three quarters of the total costs. Fuel costs 
are only 10% and operations and maintenance account for the remaining 16%. Hence, the largest portion 
of the costs is fixed and nuclear has very limited exposure to international commodity prices. 
Fuel costs for gas represent about three quarters of the total costs. Compared with nuclear, capital 
costs arc significantly lower. In other words, gas-fired power generation is highly dependent on the 
international price of natural gas. 
The cost structure of coal is more balanced. About 54% are capital costs and 23% fuel costs in the 
total costs. 
In the following sections, we will quickly examine the relevant projections that could affect the 
relative competitiveness of nuclear, gas and coal. Capital costs, O&M costs and fuel costs will be 
considered. Annual Energy Outlook projections will then be displayed to illustrate the prospects for 
electricity generation in the United States. 
3.2. Capital and O&M cost trends across technologies 
According to the University of Chicago, capital costs for new PCC plants range from $1,100 to 
$1,200 /kW depending on their location.20 DOE estimates the future cost of IGCC units at just over 
$1,300 /kW and projects that its price will come down to $1,000 IkW by 2008. 
The cost of operating emission control devices for both sulfur and NOx are included in the O&M 
costs of a coal-fired plant. The graduate decline of plant performance over its lifetime generally translates 
into lower availability and higher O&M costs.21 In that respect, cap-and-trade programs with SO2 and 
NOx allowance trading provide incentives for power generators to find the lowest-cost mechanism to 
achieve emission levels. 
Gas capital costs comprise less than one-third of the total cost of generation. An average estimate 
for a new combined cycle plant is $590 /kW. 
The cost of operation and maintenance for gas-fired power plants includes costs of emission 
control. However, gas-fired plants generally do not require additional pollution control equipment: this 
feature represents a significant O&M cost advantage. However, O&M costs share in the cost of electricity 
production is less than 6%. Those costs are expected to remain stable. 
2003 Long Term 
Capital Cost ($/kW) 590 450 
Total O&M Cost ($ per MWh) 2.6 2.6 
Figure 6 - Cost Estimates for New Gas Plants 
Source: University of Chicago, 2004 
20 University of Chicago, 2004 
2' University of Chicago, 2004 
Trends in production costs will be discussed in a subsequent section of this study. As for capital 
costs, they are substantially lower than they were in the 1980s, but it is to be expected that the vendor's 
estimates are ambitious and will not be realized. Pessimistic capital assumptions should be used in 
estimating levelized costs of electricity until capital costs are proven.22 This assertion should in fact be 
applied across all technologies for consistency purposes. 
22 Joskow, 2005 
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3.3. Fuel cost trends across technologies 
Fuel Prices to Electricity Generators, 1990-2025 
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Figure 7 - Fuel Prices to Electrldty Generators, 1990-2025 
Source: Energy Information Administration, 2005 
The cost of producing electricity is a function of the costs for fuel, operations and maintenance, 
and capital. Fuel costs make up most of the operating costs for fossil-fired units: 
For new coal-fired plants, fuel costs represent about one-half of total operating costs; 
For new natural-gas-fired plant, fuel costs would be almost 90 percent; 
For nuclear units, fuel costs typically are a much smaller portion of total production costs, 
and non-fuel operations and maintenance costs make up a much larger share. 
The impact of higher natural gas prices in the projections is offset by increased generation from 
coal-fired and nuclear power plants and by higher generation efficiencies as new capacity is installed. 
3.3.1.Natural Gas 
The North American natural gas market is mainly driven by increasing demand from power 
generation, and domestic supply has been stagnant. Natural gas prices are projected to decline in the early 
years of the AE02005 reference case forecast. Except for an increase in drilling levels and new 
production capacity coming on line, the only near-term alternative for the United States in response to 
current high prices is a substantial increase in imported liquefied natural gas (LNG) to fill the gap 
between declining North American production and rising gas demand from electricity generation. 
Natural Gas Prices - Henry Hub, 1995-2004 
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Figure 8 - Natural Gas Prices - Henry Hub, 1995-2004 
Source: Nuclear Energy Institute, 2005 
According to projections, spot gas prices at Henry Hub (pricing point for natural gas futures 
contracts traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange on the natural gas pipeline system in southern 
Louisiana) are likely to move average spot gas prices at Henry Hub around a level of $5 per million Btu. 
Coal markets are generally affected by high natural gas prices. In 2002, when spot natural gas 
prices were low, gas-fired generation increased substantially. This trend was reversed sharply in 2003 as 
prices rose above $5 per million Btu. Consequently, coal-fired generation rose in 2003 to make up the 
shortfall. 
The increase of coal use happened in spite of the tightening restrictions on nitrogen oxides and 
sulfur oxides tightened. 
According to EIA projections,23 minemouth coal prices will rise initially in response to strong 
growth in the demand for coal in the electric power sector. High spot prices for coal are indeed embedded 
in new term agreements. At expiration of a contract, like many in 2004, new contracts are signed at higher 
prices, and most coal is sold under term agreements. Consequently, coal costs will rise steadily and 
possibly sharply, even if spot coal prices begin to decline. 
Average minemouth price of coal, 1990-2025 
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Figure 9 - Average minemouth price of coal, 1990-2025 
Source: Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 
Uranium spot sales represent only about 15% of global uranium demand. Suppliers sell the 
majority of their production through long-term contracts, direct to utilities, but with the price often related 
to the spot price. 
23 EIA, 2005a 
Contracts are structured at either a singled fixed price, based on reference prices and indices, or 
have escalation clauses related to the spot price. Delivery quantities and schedules are specified in 
contracts as well, and contracts usually run for three to seven years. Since long-term contracts allow 
buyers to eliminate their exposure to spot rallies, they have been priced at premium to spot. 
Uranium Spot Price History, 1988-2005 
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Figure 10 - Uranium Spot Price History, 1988-2005 
Source: Ux Consulting 
In the period 1970-1984, uranium production resulted in a huge commercial utility inventory to 
operate existing nuclear plants in the US. At that time, the spot price of uranium ranged from $30 to $45 
per pound of U308. From 1985 to 2003, the market was essentially driven by the liquidation of the very 
large utility inventory. As a result, the spot price of uranium during the liquidation era was as low as $7 to 
$10 per pound. Starting in 2002, the price of uranium began to climb. In January 2002, it was at $10 per 
pound, and by the end of 2003, it was nearly $13. At the end of October 2005, it had risen to $31, the 
highest price since 1984. JPMorgan expects uranium spot prices to maintain momentum through 2006 up 
to almost $33, but to slip in 2007 towards $30.5.~~ 
" JPMorgan, 2005 
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3.4. Projections for power generation fleet in the United States 
Currently, the United States has an over supply of generating capacity. As of October 31, 2003, 
total national supply equaled 964,469 MW, distributed as follows: 
US Existing Capacity by Energy Source, 2003 
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Figure 11 - US Existing Capacity by Energy Source, 2003 
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However, some of the capacity has been retired and will continue to be retired. Power plant 
retirements occur because of excess supply making many power plants uneconomic. 
According to AEO 2005, with growing electricity demand and the retirement of 43 GW of 
inefficient, older generating capacity, 28 1 GW of new capacity will be needed by 2025. 
2005 EIA projections do not forecast any new nuclear capacity coming on line by 2025 simply 
because there are no orders today.25 Hydropower is also geared for baseload, but it is much more subject 
to weather conditions (e.g., drought). Hydropower is concentrated in certain regions and production is 
declining. 
" This may change in the 2006 projections due to the Energy Policy Act of 2006 
Because of deregulation and market competition in some regions, Scully Capital believes utilities 
will be shifting some plants to intermediate and peaking units to better match load demand and market 
conditions. By 2020, baseload as a percentage of total capacity should decline?' 
The majority of new capacity additions are likely to be natural-gas-fired combined-cycle or 
combustion turbine, more than 80 percent needed after 2010, when the current excess of generation 
capacity has been reduced. Natural gas prices are likely to increase, and new coal-fired capacity is 
projected to become increasingly competitive. Most of the new coal capacity is expected to use advanced 
pulverized coal technology but advanced clean coal technology will certainly be added too, with higher 
capital costs but relatively low fuel costs. According to EIA, about 5 percent of the projected capacity 
expansion will consist of renewable generating units. 
Electricity Wmratlan by Fuel, 2003 and 2025 
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Figure 12 - Electridty generation by hel, 2003 and 2025 
Source: Energy Information Administration 
" Scully Capital, 2002 
4. Prospects for the US nuclear industry 
The operating and safety performance of the existing US nuclear fleet - with 104 reactors and 99 
GW of installed generating capacity - has been improving steadily since the early 1990s. During the 
1980s, the nuclear fleet had serious performance problems. Moreover, public acceptance of nuclear power 
was undermined after the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. Over the past decade however, 
the efforts made by plant operators have resulted in improvements of most performance indicators. 
The nuclear consolidation trend for plant ownership and management over the past five years 
placed many nuclear plants in the hands of efficient operators. This has probably contributed to improving 
the fleet's performance. Nevertheless, nuclear ownership remains somewhat fragmented despite 
consolidation. The largest nuclear operator in the United States, Exelon, owns only about 15 percent of 
total capacity, and the top ten firms together own 61 percent. The remaining 39 percent are owned by 26 
investor-owned power companies and 40 government entities and rural cooperatives. 
4.1. Improved performance of the current nuclear fleet 
In general, the impact of electricity market deregulation on the performance of nuclear power 
plants is expected to be positive. As reminded by the Nuclear Energy ~ ~ e n c ~ , ~ ~  it is reasonable to expect 
that increased competition in a deregulated market will bring about cost reductions through reductions in 
staffing, increased productivity, and higher availability factors, thereby improving economical 
performance. 
4.1.1 .Cost improvements 
Marginal costs of operation, including fuel costs and O&M costs, as well as applicable repair and 
refurbishment expenses, are the determining costs in decisions on whether existing nuclear power plants 
will be continue to operate in a competitive market. Of course, these marginal costs vary with different 
time horizons and are applied differently for existing plants and new plants. With respect to existing 
power plants, marginal costs are relevant in deciding whether to continue producing power at the current 
level, increase power output, or permanently shut down the plants. 
27 NEA, 2000 
According to NEA,~' the merging, buying and selling of nuclear power plants in the United States 
today is an indication that well-run nuclear power plants are valuable assets and as such probably will 
reduce the risk of early retirements. 
Due to its low variable production costs, nuclear power is generally used in base-load. The 
following graph shows the average operating costs per unit on a three-year average. The lowest level is 
below $10 per MWh for fuel costs and operations and maintenance costs. In addition, a large proportion 
of the fleet spends less than $20 per MWh. 
The average production costs in 2004 were as low as $17 per MWh, whereas they were above $21 
per MWh in 1990. If we add $5 to $6 per MWh for capital expenditures, insurance, and taxes, the fleet is 
running at costs of about $23 per M W ~ ~ ~ .  
US Nuclear Industry Production Costs, 1 989-2004 
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Figure 13 - US. Nuclear Plant Production Costs (OdrM + Fuel), 1989-2004 
Swrce: Nuclear Energy Institute, 2005 
The profitability of nuclear power plants in the past few years is quite different from what had 
been expected with the introduction of competitive electricity markets. Then was a widespread belief in 
the 19908 that nuclear plants would be uncompetitive and forced to shut down. The above graph shows 
the evolution of the competitiveness of nuclcar production costs. 
Improvements in production costs from nuclear power plants evidently come frmn improvement 
in the operational performance. As we will analyze in the next section, power output improvements of 
a NEA, 2000 
29 NEI, 2005 
nuclear power plants have been achieved mainly through improved refueling operations, longer intervals 
between outages and reduced outage times, and power upgrades. Furthermore, reductions in staff levels 
and increases in productivity and reliability have resulted in enhancing the competitive position of nuclear 
power plants. 
4.1.2.Performance improvements 
A significant achievement of the US nuclear power industry over the last twenty years has been 
the increase in operating efficiency with improved maintenance. In 1987, according to N E A , ~  only 42 
percent of the nuclear units had capacity factors above 70 percent. The average capacity factor (output 
proportion of their nominal full-power capacity) has increased steadily since the 1990s and has been 
around 90 percent for three years in a row. 
Nuclear Generation and Capacity Factor, 1973-2004 
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Figure 14 - Nuclear Generation, 5973-2004 and Capacity Fador Trend, 1989-2004 
Source: Energy I n f o ~ o a  Administration, 2005 
The perfonnaoce of nuclear powa plants in the United States has improved markedly and the 
following factors have resulted in costs falling substantially over the past decade. 
Refueling outages are periodic shutdowns at nuclear plants necessary for the replacement of used- 
up fuel rods and for reshuffling of the remaining rods to ensure the proper distribution of power within the 
NEA, 2000 
reactor core and efficient fuel burn-up. The length and the frequency of refueling outages have been 
considerably reduced. In the 19809, the refueling process required a 60 to 90-day outage every 12 months. 
In 1990 it averaged 107 days but dropped to 40 days by 2000. Today, improved nuclear fuel designs 
(including elements like higher initial enrichment levels) and better outage planning have reduced these 
outages to an average of 34 days every 18 or 24 months. The record is 15 days. The effect of reduced 
refueling outage is quantifiable and has added at least 10 percentage points to average capacity factors. 
US Nuclear Refueling Outage Days (1 990-2004) 
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Figure 15 - US Nudear RePclehg Outage Days, 19!Xb2004 
Soutct: N ~ l ~  Eaergy Instirute 
Shutdowns can also occur at a nuclear power plant in the form of forced outages. Accumulation 
of operator experience and more effective maintenance have rctulted in the d u c e d  number and length of 
unplanned outages. 
Unplanned Capability Loss 
Figure 16 - Unplanned Capability Loss 
Source: World Association of Nuclear Operators, 2005 
Other factors of improved performance include the increased demand growth which allowed 
power plants to operate at nameplate capacity, and the efficiency improvements of sang at nuclear 
power plants (from a thousand workers needed to run a plant in the 1980s to around 700 now). 
All this is reflected in increased output between 1991 and 2004, from 612 billion kwh hours to 
778 billion kwh, a 27 percent improvement without much change in installed capacity. The lack of 
capacity growth has been partly compensated since the 1990s by the first three factors listed above. After 
1990, a few more reactors have come online, but the new capacity was offset by early retirements of 
several plants (Yankee Rowe, Trojan, San Onofre 1, Millstone 1, Haddam Neck, Maine Yankee, Big 
Rock Point, and Zion 1 and 2). Despite the early retirements, the total electricity generation by nuclear 
power plants has increased steadily from 640 million MWh in 1994 to about 788-million MWh in 2004 
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(an output increase equivalent to having 20 additional large units running at a 90 percent capacity factor). 
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4.2. Improved safety of the current nuclear fleet 
It is too early to assess whether competition has had a positive effects on nuclear safety. One can 
argue that nuclear safety should be improved in a competitive market, mainly because safe and efficient 
operation of nuclear power plant will simultaneously fulfill competitiveness and the regulatory 
requirements of nuclear safety (NEA, 2000), be it only to avoid the denial of their operating licenses. 
4.2.1 .Nuclear safety and competition 
Some safety regulators believe economic competition and safety to be perfectly compatible. 
Others will argue that competition sets a significant emphasis over short-term economics: management 
decisions could be made at the expense of nuclear safety. Economic effectiveness being a major factor in 
a competitive market, operators will examine all aspects of electricity generation for cost-reduction 
purposes. In such a setting, safety upgrades and bacWits are unlikely to be undertaken if they are not 
associated with productivity increases. The only remaining solution would then be explicit mandates by 
the NRC. 
Furthermore, with market deregulation, nuclear safety regulatory authorities may tend to tighten 
their administrative control over nuclear generators, and intensify their overview in order to assure that 
economic deregulation does not compromise nuclear safety.3' This tightening in regulatory control could 
negatively impact the competitiveness of nuclear power. 
4.2.2.Safety performance in the United States 
The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) believes that high safety levels and good economic 
performance go hand-in-hand. US nuclear power plants have simultaneously managed to significantly 
reduce their production costs and achieved a high record of safety and reliability. 
Safety system performance has improved from 92 percent in 1990 to an expected value of around 
97 percent in 2005 according to WAN0 (World Association of Nuclear Operators) indicators. Unplanned 
automatic plant shutdowns were reduced considerably, and the number of accidents has been reduced 
more than threefold since 1990. In addition, collective radiation exposure of nuclear plant workers is now 
40 percent of the already low levels achieved back in 1990. 
" Bertel & Naudet, 2004 
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/ Unit Capability 
Safety Performance Indicator 
line and produce electricity. Plants with a high unit 
capability are successful in reducing unplanned 
Description 
This indicator measures a plant's ability to stay on 
outages and improving planned outages. 
This indicator measures how much a plant is off 
I I line or unable to produce electricity due to power I 
Unplanned Capability Loss reductions, unplanned shutdowns or outage 
extensions. Plants with low unplanned capability 
loss have successful equipment performance and 
materiel condition Programs. 
/ Safety System Performance 
This indicator monitors the availability of three 
standby safety systems - two main cooling systems 
and their backup power supplies - used to respond 
to unusual situations. The graph shows the 
percentage of systems achieving their availability 
goals each year. 
This indicator shows the unplanned automatic 
Unplanned Automatic Scrams scram rate. Plants with low scram rates have 
effective operations, engineering, maintenance, and 
training programs. 
This indicator shows the percentage of units with I ~ u e l  Performance no defects in the metal barrier that surrounds fuel. The industry's long-term goal is that units should 
I I strive to operate with zero defects. I 
Chemistry Performance 
This indicator monitors the effectiveness of overall 
chemistry control, based on the concentration of 
impurities and corrosion products. This graph 
shows the percentage of units achieving specific 
2005 goals that vary according to plant design. 
This indicator tracks how many industrial accidents 
Industrial Safety 
per 200,000 worker-hours result in lost work time, 
restricted work or fatalities. The nuclear industry 
continues to provide one of the safest industrial 
work environments. 
I radiation protection. 1 
Figure 17 -Safety Performance Indicators, definitions 
Collective Radiation Exposure - BWR/PWR 
Source: World Association of Nuclear Operators, 2005 
This indicator measures the effectiveness of 
practices that reduce radiation exposure at boiling 
water reactors and pressurized water reactors. Low 
exposure indicates strong management attention to 
Figure 18 Safety Performance Indicators 
Soume: World Association of Nuclear Operators, 2005 
Concurrently, capacity factors have been trending upward in the same period, and according to 
NEI, nuclear power plants with the best performance ratings with the NRC also have the best capacity 
factors and the lowest O&M costs. According to NRC data, there has been a steady reduction in the 
number of significant events in US nuclear power plants, from an average of 2.4 events per unit in 1985 
to 0.02 event per unit in 2004. 
Significant Events at U.S. Nuclear (1988 - 200 
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Figure 19 - US Nuclear Significant Events (1988 - 2003) 
Source: Nuclear Energy Institute, 2004 
Summing up, nuclear safety, regulatory compliance and efficient economic performance seem to 
be rather complementary. Safety is a key factor, since a nuclear power plants will be shut down if not 
operated safely. The importance of nuclear safety does not depend upon market conditions. In its final 
policy statement on the "Restructuring and Economic Deregulation of the Electric Utility Industry", the 
NRC states that economic deregylation does not preclude adequate protection of public health and 
safety ." 
Thus, safety has been improving since 1990, but it is difficult to assess the main factor to which 
the success can be attributed. The regulatory change that appeared in the Uaited States starting in 1995 on 
risk-informed regulations might also have played an important role in the safety improvements. The NRC 
defines risk-informed regulations as: "New techniques for measuring, analyzing, and ranking public 
health risks make it possible for the NRC to incorporate risk insights into its regulations. By risk- 
informing its regulations and regulatory processes, NRC can focus the attention of its licensees on those 
design and operational issues most important to safety and move away from prescriptive regulations 
based on conservative engineering judgments toward regulations focused on issues that significantly 
contribute to safety." It is also legitimate to expect cost-reductions and safety improvements from such 
measures, and there has riot been any study to assess the contribution of safety regulatory design versus 
market competition. Such a study may use statistical analysis of safety performance indicators in 
regulated and deregulated states with or without risk-informed practices, and quantify the correlation 
between safety improvements and deregulation and/or risk-information. 
32 NEA, 2000 
4.3. Prospects for the US nuclear electricity generation without investments in new plants 
4.3.1 .Plant life extension 
The cost of life extension in the US is expected to be much less than that of building a new power 
plant of any kind, which explains the substantial interest in nuclear power plant life extension. Under the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the NRC has issued rules that permit extension of nuclear power plant 
operating licenses by up to 20 years. The following graph shows the status of license renewal in the US. 
According to NEA,") it is estimated that life extension of nuclear power plants in the United States will 
cost approximately $10-$15 million: this figure includes the preparation of the renewal application, the 
review fees incurred by the NRC, and potentially hearings costs. License renewal will clearly allow 
utilities to maintain generating capacity without large investment costs for the construction of new plants 
as replacements. 
US Nuclear License Renewals 
33 NEA, 2000 
License renewal is a critical issue for the future of the existing fleet. Originally, operating licenses 
for current plants had been granted by the NRC for 40 years, and some will begin expiring in the next 
decade. For example, the oldest nuclear plant in operation in the US is Nine Mile Point 1 in New York; it 
came online in December of 1969, and its license, along with three others, is to expire in 2009. 
Approximately one quarter of the existing fleet will reach the end of their original license period before 
2015. 
According to various industry comments, the vast majority of existing units should get their 
licenses renewed. The first renewal was approved by the NRC in 2001, adding 20 years to the operating 
license of the 2-unit Calvert Cliffs plant in Maryland. Since then another 28 units have had their licenses 
renewed, making 30 renewals in all. 
The license extension process typically takes around two years to complete, and 18 units are 
under review. Owners of at least 28 units have informed the NRC their intention to file for renewal. The 
remaining 30 units have not made any public announcement, but they are all still in time to prepare for the 
filing. 
4.3.2.Capacity upgrades 
Nuclear power plant power upgrades, or uprates, is another method for increasing capacity 
without building new nuclear power plants, thereby avoiding the high investment costs of such projects. 
Power companies in the United States have been using power uprates since the 1970s and the NRC has 
approved more than 100 applications totaling over 4 GW so far. Of those 4 GW of uprating, about 2 GW 
have been approved over the past few years, as reflected by the net increase in nuclear capacity after 2000 
in the United States. 
The NRC has defined three separate categories of nuclear power plant power uprates: 
Category 
Measurement 
uncertainty 
recapture 
Stretch power 
up rates 
Extended power 
uprates 
General principle 
Measurement of reactor power with 
improved instrumentation to reduce 
uncertainty 
Taking advantage of extra margins of 
safety included in the plant's original 
design 
Extensive changes to the plant's turbines, 
pumps, generators, and other non-nuclear 
equipment 
Capacity changes 
9 1.3 percent to 1.7 percent in most 
cases 
9 Up to 7 percent can be achieved 
9 NRC has typically approved uprates 
of between 4 and 6 percent 
9 6 percent up to 20 percent 
9 All but one of the approved extended 
power uprates are B WRs 
Uprating can add as much as 20 percent to a plant's capacity. Since 2001, eight units at five sites 
have received uprates of between 15 and 20 percent." The plants are Brunswick (two units, 15 percent), 
Duane Arnold (15.3 percent), Dresden (two units, 17 percent), Quad Cities (two units, 17.2 percent), and 
Clinton (20 percent). Five of these units are owned by nuclear leader Exelon Corp. In addition to these, 
six plants received uprates of between 10 and 24 percent in connection with provisional operating licenses 
between 1969 and 1990. Four additional cases, Vermont Yankee and the three units at Browns Ferry, 
have applied for uprates of between 15 and 20 percent and are under NRC review. Counting the cases 
under review and expected by the NRC, additions are estimated around 2 to 3 GW from uprating over the 
next few years. 
In 1985, a period of management turmoil due to safety concerns, the Tennessee Valley Authority 
(TVA) shut all three Browns Ferry units. 
In subsequent years, Browns Ferry units 2 and 3 resumed operations. Unit 2 was eventually 
restarted in 199 1, and unit 3 came back online in 1995. 
Browns Ferry Unit 1 is now being refurbished by TVA, for a cost of around $1.7 billion. If 
refurbishment occurs as planned, the 1,280 MW-unit is scheduled to be restarted in 2007. 
4.3.4.Capacity factor improvements 
The US nuclear fleet average capacity factor reached 91 percent in 2004. However, this value is 
already quite close to the technical limits of reactor design. Indeed, under existing technologies, all US 
reactors need to shut down for refueling every 18 or 24 months. We have shown that the average duration 
of refueling outages had been steadily declining over the past decade to a value of 34 days. Several plants 
have managed to refuel in less than 20 days, but 30 days is usually a minimum, especially when other 
maintenance needs to be performed during the shutdown. 
The maximum achievable capacity factor with one 30-day refueling outage every 18 months will 
be between 94 and 95 percent. Plant ageing will also mean more necessary inspection and repairs. Thus, 
34 NRC, 2005a 
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there is little likelihood that performance will achieve levels much above the current 91 percent on 
average. 
4.3.5.Modest prospects for expansion: absent new builds, the capacity will decline 
US Nuclear Generating Capacity With and Without 
License Renewal 
ID Current licensed capacity Capacity with 1 M)% license renewal I 
Figure 21 - US Nuclear Generating Capacity With and Without License Renewal 
Source: Dominion Resources 
The figure above shows the potential of the existing fleet in the coming years and the importance 
of license renewal. Uprates will augment the 99 GW existing capacity by several hundreds of megawatts 
per year for the next few years. In addition, the restart of Browns Ferry Unit 1, which has been down 
since 1985 will provide additional capacity in 2007. 
However, despite this slight enlargement of the fleet:' the US nuclear capacity would begin a 
sharp decline after 2010 if licenses are not renewed. On the other hand, renewal of the entire fleet will 
maintain capacity until after 2025. 
35 The increase is not reflected in the above figure by Dominion Resources 
If the expansion of the nuclear fleet remains so modest, it will mean a decreasing trend of the 
share of nuclear generation. Even with full renewal and 92 percent capacity factor, if no new plant is 
built, 35 years from now at the most, US nuclear capacity will be reduced by a factor of one half, and 50 
years from now, the capacity will be down to zero. This gives an idea of how many new plants would 
have to be built if the objective was to keep the capacity constant. 
According to EIA projections, the share of nuclear generation from the existing fleet will decline 
if no new capacity is built, from 20 percent today to 18 percent in 2015, and 15 percent in 2025. If the 
objective was to maintain today's 20 percent share, over 30 GW of new nuclear capacity would be needed 
by 2025. 
PART 11: Drivers impacting potential new 
investments in new nuclear power plants in 
the United States 
5. Characterization of risk and uncertainties related to power generation under a competitive 
environment 
5.1. Risks and uncertainties faced by power generating projects 
An industrial project can only be realized if it is possible to find financing to carry it out. In the 
case of nuclear power generation equipment, financing is an exceptionally difficult matter, especially 
when it comes to calling for private investment, because of the risks and uncertainties to which the project 
is exposed in a competitive electric market. 
The first step to be taken in project finance is to identify the risks to which the project will be 
exposed throughout its lifetime, and to characterize them as closely as possible. Banks and private 
investors will only invest in a nuclear project if risks are properly mitigated. 
Risks and uncertainties bearing upon 
all power generation projects 
Interest rate 
Exchange rates 
Electricity price 
Electricity demand 
Coal price and supply 
Oil price and supply 
Gas price and supply 
Technology Transmission availability 
Risks and uncertainties bearing upon 
all nuclear power generation projects  
Uranium price and supply 
1 Construction 
Technology and design 
Development and siting 
I I Operation and maintenance 
Regulation 
Environmental 
Market-related 
Fiscal 
Commissioning and licensing 
Safety 
Waste storage and disposal 
Decommissioning 
Accidents 
The table above and the subsequent sections intend to classify and explain risks and uncertainties 
bearing upon any power generation project, and those specifically related to nuclear power projects. 
Other 
Figure 22 - Risks and uncertainties for baseload electricity generation projects 
Country 
Climate 
Force majeure 
Legal 
Political 
Public acceptance 
5.2. Economics and market-related risks 
5.2.1 .Interest rate risk 
Interest rate might vary over time, and variations represent a risk to the investor. Interest rate risk 
is defined as "The risk that a security's value changes due to a change in interest rates. For example, a 
bond's price drops as interest rates rise."36 
The high capital-intensiveness of nuclear power makes it more sensitive than other technologies 
to the evolution of the interest rate, considering the large proportion of debt in the capital, the cost of 
capital is very affected by any change in the interest rate. 
5.2.2.Exchange rates risk 
Exchange rate risk is "also called currency risk, the risk of an investment's value changing 
because of currency exchange rates."37 
Some of the financial commitments for a power project may be subscribed in a currency that is 
not $US: investments, long-term contracts for fuel supply.. . As a result, a depreciation of the $US 
compared to other currencies would create a risk on the overall profitability of the project. 
5.2.3.Electricity price risk 
Electricity prices determine the level of revenues that a utility can achieve given the total output. 
Consequently, in case most of the off-take is sold on the spot market, the profitability of the company will 
be highly sensitive to variations in the price for electricity. 
It will be beneficial for a power plant to operate provided the price for electricity exceeds the 
marginal cost of production. As a result, a price drop would affect gas-fired plants more acutely because 
their operating costs are very high. Even if the price decreases, revenues are more likely to exceed 
operating costs for a nuclear power plant than for a CCGT: the NPP will operate while the CCGT might 
not. Even if the IOU owning the nuclear power plant does not generate sufficient revenue to ensure return 
on equity of investment bearing a certain level of risk, revenues may still be sufficient to provide debt 
repayment, which would prevent the IOU from bankruptcy.38 
5.2.4.Electricity demand risk 
Evaluating the growth rate of electricity demand is a complex issue. Demand for electric power is 
closely intertwined with the growth rate of the economy overall: one can choose to estimate that growth 
around 2% a year,'g and however reasonable that hypothesis may be, it still provides no certitude as to 
how high consumption from the industry will be, or how efficient energy efficiency policies will prove to 
be? The demand risk materializes when revenues are lower because the level of long-term demand for 
electricity does not enable full utilization of the plant. 
In a regulated context, operators in a monopolistic situation have a relatively good anticipation of 
demand, at least for baseload demand, that they can extrapolate from national consumption and their long 
term import and export contracts. 
In a deregulated context, however, when a utility chooses to invest in new capacity, the 
underlying hope is competitiveness, that is long-term production at costs below market prices and 
increasing market share. Consequently, the investment decision is closely related to market price signals - 
even though those prices themselves depend in reverse on the investment decisions of all operators. 
Investments in new capacity bear higher exposure because their profitability depends on a factor that is 
largely variable - the market price for electricity - and operators must anticipate future prices on the basis 
of future demand on a macroeconomic scale and the distribution among the various actors of the market." 
5.2.5.Fuel prices and supply risk 
For a given technology, the uncertainty about fuel price and the availability of supply generates a 
risk of losses incurred by the operator, or at least higher operating costs in case of fuel price spike or 
supply interruption. Consequently, the uncertainty on fuel price and supply directly impacts the 
competitiveness of a technology over the other. 
38 Zaleski & MCritet, 2004 
39 EIA, 2005a 
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In a competitive environment, should fossil-fuel prices increase, the profitability of nuclear power 
would increase. However, it is difficult to anticipate gas, coal or oil prices because they are highly related 
to technology advances and estimations of world reserves. 
Price volatility for gas is higher than for coal, which is in turn greater than that for uranium. 
Moreover, the proportion of fuel costs within the overall cost of production plays an important part. Fuel 
accounts for a much larger portion of power generation costs for gas-fired plants than for coal-fired or 
nuclear power plant (around 72% for CCGT versus 41% for coal and 19% for nuclear, consistently with 
earlier calculations). 
According to current forecasts, uranium supply, at least in the US, is stable, and it is unlikely that 
changes in uranium price would substantially affect the cost of nuclear power generation. Conversely, gas 
supply is at risk: transporting gas is an issue especially when done through pipelines. If the pipeline 
owner is unable to transport the gas because of geographic conditions, the gas-fired plant will be unable to 
operate. 
5.3. Technology-related risks 
5.3.1 .Transmission availability risk 
Electric power stations need the transmission network to be such that they can dispatch their 
production. If transmission is constrained for a power plant, the utility might lose revenues because the 
off-take of the plant's power production is reduced. Moreover, nuclear units are generally of a large size, 
which amplifies the potential problem arising from transmission capacity. 
5.3.2.Construction risk 
When undertaking a power plant project, there is always uncertainty due to the complex 
technologies involved that some of the costs or construction times might not have been properly 
estimated, or that additional costs and schedule delays might incur to the project. Construction, labor, and 
materials might generate uncertainty at the initial stages of the project. This is all the more true in case of 
a first-of-a-kind construction, lacking any previous experience. 
During the construction period, the more complex the building of the power plant is, and the 
higher the weight of the investment, the more serious the consequences of technological issues. As a 
result, a large premium will be attributed to power plants that have proven to be functioning with similar 
designs. In other words, new designs will be penalized." 
5.3.3.Technology and design risks 
Some risk bears upon the technology and design of the reactor. The source mainly lies within the 
possible failure or below-grade operating performance, potentially stemming from faulty design of the 
reactor and balance of the plant system. Should such risks materialize, the output will be reduced, and 
with it the revenues generated by the power plant. Consequently, investors must take this risk into 
account in their decision to build a power plant, and this risk includes nuclear power, considering the 
complexity of the technology that offers more chances of failure. 
5.3.4.Development and siting risk 
In the siting of the new power plant, investors might face unexpected costs when preparing 
construction, some of which coming from specific site designs. For nuclear reactors, there could be a high 
cost in trying to build at new sites rather than at existing sites. 
By choosing to build at non-greenfield sites, already hosting a nuclear unit, some of the siting risk 
would be offset. 
The Early Site Permit process is also supposed to prevent such shortcomings. 
5.3.5.0peration and maintenance risk 
Poor or inefficient management, operation, and maintenance of a reactor may result in increasing 
O&M costs. During operations, nuclear power plants implement innovating and complex technologies, at 
an even higher level than coal-fired or gas-fired power plants. Even with a long operating experience, as 
well as good ratings, risk premium and insurance have large fees. Those premiums would turn out even 
higher in case of a major technological change. 
5.4. Regulatory risks 
Regulations and their stability are very important before investment, especially in the case of a 
nuclear power plant. Shifts in regulations may affect critical phases of the development of a project. There 
are several types of uncertainties regarding regulations that could affect investment in power generation. 
Some of them bear upon any kind of project in electric power generation, and some are specific to nuclear 
power. 
5.4.1 .Construction, commissioning and licensing regulatory risks 
In large-scale power projects, there are specific regulatory measures regarding 'project 
development that have considerable impact on the investment decision. Those regulations may include 
siting, commissioning and licensing. Regulations influence the profitability of a project because of the 
time constraints and potential additional costs they may impose on the utility undertaking the new 
construction, should there be extended construction times or delays in the process. 
In the United States, regulatory changes have caused the decline of the nuclear power program, 
with frequent extensions in construction time and unpredicted costs. The accident at the Three Mile Island 
power plant has required regulations to change.43 
The United States has now implemented a new regulatory system that should lead to more 
stability and shorter construction times comparable to countries such as France and Japan. It involves 
Design Certification, Early Site Permits (ESP) and Combined Construction-Operating Licenses (COL), 
and will be later discussed in this study. 
5.4.2.Environmental regulations risk 
Although other sources of electric power do not face the same skepticism as nuclear power, 
public opinion and governments might impose measures regarding emissions. Those measures could be 
more or less binding for utilities, and concern S02, NOx, particulate matters as well as greenhouse gases. 
Policies could include the implementation of a carbon tax that would penalize C02 emissions (or 
any other type of tax on other emissions), tax credits for low-emitting power generation technologies, 
emissions trading.. . All the above measures would impose an additional cost on emission-intensive, and 
more specifically on carbon-intensive generation technologies. Nuclear energy being a pollution-free 
source of electricity would consequently become more attractive in such a context, as coal and gas would 
be penalized by additional costs. 
5.4.3.Safety regulations risk 
Safety measures represent a large portion of the operation and maintenance costs. Any accident 
or precursor event could awaken concern about the safety of power plants, and result in a change in safety 
regulations, thereby increasing the O&M costs. 
Conversely, the spreading of the use of "risk-informed regulations" would tend to reduce some of 
the maintenance costs based on the probabilistic risk of failure of certain components, and there is also a 
chance safety regulations might soften on a local basis. 
Consequently, safety regulatory changes represent a risk (positive or negative) which might affect 
the way an investor makes a decision for a nuclear power plant. 
5.4.4.Market regulations risk 
After the process of deregulation of the energy industries, there is still some uncertainty on 
whether some of the rules might evolve. 
There is a chance investment strategies might evaluate the risk of such changes. As an illustrative 
example, a threat to reduce the cap in SO2 emissions in the Acid Rain program would undoubtedly affect 
the behavior in investment in emission control technologies. Similar considerations can be made for 
investment in nuclear power or other new power plants in the US. 
5.4.5.Fiscal risk 
The uncertainty inherent to a fiscal policy is that tax rates could change at any moment, thereby 
affecting the expected profitability of an investment. Although it might not bear a very high probability in 
the United States, there are countries where investment is largely affected by fiscal risk. 
5.4.6.Waste disposal and decommissioning risk 
The uncertainty bearing upon waste storage and disposal as well as on decommissioning relates to 
the costs for disposing of spent fuel and, to a lesser degree, low-level waste, as well as the costs for 
decommissioning. 
Waste management is a very important risk to be covered for the investor, Final waste 
management is normally the responsibility of public authorities. Even without a new project, existing 
radioactive waste should be dealt with. If the public authorities deal with the waste, it is natural that they 
should charge the utility for waste storage and disposal, and even the decommissioning of the plant at the 
end of its life? 
Regulations in the US are currently designed so that a utility undertaking a new project must 
provision decommissioning funds to a certain amount. There are still some technical and regulatory 
uncertainties on those issues and uncertainty about the fee, which puts the investor in a difficult position, 
considering the decommissioning funds have to be saved initially. Moreover, managing the saved funds 
might turn out to be an issue for the utility. The United Kingdom had to face the problem when it turned 
out that all of the decommissioning funds had been invested in high risk and high return stocks during the 
internet bubble, and that a reasonable portion of the invested capital was lost. 
Investors are required to save a relatively small amount of money initially for future 
decommissioning. As a result, even with large premiums to cover risk, such charges have a small impact 
on the investment decision. 
5.4.7.Accident risk 
After the accidents occurred in 1979 at the Three Mile Island nuclear power station and in 1986 at 
the Chernobyl nuclear power station, concerns have arisen about the safety of nuclear energy. In any case, 
the risk incurred by investors relates to third party liability and the costs of remediation and recovery in 
case of a major accident, force majeure, or terrorist incident. 
In 1957, Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act, which provides for payment of public liability 
claims in the event of a nuclear incident. The act provides an umbrella of insurance protection, and it 
ensured that enough money would be available to pay liability claims that could result from a major 
nuclear accident or attack.45 
44 Zaleski & MCritet, 2004 
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5.5. Other sources of risk and uncertainty 
5.5.1 .Country risk 
"The financial risks of a transaction that relate to the political, economic, or social instability of 
the country of the debtor, and is over and above the credit risk of the borrower"46 
5.5.2.Climate risk 
Wind farms have the highest exposure to climate risk in their operating requirements. Indeed, the 
strength and steadiness of the wind is most important for the efficiency of a wind farm. The intermittency 
of the wind impedes the full competitiveness of wind power technologies. As a result, wind farm 
operators must cover themselves against that risk. 
Moreover, the recurrence of climate disorders and the increased frequency of natural disasters that 
seem to form into patterns increase the risks of system failure in general: hydraulic resources shortages, 
heat waves or cold waves, electric wires wrenching...). This can also explain the progressive 
implementation of climate derivatives markets.47 
5.5.3.Force majeure risk 
The financial definition of a force majeure risk is a risk "that there will be prolonged interruption 
of operations for a project finance enterprise due to fire, flood, storm, or some other factor beyond the 
control of the project's sponsors."48 The factors could include natural disasters, strikes, civil wars.. . 
46 http://www.tefo.org/trdde-finance-gIossasy/c. htlnl 
47 Esnault. 2002 
5.5.4.Legal risk 
Legal risk is "risk from uncertainty due to legal actions or uncertainty in the applicability or 
interpretation of contracts, laws or regulations.'" Legal risk highly depends on an institution's 
circumstances, but it generally entails issues such as potential bankruptcy from legal proceedings, 
application of the terms included in a contract, choice of the legal system if there are discrepancies across 
entities involved in the transaction, mediation and arbitration systems, ex-post renegotiation of a 
contract. . . 
5.5.5.Political risk 
Generally speaking, political risk is the "risk that a country's government will suddenly change its 
policies."50 It is measured by the consistency of government policies and the quality of economic 
management. Elements like foreign debt or foreign exchange reserve are taken into account. This 
category of risk includes changes that could occur in the political system and that would question the 
initial hypotheses of the investment, such as taxation rate, foreign currency control and circulation of 
capital, laws on the participation of foreign companies in the capital of local firms, sovereign risks of 
expropriation or nationalization, etce5 
For an investor, it is essential to evaluate the political authorities' attitude and its stability when 
deciding on whether to finance any technology-based project, all the more for a power project. When the 
sector in question is deregulated, profitability is a key factor and the impact of bad investment decisions 
bears upon the investors, hence the necessity of stable political orientations. In extreme cases, the project 
will not receive the permits and licenses necessary for operation. Otherwise, operations might be 
interrupted or delayed, thereby preventing the project from being unprofitable. Construction can be 
delayed, due to new regulatory provisions that make the licensing process stricter or that increase 
operating costs. Those issues are all the more intense for nuclear power investment because of both its 
capital intensiveness and the opposing opinions. The future of nuclear power clearly depends on the pro- 
or anti-nuclear attitude adopted by the government.52 
There are countries that chose to renounce the nuclear option. Among those countries, some were 
not operating any nuclear power plant, and some simply opted out of nuclear with a profitable and 
" http://www.riskglossar~.com/linklle~al risk.htm 
" htt~://~~~.investopedia.comlterms/~/~oliticalrisk.as~ 
" Pignon & Tarbe, 2004 
52 Zaleski & MCritet, 2004 
operating nuclear fleet. Examples can be found in Sweden, Germany and Belgium. Those decisions to 
stop all nuclear operations can be maintained if the political majority in power at the time of the decision 
remains, or be overruled if the majority changes. Those public attitude changes will highly depend on 
whether no-nuclear energy policies can function in a sustainable manner, especially on an economic and 
environmental standpoint, as well as on whether nuclear-inclusive energy policies succeed.53 
Obviously, when the political majority is against any nuclear power program, no new nuclear 
power plant will be built. However, potential investors must evaluate the risk related to any change in the 
attitude of the political authority. In the US, had A1 Gore been elected for President in 2000, any hope of a 
new nuclear energy program would have been in vain in the short run, whereas, although not decided yet, 
George W. Bush is favorable to the nuclear option and there is some hope it might lead to new 
investmend4 
The necessity for the investor to appropriately evaluate the probability of a change in public 
attitude towards nuclear power is even higher during the period between the beginning of construction 
and the beginning of operation. After operation has started, there is a lower chance that the government 
might require closure and decommissioning of the plant. In Germany, any operating plant is authorized to 
continue operation until the end of the payback period." In contrast, other sources of electric power, even 
fossil-fuel power generation, do not face the same risk of a ban. 
5.5.6.Public acceptance risk 
For obvious reasons, the attitude political authorities adopt towards a technology is highly 
influenced by public opinion. Regarding public opinion matters, nuclear power has a string disadvantage 
compared to other power generation technologies. There are individuals and organizations utterly 
opposed to nuclear energy for various reasons regarding accident risks, the long term liability of 
radioactive waste, proliferation concerns, etc. Those fundamental disagreements are very difficult to 
argue and technological development can barely offset the concerns of such entities. Moreover, such 
opposition often holds a very wide media broadcast: consequently, they can result in public opinion 
swings at times when nuclear power programs are being discussed. 
As was discussed above, there are countries, such as Germany, where pubic opinion was in such 
disfavor against nuclear energy, that the government had to pass bills to opt out of nuclear power. Such 
53 Zaleski & Meritet, 2004 
" Zaleski & Meritet, 2004 
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political decisions can be either maintained even if public opinion evolves in favor of nuclear power. In 
Sweden for instance, operation of nuclear power plants proved to be a success, and public opinion 
changed. Like any political decision, there can be underlying agreements between political entities 
involving related issues and which compromise over nuclear energy matters.% 
5.6. Effect of nuclear-specific risks on investments 
As a consequence of a number of risks characterized above, the assumptions of the base-case 
scenario for calculations of levelized costs of electricity are subject to uncertainties. Therefore, it is useful 
to conduct sensitivity analyses in order to determine the impact of different assumptions on the cost of 
producing electricity. 
As a first step, the most critical input assumptions were tested: some of the key assumptions are 
varied by 5% and the change in levelized costs of electricity is calculated. The results of this analysis are 
displayed below for the nuclear power, coal (pulverized coal) and gas (combined cycle). 
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Figure 23 - Sensitivity of LCOE to a 5% change in key assumptions - Nuclear 
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Figure 24 - Sensitivity of LCOE to a 5% change in key assumptions - Coal 
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Figure 25 - Sensitivity of LCOE to a 5% change in key assumptions - Gas 
The results of this analysis show the relative importance of a change in important elements of the 
LCOE calculations. 
The costs of production for nuclear power are extremely sensitive to capacity factor and capital 
cost variations. Since the ratio of capital costs to short term marginal costs is higher than for other 
technologies, it was predictable that a variation in capacity factor would affect all positive cash flows and 
have a large impact on marginal benefits. Because annualized capital costs represent around 75% of 
LCOE, it is no surprise either that uncertainty in capital costs propagates to a large extent as well. This 
also explains why LCOE is not highly sensitive to fuel cost variations, as fuel costs account for a much 
smaller share of production costs. 
Coal-fired power generation is, to a lesser extent, capital intensive, which explains similar trends 
in sensitivity to capacity factor and capital costs. Fuel representing a larger share in coal-fired electricity 
production, it was also likely to have a larger impact than in the case of nuclear power. 
Last, gas has much lower capital costs, which explains why a small variation in capital costs or 
capacity factor has little impact on LCOE. Fuel costs are the largest cost item in gas-fired power 
generation: as a result, LCOE are very sensitive to fuel prices. This also explains why gas prices are a 
very important element of the investment decision in nuclear power: high increases in natural gas prices 
could greatly contribute in making nuclear power cost-competitive with gas-fired electricity production. 
5.7. Comparison with other studies 
Several studies have been published to assess the economics of nuclear power, and there are 
conflicting views on whether nuclear energy is competitive over time with other baseload options. 
A study by the Ministry of Economy, Finance, and Industry in France supporting the Flamanville 
projects has recently concluded that nuclear energy was the lowest-cost option. 
In the United States, the MIT study and the University of Chicago Study concluded nuclear power 
was more expensive than other sources. The Canadian Energy Research Institute and the Royal Academy 
of Engineering in the United Kingdom have also assessed the economics of nuclear power. 
The disagreement between the studies is essentially due to differing assumptions regarding 
nuclear plants capital costs and capacity factors, and most importantly discount rate and cost of capital. 
Regional variations in the fuel price and labor costs also play an important role. 
Moreover, Page: 71 
an important explicit assumption of the MIT study is that the cost calculations were carried out for 
conditions appropriate to merchant plant investments. Those conditions have significant consequences on 
the general economic and financial environment. Conversely, the studies by the French Ministry of 
Economy, Finance, and Industry and by the Royal Academy of Engineering assume investments are made 
by the public sector (in France, Electricit6 de France). Other studies do not explicitly state equivalent 
assumptions. 
All studies agree on the fact that if fossil fuel prices continue to rise, the competitiveness of 
nuclear power will be improved. 
Also, European assessments of nuclear power economics now also must include the price of C02 
allowances under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, which began in January 2005. Long-term prices are 
uncertain for many reasons, but emissions are currently trading at around 17 euroslton of C02. The 
competitiveness of nuclear energy is improved relative to fossil fuels. It is supposed to have been a factor 
in the Finnish decision to build a fifth nuclear reactor. 
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Figure 26 - Summary of Recently Published Studies of Nuclear Power Costs 
Source: MIT, University of Chicago, CERI, Royal Academy of Engineering, DGEMP~~  
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" Direction Gtntrale des Energie et Matibres Premibres, office of the French Ministry of Economy, Finance, and 
Industry in charge of energy and raw materials 
6. Nuclear power worldwide - the nuclear option is still open 
6.1. Worldwide historic trends and prospects for new nuclear construction 
6.1.1. Growing momentum in nuclear reactor construction 
As of 2005, 31 countries were operating 439 nuclear plants for electricity generation, for a total 
net installed capacity of 366 GWe, and nuclear energy represented around 16% of the world's electricity 
generation. 
In absolute value, nuclear energy seems to be growing worldwide. Whereas a nuclear comeback 
is still debated in the United States, the following graph shows that, in spite of a slow-down at the end of 
the 1980s, nuclear power was never abandoned. 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has significantly increased its projected 
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worldwide nuclear generahng kapacityp3 bringing it to at least 60 new plants in the next 15 years, making 
430 GW in place in 2020. It would bring capacity 17% higher than existing capacity in 2005. 
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Figure 27 - Historical growth in global nuclear capacity and the IAEA's high projections 
Source: McDonald, 2005 
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Figure 28 - Regional dbMbutiaa of global nuclear capacity in the IAEA's high projection 
Source: McDonald, 2004 
The projection revisions are based on specific plans and actions taken in countries like China, 
India, Russia, Finland and France, along with the new perspectives attributable to the Kyoto Protocol. 
This would give nuclear power a 17% share in electricity production in 2020 (16% in 2005). 
Asia has bem most eager to pursue nuclear power programs over the past decade, and represent a 
large portion of the curnnt growth in the nuclear industry. Western Europe and North America also seem 
to show a regain of intacst towards nuclear electricity generation. 
Global Nuclear Capacity Additions 
South Africa Pakistan 
Canada 
3% 
Finland 
3% 
Ukraine ---- 
3% 
Korea DPR (North)/ 
3% 
China: ~aiwan / 
4% 
Korea RO (South) 
1 5% 
Figure 29 - Flanned Global Nuclear Net CIIpadty Additi8as (60 GWe in totsl) 
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In the 19508, the initial developments of h e  civilian use of nuclear energy were led by the United 
States and a subset of Western European couatrim. Since the 1990s. however, while the nuclear pioneers 
progressively stopped adding nuclear capacity. other couneics, w f f h g  energy crises since the 19708, 
took on the nuclear option, most notably among Asian nations. 
For mans of comparison, North America and Western Europe accounted for 87% of the nuclear 
power capacity built in the 1960s, 77% in the 1970s, and 71% in the 1980s and down to 44% in-the 
* , 3 . , . , -  ' 
. . 1990s. Since 2000, not a single nuclear power plat has gone online in either region. I $ 
Thirtyone countries now have commercial nuclear powa reactors in operation, and thirtycight 
countries are opaating, building or proposing nuclear capacity. As of September 2005, almost 60 GW of 
new nuclear capacity in 17 countries is currently on order or un&r construction, and an additional 64 GW 
have been proposed. 
Figure 30 - Nuclear Power Plants Operating and Under Construction 
Source: World Nuclear Association, 2005 
6.1.2.Substantial constructions in Asia 
Operating Nuclear Generation Under Construction Additions Target 
(GW) Share (%) (GW) (GW) 
China 6.6 2 2.0 30 by 2020 
India 2.6 3 4.1 18 by 2020 
Japan 45.5 25 3.2 15 by 2015 
Russia 21.7 17 1.9 15-25 by 2020 
South Korea 16.8 40 0.0 10 by 2015 
Figure 31 - Countries with Substantial Targets 
Source: World Nuclear Association, 2005 
China has 9 nuclear reactors and 6.6 GW in operation. 2 GW are currently under construction, 
and the nuclear power program aims at bringing an additional 30 GW of new nuclear capacity online 
before 2020, using both foreign and indigenous designs. Government approval has been granted for about 
one third of the 30 GW, and China is now reviewing bids for four pressurized water reactors. Contracts 
should be awarded in fall 2005. 
Japan - despite recent problems at operating reactors - plans to expand its nuclear program. With 
an installed capacity of 45.5 GW, Japan currently has three reactors for a total of 2.4 GW under 
construction. Moreover, 15 GW are on order or scheduled to go online before 2015, some of which are 
currently undergoing government approval. Recent nuclear accidents and safety scandals have 
deteriorated public acceptance of nuclear power in Japan. Early in 2001, slow demand growth led the 
major utility TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Company) to postpone plans for twelve major fossil fuel 
plants but maintained its schedule for four new nuclear plants.64 
India has nine reactors under construction and expected to be completed by 2010. From the 2.6 
GW currently in operation, and 4.1 GW under construction, the plan is to expand the current fleet to 20 
GW by 2020. A few early plants used American and Canadian designs. New plants, on the contrary, will 
be either of Indian-design (heavy water reactors) or Russian-built (PWRS).~' 
Russia has engaged in an expansion plan to build 15 to 25 GW of new nuclear capacity by 2020. 
After retrofitting or shutting down the Chernobyl-type plants, Russia has 21.7 GW in operation. The five 
reactors under construction add up to 4.5 GW, due for completion in 2010. New construction includes a 
750 MW fast breeder reactor. This will increase Russia's nuclear power capacity to 50 GW. Construction 
of a sixth plant has been halted because of lack of funds. Russia also plans five reactors to replace existing 
units at Leningrad, Novovoronezh, and Kursk. 
64 WNA, 2005a 
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This will possibly change as a result of the proposed new bilateral agreement for cooperation between the US and 
India. 
South Korea has steadily built up its nuclear power capability and fleet over the past three 
decades. It has 15.9 GW in operation and plans to bring an additional 10 GW online by 2015 with nine 
new reactors. South Korea used US, Canadian and French designs before 1990and has developed its own 
designs thanks to technology transfer. 
In Iran, nuclear power plant construction was suspended in 1979, but an agreement with Russia 
was signed in 1995 to complete a 1000 MWe PWR at Bushehr. Construction is well advanced and a 
further unit is planned. Iran's uranium enrichment program has become the central point of contention 
with Europe and the United States, over whether it is pursuing nuclear weapons. 
In addition, nations as diverse as Pakistan, South Africa, Argentina, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt 
and Turkey have shown interest in nuclear power.66 Pakistan intends to build a new 300 MWe reactor at 
Chasma, and the government has signed a contract with China for construction and financing. Argentina 
is developing plans to complete the stalled Atucha-2 reactor. Indonesia has completed the feasibility study 
for its first 1800 MWe nuclear power station. Vietnam is also considering its first nuclear power venture, 
and Egypt and Turkey have for decades included a nuclear power plant in their electricity plans. 
66 WNA, 2005a 
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6.2. Comparison with investment in other technologies 
To understand the extent to which nuclear power is gaining momentum internationally, it is 
relevant to consider other sources of electric power and the pace at which their construction is expected to 
occur in the coming years. The International Energy ~ u t l o o k ~ ~  carries out such projections, and the 
following discussion is based on the results from their 2005 report. 
In 2002, worldwide electricity generation capacity was 3,315 GW. In order to meet the projected 
electricity demand between 2002 and 2025 (end of the forecast period), the installed capacity will have to 
grow to 5,495 GW in 2025, with a compound annual growth rate of 2.2%. 
Since the beginning of the 1980s, high world oil prices lead to increased use of natural gas and 
nuclear power, and to reinforce coal-fired electricity generation. The IE02005 reference case expects 
increased use of natural gas for electricity generation to continue. Coal is expected to retain the largest 
market share for electricity generation, though it will decrease in favor of gas-fired power generation. 
Hydropower and other renewable energy sources are projected to grow by 54% between 2002 and 2025, 
maintaining their share of total electricity generation near the current level of 18%. 
Fuel Shares of World Electricity Generation 
'' EIA, 2005b 
Figure 32 - Fuel Shares of World Electricity Generation 
Source: International Energy Outlook, 2005 
Despite the argument made in the preceding section, nuclear power should see its role reduced, 
from 16.6% in 2002 to 13.2% in 2025. Some new reactors are expected to be added over the forecast 
period, mostly in the emerging and transitional economies, but it is not projected to maintain the share of 
nuclear electricity generation at current levels. One can argue that the forecast is from 2002, and that 
some countries which were not expected to take on a new nuclear power program did, or that other 
countries with active civilian nuclear energy have declared their intention to build more nuclear capacity. 
7. Qualification of recent developments impacting potential new investments in nuclear power 
7.1. Growing public acceptance of potential new nuclear power constructions 
We have already discussed the importance of public opinion when considering new power plant 
projects. In the United States, the general public has long been skeptical about nuclear power. According 
to the MIT a majority of Americans approve the continued use of nuclear power, but oppose the 
building of new nuclear power plants. Although public opinion has softened since the accident at the 
Three Mile Island accident in 1979, there is still a strong public concern. More specifically, there is still a 
large majority of people opposing the construction of a new nuclear power plant within 25 miles from 
their dwelling. The most important factors weighing upon public attitude are in decreasing order of 
importance: 
Perceived environmental harm caused by nuclear power; 
Safety performances and waste disposal issues; 
Perceived costs associated with nuclear power; 
Concerns about global warming. 
The evidence from the MIT survey also suggests that a public information campaign to change 
perceptions might not be enough to change public opinion. 
However, a more recent survey carried out for the Nuclear Energy Institute by Bisconti Research 
69 Inc. in 2005 shows that public acceptance has grown over the years, and that 70%of the US population 
are now in favor of nuclear power, and only 24 percent oppose it. Moreover, 69% of the population finds 
it acceptable to build new nuclear power plants if it is required by increased electricity needs. 58% said 
that new nuclear plants should definitely be built, and 74% wanted the option to build new plants to be 
kept open. More than three times as many strongly supported nuclear energy than strongly opposed it. 
Two thirds of self-described environmentalists favor it. This trend is quite homogeneous region by region. 
The general public is favorable to public policies regarding nuclear power such as investment incentives 
(64%) and public-private partnerships (80%). 
The strong momentum for support of nuclear energy comes from near unanimous belief in the 
future importance of nuclear energy; awareness of nuclear energy's clean-air benefits, efficiency and 
reliability; and growing confidence in nuclear power plant safety. 
MIT, 2003 
69 Bisconti, 2005 
Public Opinion towards Nuclear Power, 1984-2005 
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Figure 33 - Public Opinion towards Nuclear Power, 1984-2005 
Source: Bisconti Research, July 2005 
7.2. Yucca Mountain and the issue of nuclear waste disposal in the US 
7.2.1 .US need for radioactive waste disposal 
Radioactive waste disposal is an unavoidable issue for nuclear power. Establishing long-term 
disposal solutions for spent nuclear fuel and low-level radioactive waste is indispensable. Indeed, spent 
nuclear fuel rods are intensely radioactive after they have been removed from the reactor core. The rods 
are then stored for cooling in large pools, which remove heat and block radiation. After several years, 
rods can be removed from the pool to be placed for long-term storage in large concrete casks. The latter 
solution has been widely used as the pools have been filling up over the years. 
In the United States, the efforts to solve the radioactive waste issue have been stalled and nearly 
50,000 metric tons of uranium from spent nuclear fuel is currently stored. Of the 103 nuclear reactors 
operating in the United States, approximately 50 reactors will exhaust on-site pool storage capacity for 
used nuclear fuel by the end of 2005 and will have to consider other storage measures that will be costly 
to consumers. 
Figure 34 - 52 P h b  Will R w ~  Out of Used Fbel Stomp by 2005 
Source: Nuelear Energy Institute 
Like many other nations, the United States has determined that spent nuclear fuel should be 
disposed of in a permanent geologic repository. Yucca Mountain, adjacent to the nuclear weapons test 
range near Las Vegas, Nevada, was formally chosen as the site when Congress ratified a decision by 
President George W. Bush in 2002. 
7.2.2.The Yucca Mountain project 
After the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Congress assigned the Department of Energy (DOE) 
to the responsibility for managing used fuel from the nation's nuclear power plants and high-level 
radioactive waste from U.S. defense programs by building a disposal facility. Additionally, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) was charged with establishing regulations and licensing construction, 
operation and closure of the repository. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was assigned to set 
public health and safety standards for the operation of a repository. The 1982 legislation called for two 
repositories. 
The federal government's waste program was to be financed by a tax levied on electricity 
generated by nuclear power. Since 1983, nearly $24 billion has been committed to the Nuclear Waste 
Fund by consumers of electricity from nuclear power plants. DOE signed contracts with electricity 
companies agreeing to accept the used fuel at a repository, beginning in 1998. Consequently, in 1985, 
EPA promulgates 40 CFR 191 health and safety standards and NRC issues 10 CFR 60 generic licensing 
standards. 
In 1983, DOE undertook preliminary studies of nine sites in six states. The conclusions of DOE 
were three recommendations, among which the Yucca Mountain site. In 1986, however, Yucca Mountain 
was ranked first by DOE because of the protective features offered by the aridity and remoteness of the 
site. The literature on Yucca Mountain suggests that the site was picked on the basis of "politics". Indeed, 
the State of Nevada is represented in Congress by a relatively small congressional delegation, and is 
outnumbered by other states. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 is amended in 1987, selecting the 
Yucca Mountain Site for more extensive site characterization, emphasizing the need for a second 
repository on or after January 1, 2007, but no later than January 1,2010. 
In the following years, the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management Program faced changing 
legislative mandates, regulatory modifications, fluctuating funding levels, and the evolving and often 
conflicting needs and expectations of diverse interest groups. The different were realizing the complexity 
and the costs of the challenge. It seemed that many of the initial expectations would not be met. 
In 1992, the Energy Policy Act required EPA to set standards for Yucca Mountain based on 
National Academy of Sciences recommendations, and directed NRC to make technical requirements 
consistent with EPA rule. In 2001, EPA issued 40 CFR 197 to limit radiation doses received by the public 
from the planned high-level waste disposal facility at Yucca Mountain. The standards set a 15 millirems 
per year dose limit for the first 10,000 years after the facility was closed. 
In 1996, a coalition of state utility regulators, attorneys general and utilities with nuclear plants 
from more than 20 states filed suit to force DOE to take the used fuel. The U.S. Court of Appeals 
reaffirmed DOE'S legal obligation to begin accepting used fuel in 1998. Following that ruling, federal 
courts have continued to hold DOE accountable to its fuel acceptance deadline based on various legal 
principles. Since 1998, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims ruled on several occasions that DOE breached its 
contract to begin used fuel acceptance. Unforeseen expenses at short-term storage sites and damages 
represent a potential taxpayer liability of more than $56 billion. In August 2004, Exelon Corp. settled a 
few cases with DOE related to this liability, and Exelon is to receive an initial payment of $80 million and 
continue to collect additional damages each year until DOE removes the used fuel from the company's 
plant sites.70 
In 2002, Congress approved the Yucca Mountain site, and the president signed into law a 
resolution designating Yucca Mountain as the site of a federal repository for used nuclear fuel and high- 
level radioactive waste from defense programs. This decision was later supported by State governors, 
legislators, utility commissioners, and consumer and citizen organizations. Indeed, the Yucca Mountain 
project is believed by many as an important milestone in meeting the nation's environmental, energy and 
national security goals. 
After Congress and Presidential approval, DOE needs to place its effort in obtaining licenses from 
NRC to build and operate a repository. Completion of the application is close and a license application to 
the NRC should be submitted soon. The framework by which the NRC will assess the Yucca Mountain 
application is based on the same risk-informed, performance-based principles that the industry has applied 
in building its improvements in safety performance. 
DOE is years behind in meeting its commitment to electricity ratepayers. Since presidential and 
congressional approvals of Yucca Mountain in 2002, Nevada has been trying to challenge the decision. In 
July 2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C., issued decisions on a group of such 
consolidated cases. In its rulings, the appeals court rejected all of Nevada's claims, except its challenge 
regarding the 10,000-year compliance period for meeting EPA regulatory requirements to protect the 
public from radiation exposure. The court ruled that a scientific report requested by Congress in 1992 
favored a period longer than the 10,000-year compliance. The federal government was given two options: 
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reinstating the 10,000-year compliance period by legislation or revising the EPA regulations to address 
longer time frames. To ensure safety beyond 10,000 years to 1 million years, EPA has proposed a 
separate, higher dose limit based on natural background radiation levels that people currently live with in 
the U.S. (350 millirems). 
At the end of 2004, DOE announced the submission of a license application to the NRC was 
delayed, and that the 2010 deadline for accepting used fuel from reactor owners and operators would not 
be met. Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman committed to submit the license application in 2005. 
7.2.3.Yucca Mountain is not a show-stopper 
According to NEI", delay is not critical for the operation of existing reactors or the construction 
of new ones. Completing the Yucca Mountain project is very important, especially in the perspective of 
regaining public acceptance. But the existing fleet can operate and new plants can be built even if Yucca 
Mountain is delayed until 2020 or later. Onsite storage remains a viable option, and will be necessary 
even if spent fuel is stored at Yucca Mountain very soon. 
Moreover, Yucca Mountain's capacity is limited by statute to a total of 70,000 tons of heavy 
metal. As of 2005, there are about 50,000 metric tons of commercial used nuclear fuel and about 12,000 
metric tons of defense high-level radioactive waste awaiting disposal at Yucca Mountain. An additional 
2,000 metric tons is generated each year. DOE expects to begin receiving up to 3,000 metric tons a year 
of used fuel beginning in 2016; the 70,000 metric ton political limit will not be reached until at least 2040. 
In total, approximately 120,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel and high-level defense waste are lined 
up for geologic disposal. The number varies for it depends on reactor operating license renewals, potential 
early closures, and foreign research reactor fuel of US origin. Some believe that plutonium from 
dismantled nuclear weapons may be mixed with radioactive waste and placed in the repository. 
Nevertheless, the capacity of a repository at the Yucca Mountain site has been determined 
politically, not scientifically. Congress chose to limit the capacity of the Yucca Mountain repository to 
70,000 metric tons of heavy metal or equivalent in the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act. One of the reasons 
for this capacity limitation is the intention to keep a balance between the Eastern and the Western part of 
the country: by limiting capacity at Yucca Mountain, Congress expected that another site would be 
chosen near the East Coast to welcome high-level radioactive waste as well. 
Scientific analysis demonstrates that the Yucca Mountain site is physically capable of holding 
much more used fuel than the politically-determined capacity. The Environmental Impact Statement 
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conducted by the Department of Energy showed that the site could safely dispose of 120,000 metric tons. 
Some scientists even believe that repository capacity could be extended to 200,000 metric tons. 
The decision will remain in the hands of Congress as to whether it wants to authorize a second 
repository or increase the capacity at Yucca Mountain. According to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 
1982, DOE will report to Congress between 2007 and 2010 on the need for a second national repository. 
In any case, spent fuel from new reactors would not be sent to the repository for many years. 
Indeed, Yucca Mountain will accept the oldest, coolest fuel first to avoid the risks of remaining decay 
heat that would degrade canisters. Fuel from a new reactor would be last in line for disposal. Thus the 
timing of Yucca Mountain completion has little practical impact on new nuclear reactors. 
7.3. The new NRC regulatory process 
7.3.1.Before vs. After 
The vast majority of the US commercial nuclear plants were licensed during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Commercial nuclear energy was new, and the regulatory process evolved along with the new industry. 
Under 10 CFR Part 5 0 7  nuclear plants were issued a construction permit based on a preliminary design. 
An operating license was granted only after construction was complete and hundreds of millions of 
dollars (in some cases billions) had been spent. 
A major flaw in the licensing and construction process was that construction permits were issued 
on the basis of designs that were neither standardized nor complete, and safety issues were not fully 
resolved until the plant was essentially complete. In many cases, only 10% of the design was complete at 
the construction permit stage. The old process often involved significant rework and redesign. 
Furthermore, after the Three Mile Island accident of 1979, NRC required design changes to plants 
under construction before they could be licensed to operate. Options for addressing these issues during 
construction were limited and costly, resulting in delays and cost overruns. Indeed, once the plant was 
built, it had to receive a license to operate. During that period, the facility stood idle, while the licensing 
p r o d i n g  progressed. In some cases, projects took 10-plus years to complete, and overruns reached 
several billion dollars. Hence, the process was clearly inefficient. 
I Constructior License 
Figure 35 - Old Process: The two-step licensing process (10 CFR 50) 
Source: Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Note: In this sequential process, regulatory reviews were overlapping: Process was inefficient, unpredictable and invited abuse. 
The last phase, post-building was an opportunity for intervention, hearings and delay. 
In 1989, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established a new licensing process - 10 
CFR Part 5273 - in order to address flaws in the licensing process. In the 1992 Energy Policy Act, 
Congress affirmed and strengthened the new licensing process. 
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Figure 36 - New Process: Combined licensing process (10 CFR 52) 
Source: Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Note: In this process, all regulatory reviews are completed before major capital investment at risk. Potential for delay 
significantly reduced. There is an opportunity for public comment at the COL phase, and an opportunity for hearing at the 
ITAAC phase, but the threshold is very high 
The new process is intended to move the bulk of licensing and safety issues to the beginning of 
the process, ahead of construction, through three components: 
Design Certification; 
Early site permits (ESP); 
Combined construction permits and operating licenses (COL). 
To ensure that a company builds a new plant according to its license, the NRC introduced 
ITAAC, a process that determines which kinds of inspections, tests, analyses and acceptance criteria it 
will use to ensure the plant is built according to the design approved in the licensing proceedings. 
7.3.1.1. Design Certification 
The approval of standard design process allows for plant designers to secure advance NRC 
approval of standard plant designs. Later, these plant designs can be ordered, licensed for a particular site 
and built. 
Following an exhaustive NRC safety review, agency approval of standard designs is formalized 
via a specific design certification rulemaking. This process allows the public to review and comment on 
the designs up front-before any construction begins. NRC design certification fully resolves safety 
issues associated with the design. The NRC approves the design for 15 years. 
To date, the NRC has certified three plant designs. Work is proceeding toward certification of a 
fourth design, and the industry expects at least three new designs to begin the certification process in the 
next three years. The advanced designs considered for new investments will be later discussed. 
Standardization offers significant benefits. It means that reactors will be built in families of the 
same design, except for a limited number of site-specific differences. Standardization will reduce 
construction and operating costs, and lead to greater efficiencies and simplicity in nuclear plant 
operations, including safety, maintenance, training, and spare parts procurement. 
There is international experience of standardization choices. The French nuclear program is based 
on standardized nuclear plant designs. Over nearly two decades, France built 34 standardized 900-MWe 
(megawatts of electric power) reactors and 20 1,300-MWe reactors, which now supply about 75 percent 
of the country's electricity. 
7.3.1.2. Early Site Permit 
The early site permit (ESP) process enables companies to obtain approval from the NRC for a 
nuclear power plant site before deciding to build a plant. The process resolves any site suitability issues 
before companies commit funds to a project. 
Companies can "bank" sites approved by the NRC for up to 20 years and build when the time is 
right. Having a pre-approved site can dramatically shorten the time to bring a new plant to market. 
ESP applications consist of three components: 
A site safety analysis; 
An environmental report; 
Emergency planning information. 
Federal, state and local government officials and the public have opportunities to participate in 
each of these at various stages during the NRC review process. 
An ESP review process encompasses a range of reactor designs. Companies are enabled to select 
the best design when they proceed with a decision to build. 
The concept of "plant parameters envelope" concept allows the NRC to assess the suitability of a 
site based on a generalized plant description that takes into account the characteristics of several designs - 
for example, the height of the tallest building and the greatest cooling water requirement for any design 
under consideration. 
7.3.1.3. Combined Construction and Operating License 
10 CFR 52 provides for issuance of a combined construction permit and operating license, also 
known as a combined construction and operating license (COL). A COL may reference a certified design, 
an ESP or both. 
All issues resolved in connection with earlier proceedings associated with a standard design or 
site will be considered resolved for purposes of the COL proceeding. This makes the process more 
efficient by allowing the NRC review and a public hearing for a COL to focus on remaining issues related 
to plant ownership, design issues not resolved earlier, and organization and operational programs. 
Moreover, granting a COL signifies resolution of all safety issues associated with the plant. 
Neither ESP nor COL commits anyone to build anything, but they will expedite future plans for new 
build. 
Whether the constructed plant conforms to the requirements of the license and is ready to operate 
can obviously not be addressed up front. For this, 10 CFR 52 provides the ITAAC process, which 
specifies the inspections, tests, analyses and acceptance criteria that will be used to assess the completed 
plant. 
ITAAC are quantitative indicators agreed upon during the design certification process and in the 
combined license. They then will be used during construction to determine that the constructed plant 
conforms to its licensing requirements. They allow the NRC to verify that a plant is built to specifications 
and they allow the project developer to prove that the plant is built to specifications. They are formally 
incorporated into COL. If the standards are met, there are no grounds for hearings, and there will be no 
delay after COL is issued. 
7.3.2.Impact of the new process 
7.3.2.1. Benefits from the new process 
All regulatory approvals are moved to the front of the process. Issues related to safety are 
resolved as soon as possible, and the license is issued at the start, not at the end. Consequently, the design 
will likely be about 90% complete before construction starts. 
Although the new process has more steps, more information is available to the public earlier and 
issues are resolved early in the development. This allows for higher levels of certainty for investments. 
Even if delays occur for various reasons, this will happen at the front-end of the procedure, before 
construction begins, i.e. before significant capital investment is at risk. 
There are opportunities for delays in the ITAAC phase, when inspections, tests and confirmatory 
analyses are performed to ensure that the facility has been built in accordance with the design, but the 
industry believes there is a low probability that this will happen. 
The benefits from the new process are summarized in the following table designed by the Nuclear 
Energy Institute. 
Figure 37 - Nuclear Plant Licensing: "Then and NOW" 
Source: Nuclear Energy Institute, 2005" 
Then 
Changing regulatory 
standards and requirements 
No design standardization 
Inefficient construction practices 
Design as you build 
Multiple opportunities to intervene, cause delay 
Technology still evolving 
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Now 
More stable process: NRC approves site and 
design, single license to build and operate, 
before construction begins and significant 
capital is placed "at risk" 
Standard NRC-certified designs 
Lessons learned from nuclear construction 
projects overseas incorporated, and modular 
construction practices 
Plant fully designed before construction begins 
Opportunities to intervene limited to well- 
defined points in process, and must be based on 
objective evidence that ITAAC have not been, 
will not be, met 
Technology mature, stable designs 
7.3.2.2. Time-to-market with the new process 
According to the Nuclear Energy ~nstitute," the first ESPs and COLs will take longer than 
follow-on applications. The time-to-market under the new licensing process should be as follows: 
7.3.2.3. Quantitative impact of the new process 
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Figure 38 - Cost reductions from the new licensing process 
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The graph displayed above shows calculation of levelized costs of electricity in various cases. 
The set of assumption used to make the calculations is still the one used in the MIT study on the "Future 
of Nuclear ~ower". '~ 
The assumption that is varying is the capital cost of building a nuclear power plant, here ranging 
from $1,000 /kW to $2,000 /kW. The upper value of $2,000 /kW is the base case assumption from the 
MIT study. The $1,000 /kW correspond to the expectations of vendors for the capital costs of advanced 
nuclear designs, and after a number of plants have been built, i.e. FOAKE costs have been paid. 
The second parameter that is changing is the construction time, from 4 to 7 years. The purpose of 
changing the value of the construction time is to assess the impact of construction delays on the cost of 
electricity generated, or conversely the impact of the new licensing process, reducing the probability of 
delays, on that same cost. Construction time is the period between the initial investment and the 
beginning of operations. 
It is clear from the LCOE calculations, no matter what capital cost assumption, when delays are 
eliminated and when construction is brought down to 4 years, the cost of electricity production is reduced 
by several $/MWh. Under our cost assumptions, the minimum gain from shifting construction time from 
7 years to 4 years is at least 10%. 
The MIT study has concluded that even a significant reduction in construction time would not 
make nuclear power cost-competitive under their capital cost assumptions and for their assumptions of 
fossil fuel costs. We will see later that, combined with financial support, nuclear power becomes 
competitive with natural gas. 
'' MIT, 2003 
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7.4. Nuclear power technology options 
Generation I11 reactors generally represent an evolution of current nuclear technology. Their 
designs generally have a 60-year operating life. The main evolutions of advanced reactors from existing 
technology are: 
Improved safety (e.g. redundant safety systems); 
Improved operational efficiency (e.g. longer periods between refueling and/or greater 
thermal efficiency); 
Reduced construction time and costs (e.g. better design and/or new materials); 
Reduced operating costs (e.g. system simplification and automation). 
Design Type Design Certification Status 
ABWR BWR Approved 
System 80+ PWR Approved 
AP-600 PWR Approved 
AP- 1000 PWR Expected in 2005 
ESBWR BWR Application in 2005 
ACR-700 CANDU Application in 2005 
PBMR HTGR Application early 2007 
EPR PWR Application early 2008 
Figure 39 - Certification Process for New Reactor Technology Options in the United States 
Source: Energy Information Administration, 2005'~ 
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7.4.1. Certified designs 
Since the beginning of the new regulatory processes, the NRC has approved three design 
certifications (ABWR, System 80+ and AP-600), and a fourth is expected to be completed in 2005 (AP- 
1000). Another application for design certification is expected to be filed in 2005 (ESBWR). 
The NRC gave final design certification for both the ABWR and the System 80+ in May 1997, 
noting that they exceeded the safety goals by several orders of magnitude. The ABWR has also been 
certified as meeting European requirements for advanced reactors. 
7.4.1.1. Advanced Boiling Water Reactor 
The Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) has several examples in commercial operation in 
Japan, and two more under construction in Taiwan. It can be built to have a high or medium net electrical 
output of around 1,350 MW and 600 MW, respectively. The ABWR operated on the same principles as 
the BWR, but is designed to be safer, simpler to operate, easier to maintain and less expensive to build 
(e.g. the inclusion of internal reactor pumps instead of external recirculation pumps eliminates piping and 
connections for increased safety and decreased costs), smaller and with shorter construction time and 
lower expenses. Furthermore, the ABWR has a longer operating cycle and shorter required refueling time 
increase their availability factor. 
7.4.1.2. System 80+ 
The System 80+ is an advanced pressurized water reactor designed by Westinghouse, ready for 
commercialization. Eight System 80 reactors in South Korea incorporate many design features of the 
System 80+, which is the basis of the Korean Next Generation Reactor program with the APR1400 
design. Westinghouse BNFL no longer actively promotes the design for domestic sale. 
7.4.1.3. Westinghouse AP-600 
The Westinghouse AP-600 gained final design certification from the NRC in Dec 1999. The 600 
MW advanced reactor is more innovative and smaller. It has passive safety features and its projected core 
damage frequency is nearly 1000 times less than today's NRC requirements. 
The initial advanced light water reactor designs have been praised for their improvements in 
reactor safety and simplicity, but construction costs remain a barrier to commercial success in the U.S. 
Moreover, separate from the NRC process - and beyond NRC requirements - the US nuclear 
industry has selected one standardized design in each category - the large ABWR and the medium-sized 
AP-600 - for detailed first-of-a-kind engineering The $200 million program was half-funded by 
the Department of Energy and meant to provide firm information on construction costs and schedules to 
prospective buyers. The evaluation was conducted by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for 
construction at Bellefonte. 
7.4.2. Designs in certification 
Any new reactor built in a near future is likely to use designs either recently certified or soon to 
be. Interest in new reactor construction in the United States has focused on the two following designs, the 
AP- 1000 and the ESB WR. 
7.4.2.1. Westinghouse AP- 1000 
Westinghouse Electric Co., now a subsidiary of British Nuclear Fuels, Ltd. (BNFL) received its 
final safety evaluation and final design approval for the AP-1000 PWR from the NRC in September 2004; 
the final design certification rulemaking is expected to be complete in December 2005. It is the result of a 
1300 man-year and $440 million design and testing program. 
The AP-1000 incorporates passive safety features in place of the redundant active safety systems 
found in existing plants. A smaller version of this design, the AP-600, was approved in December 1999 
but has received little interest because of its economics. The 1,100 MW AP-1000 design requires the 
same development and licensing costs and staffing levels as the AP-600, and about the same size site and 
structures. 
Capital costs are projected at 1,000 $ / k ~ ~ ~  and modular design will reduce construction time to 
36 months. The 1100 MW AP-1000 generating costs are expected to be below $3.5 centsIkWh. 
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7.4.2.2. General Electric ESB WR 
This Economic Simplified, Boiling Water Reactor design is an evolution of GE's NRC-approved 
ABWR design. Both reactors produce 1,350 to 1,500 MW of power, but the ESBWR uses passive safety 
systems. 
Three ABWR units are operating in Japan, and three more are under construction there and in 
Taiwan. These designs' large capacity and 24-month fuel cycle are particularly attractive from an 
economic standpoint, but the ESBWR's passive safety design gives it the edge over the ABWR. 
GE has filed for design certification in summer 2005, with a 7500-page application representing a 
decade of work. The design certification process for ESBWR will take at least three years. 
The AP-1000 and ESBWR designs are particularly attractive because they are designed for 
passive safety, meaning that no external power or operator action is needed to assure safety. Instead 
natural forces like convection, gravity, and evaporation can cool the reactor core in an emergency. Large 
tanks of emergency cooling water sit directly above the reactor vessel as well. 
Passive safety simplifies the plant by requiring less equipment, less construction material, and 
smaller buildings, allowing for faster, cheaper construction and decommissioning. Westinghouse claims 
that, compared with an active safety design, the AP-1000 contains 50 percent fewer safety valves, 35 
percent fewer pumps, 80 percent less safety-grade piping, 85 percent less cable, and 45 percent less 
seismic building volume. 
7.4.3 .Designs in pre-certification 
Designs that vendors anticipate submitting for certification during the next two years include the 
ACR700, the EPR and IRIS. The process of certification takes several years and depends heavily on how 
unique the proposed design is and whether the design is supported by potential vendors and buyers. NRC 
hearings have emphasized that new and innovative designs might take more time for certification because 
of limited NRC staff familiarity with the designs. 
Pre-certification is a technical concept within the NRC regulatory environment, the process can 
mean many things to potential reactor vendors. A number of reactor types are at NRC pre-certification 
stage. 
The Siedewasser Reaktor is a Framatome ANP design for an advanced BWR, originally 
designed by Siemens. It presently has no U.S. utility sponsor and is no longer being 
actively promoted by Framatome which now emphasizes its EPR design. 
The ACR700 is an evolution from AECL's internationally successful CANDU line of 
Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors. As is the case for most non-LWR reactors, most U.S. 
utilities, nuclear engineers, and regulators have only limited working familiarity with the 
design. Interest was initially shown by Dominion Resources, but the utility has recently 
switched to the ESBWR design in anticipation of the slow regulatory approval process 
for the innovative Canadian-design. 
The Gas-turbine Modular Helium Reactor is an HTGR design developed primarily by the 
U.S. firm, General Atomic. Entergy has participated in GT-MHR development and 
promotion. 
Westinghouse's IRIS (International Reactor Innovative and Secure) is a significant 
simplification and innovation in PWR technology. Pre-certification is proceeding, and the 
IRIS reactor may show potential during the next decade. However, IRIS presently has no 
utility sponsor in the US. 
The following reactors are at pre-certification and have chances of being supported by a utility in 
the coming years. 
7.4.3.1. Eskom PBMR 
The Pebble-bed Modular Reactor, which uses helium as a coolant, is part of the HTGR family of 
reactors and thus a product of a lengthy history of research, notably in Germany and the United States. 
More recently the design has been promoted and revised by the South African utility Eskom and 
its affiliates. Westinghouse BNFL is a minority investor. Prototype variations of the PBMR are now 
operating in China and Japan. 
Certification procedures in the U.S. have slowed, but never have been abandoned. 
At around 165 MWe the PBMR is one of the smallest reactors now proposed for the commercial 
market. This is considered a marketing advantage because new small reactors require lower capital 
investments than larger new units. Several pebble-bed reactors might be built at a single site as local 
power demand requires. 
Small size has been viewed as a regulatory disadvantage because most licensing regulations (at 
least formerly) required separate licenses for each unit at a site. 
The NRC also does not .claim the same familiarity with the design that it has with Light Water 
Reactors. Fuels used in the PBMR would include more highly enriched uranium than is now used in 
LWR designs. 
Exelon pulled out of the effort in 2003, leaving the PBMR without a US sponsor. 
7.4.3.2. Framatome-ANP EPR 
Framatome ANP announced in early 2005 that it would market its European Pressurized Water 
Reactor design in the United States and has recently begun pre-certification. 
The EPR is an evolutionary PWR design with a high net electrical output (1,600 MW). Its 
components have been simplified and considerable emphasis is placed on reactor safety. 
The design is now being built in Finland with a target completion during 2009 at an estimated 
cost of €3.0 billion. 
The French government also plans to build an additional EPR at Flamanville 3 in France starting 
in 2007. Present French policy suggests that additional EPRs might replace additional commercial 
reactors now operating in France starting in the late 2010s. 
The EPR was bid in early 2005 in competition to the APlOOO for four reactors at two sites in 
China. 
The proposed size for the EPR has varied considerably over time but might be around 1600 
MWe. Earlier designs were as large as 1750 MWe. In either case the EPR would be the largest design 
now under consideration in the United States. Some redesign might occur for the U.S. market. 
Framatome designs its reactors according to European codes and standards and will have to 
demonstrate their compatibility with US code requirements. Framatome had earlier indicated that U.S. 
certification for the EPR would occur after European development proceeded. 
This decision has since been made and Duke Power is evaluating the EPR, along with the 
APlOOO and ESBWR, for a COL application process that began during 2005. A formal COL application 
by Duke would occur several years later though design selection might occur earlier. 
7.4.4.0ther designs 
7.4.4.1. Designs in anticipated pre-certification 
Two designs, the ACRlOOO (Atomic Energy of Canada Limited) and the 4 s  (Toshiba) have not 
been formally submitted for pre-certification in the United States. The designs are now receiving attention 
and there is a chance they might be submitted for certification: 
ACR1000: same series than the ACR700, with lower costs, three-year construction time. 
Dominion Resources indicated in late 2004 that it might place effort in the ACRlOOO 
after certification of the ACR700 
4s: very small molten sodium-cooled reactor (10 MWe), designed for remote locations 
and to operate for decades without refueling (comparable to a nuclear battery). Toward 
the end of 2004, the town of Galena, Alaska granted initial approval for Toshiba to build 
a 4 s  reactor in that remote location, but NRC indicated it was not familiar with the 4 s  
design and that design certification might be costly and prolonged. 
7.4.4.2. Generation IV reactors 
The U.S. Department of Energy participates in the Generation IV International Forum (GIF), an 
association of thirteen nations that seek to develop a new generation of commercial nuclear reactor 
designs before 2030.'~ 
The U.S., Canada, France, Japan and the United Kingdom signed an agreement on February 28, 
2005 for additional collaborative research and development of Gen IV systems. 
Criteria for inclusion of a reactor design for consideration by the initial GIF group include: 
Sustainable energy (extended fuel availability, positive environmental impact); 
Competitive energy (low costs, short construction times); 
Safe and reliable systems (inherent safety features, public confidence in nuclear energy 
safety); 
Proliferation resistance (does not add unduly to unsecured nuclear material) and 
physical protection (secure from terrorist attacks). 
Potential generation IV systems include: 
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Gas Cooled Fast Reactors (GFR); 
Fluid Lead Cooled Fast Reactor (e.g. Lead or Sodium); 
Fast neutron spectrum Supercritical Water Cooled Reactor (SCWR); and 
Very High Temperature Reactor (VHTR). 
Currently, these systems are still in the design stages as significant technology gaps exist (for 
example, materials that can withstand very high temperatures and fuel technology). 
In the near future, potential nuclear plant owners will shy away from unfamiliar designs and 
vendors, as well as from the additional cost, schedule, and technology risks they present. Nonetheless, it 
is in the interests of nuclear plant owners to maintain a competitive reactor supplier industry. 
7.5. Consortia to test the new regulatory process 
Although the combined licensing process is much more attractive to potential nuclear plant 
builders than the two-step process, testing the process has just begun, and it will take at least several more 
years before the first COL is issued. 
The COL program has two objectives: to encourage utilities to take the initiative in license 
application, and to encourage reactor vendors to undertake detailed engineering and arrive at reliable cost 
estimates. 
7.5.1 .Early Site Permit 
Three companies filed for an ESP during September and October 2003, with decisions expected 
in late 2006: 
Dominion for North Anna (Virginia); 
Exelon for Clinton (Illinois); 
Entergy for Grand Gulf (Mississippi). 
Southern Company is reviewing sites and plans to file an ESP application to the NRC in 2006. 
The application should take around three years to review. 
None of these companies currently has concrete plans to build a nuclear power plant. 
7.5.2.Combined Construction and Operating License 
Although the combined licensing process is much more attractive to potential nuclear plant 
builders than the two-step process, testing the process has just begun, and it will take at least several more 
years before the first COL could be issued. 
In 2003, the Department of Energy (DOE) called for COL proposals under its Nuclear Power 
2010 program on the basis that it would fund up to half the cost of any accepted. The COL program has 
two objectives: to encourage utilities to take the initiative in license application, and to encourage reactor 
vendors to undertake detailed engineering and arrive at reliable cost estimates. 
According to the World Nuclear Association, for the first COL application, DOE matching funds 
of up to about $50 million are available. For the second, up to some $200 million per vendor, are 
available to be recouped from royalty. 
Three consortia have received DOE funding in November 2004 for the demonstration of the new 
nuclear licensing process. 
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7.5.2.1. NuStart Energy consortium 
NUS tart Energy Development LLC comprises nine major utilities: Exelon, Entergy , Southern, 
Constellation, Duke, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), FPL Energy, Progress Energy. It was brought 
together by Entergy and represents more than half of the US nuclear plants. 
It involves Westinghouse, General Electric and EDF International and will pursue the 
Westinghouse APlOOO and GE's ESBWR technology options before submitting applications. 
Initially, the consortium was considering the six following sites, four of which already house 
operating nuclear power plants: 
Scottsboro, Alabama: The Bellefonte Nuclear Plant, an unfinished site owned by the U.S. 
government's Tennessee Valley Authority. 
Port Gibson, Mississippi: The Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, owned by Entergy. 
St. Francisville, Louisiana: The River Bend Station, owned by Entergy. 
Aiken, South Carolina: The Savannah River Site, a U.S. Department of Energy nuclear 
weapons lab. 
Lusby, Maryland: The Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Plant, owned by Constellation Energy. 
Oswego, New York: The Nine Mile Point plant, owned by Constellation Energy. 
NuStart eventually identified Entergy's Grand Gulf site for an ESBWR reactor and TVA's 
Bellefonte site for an APlOOO reactor. The consortium plans to submit both license applications in 2008. 
Nustart's role will end at issuance of the licenses. Once NRC issues the licenses, the utilities 
selected for the COL test, either alone or in partnerships, will make the decision as to move ahead with 
construction. They would then take over the licenses from NuStart in order to build and operate the 
plants. Construction could start as early as 2010, with at least one plant operating by 2014, according to 
NuStart. 
The NuStart consortium is headed by an Exelon senior executive. In May 2005 it signed an 
agreement with DOE to split the estimated $520 million cost of completing detailed engineering work on 
one of the two designs. 
Before the announcement of the site selections, several local areas had passed resolutions 
supporting selection of their communities for a new build plant. On 11 July, two Alabama jurisdictions 
also weighed in. The Scottsboro city council and the Jackson county commission each passed a resolution 
supporting TVA in construction of a new reactor at the Bellefonte site, whether through the TVA-led 
consortium or through NuStart. 
7.5.2.2. Dominion-led Consortium 
The second consortium is led by Dominion and originally included Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd 
(AECL), Hitachi and Bechtel. 
The initial option pursued was AECL's ACR-700, developed from the successful Candu heavy- 
water reactor design, but with light water cooling. Hitachi and Bechtel have been key contributors in 
successfully completing the recent Candu plants in China. 
However, in January 2005, AECL and Hitachi were replaced by General Electric and the ESBWR 
was favored over the ACR-700. The reason for this change was the NRC indication that certification of 
the ACR design would be very slow because of its lack of familiarity with the design. Conversely, a US 
technology, developed from already approved designs, is expected to be much quicker. 
The consortium is currently looking at Dominion's existing nuclear site at North Anna, Virginia. 
In April 2005, the Dominion-led consortium signed an agreement with DOE to split the estimated $440 
million cost of its COL work on the ESBWR, and development costs will be shared with NuStart. In 
addition to these costs, the main design certification and engineering costs will be borne by the vendor 
partners. 
7.5.2.3. Tennessee Valley Authority consortium 
Under the same DOE program, the TVA consortium, consisting of the Tennessee Valley 
Authority, GE Energy, Global Nuclear Fuels, Toshiba, Bechtel, and USEC received DOE funding in May 
2004 to study cost and schedule of building two GE-designed advanced boiling water reactors (ABWR) at 
Bellefonte, Alabama, the site of a partially completed TVA nuclear plant. The $4 million feasibility study 
was half funded by DOE. 
The TVA site has two large PWR units whose construction was abandoned in 1988 after $2.5 
billion had been spent and unit 1 largely (88%) completed. 
The 1350 MWe ABWR was the first Generation 111 reactor design to enter service. A number of 
units are operating and under construction in Japan. 
TVA has apparently decided not to proceed as they would be the only ABWR units in USA. 
However the figures are noteworthy: twin 137 1 MWe ABWRs would be $161 1 per kilowatt, or if they 
were uprated to 1465 MWe each, $1535 /kW, *' and built in 40 months. 
7.5.2.4. Duke Energy 
In March 2005, Duke Power informed the NRC that the EPR was one of three reactor designs it 
was considering for a COL application for a new reactor in its service territory. 
Duke conducted a study of the scope, schedule and costs for preparing a COL and, before the 
EPAct of 2005 was preparing to award its first pre-application contracts. However, Duke has made no 
final decision to proceed with construction of a new plant. 
" Owner's costs are not included in the TVA study 
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7.6. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 
7.6.1 .Overview of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 
In late July 2005, the US House and Senate passed the Act by wide margins. It is the first 
comprehensive federal energy legislation in 13 years. President George W. Bush signed the Act into law 
on August 8,2005. 
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 differs fundamentally from the Energy Policy Act of 1992, which 
introduced wholesale power market competition. Whereas the 1992 Act promoted a competitive market 
framework, the 2005 Act induces markets to adopt certain technologies and to invest in certain areas. 
According to various consulting reports,82 the Act will: 
Allow consolidation of ownership in the power cestor: By repealing the Public Utility 
Holding Company Act of 1935, a major barrier to mergers and acquisitions has been 
removed; 
Provide incentives for a diverse energy portfolio and foster innovation: The Act provides 
incentives for advanced nuclear power, IGCC and wind power plants for purposes of fuel 
diversity; 
Stimulate investment and upgrading of infrastructures, through financial incentives for 
transmission investments, and for advanced coal and nuclear plants construction; 
Favor the declining trend of electricity intensity, by promoting end-use efficiency; 
Support the hybrid structure of the electricity generation sector, by allowing both 
competitive generators and utilities to take advantage of the financial incentives 
contained in the Act. 
82 ICF, 2005; UtiliPoint, 2005 
7.6.2.Nuclear power provisions including in the act 
The Act has a number of provisions that should contribute to facilitating the construction of new 
nuclear power plants in the US. The focus of the Act is on advanced reactor designs, and the main 
provisions are the following. 
7.6.2.1. Production tax credits 
Electricity produced from qualifying advanced nuclear power facilities can claim production tax 
credit as high as 1.8 centstkwh for the first eight years of operation. This applies for up to 6,000MW of 
nuclear capacity, provided it is online before 2020: if the new capacity exceeds 6,000 MW, the amount 
will be distributed on a pro rata basis (with an annual cap of $125 million per GW). 
7.6.2.2. Loan guarantees on new projects 
As a greenhouse gas emission-free technology, advanced nuclear power will be covered by an 
80% loan guarantee from the Secretary of Energy. Loan guarantees are particularly attractive for 
merchant generating companies. They provide the possibility to develop highly leveraged projects at 
cheaper costs; some regulated companies may also take advantage of the loan guarantees, because they 
reduce the cost of borrowing. 
Loan guarantees and production tax credits work differently, but both have the same effect: a 
reduction of the cost of electricity from the first plants. Since their effect will be combined, there will be a 
larger reduction of the cost of electricity for the first new plants. 
7.6.2.3. Insurance against delays 
Under the licensing process for new nuclear plants, project developers receive all regulatory 
approvals before construction begins, before significant capital investment is placed at risk. Although the 
licensing process is designed to preclude delay, there still is a residual risk of delays during construction. 
Such delays will have a lower probability but we have seen that, if they occur, they can have high 
financial consequences. 
The Secretary of Energy may use federal funds to pay for all or part of the costs incurred as a 
result of delays (including principal, interests and costs related to replacement power) caused by litigation 
or a "breakdown in the regulatory process" at NRC approval, if those delays exceed 180 days. The 
support is available for six reactors of three different types: the first two plants can receive up to $500 
million each, and four more can receive as much as $250 million each. 
7.6.2.4. Extension of the Price Anderson Act 
The main purpose of the Price-Anderson Act is to ensure the availability of a large pool of funds 
to provide prompt compensation for members of the public who would incur damages from a nuclear or 
radiological incident, including the costs of incident response or precautionary evacuation and the costs of 
investigating and defending claims and settling suits for such damages, regardless of who might be liable. 
Approximately $200 million have been paid in claims by the insurance pools since the Price-Anderson 
Act went into effect. 
The liability protection for NRC licensees and DOE contractors, which aims at protecting 
operators of the financial risk of plant accidents, is extended for 20 years until 2025 (fifth extension since 
1957): as a result, owners of power plants coming online before 2025 are eligible for the same liability 
protection that is available for the existing fleet. 
7.6.2.5. Modification of the rules for decommissioning trust funds 
The new legislation also includes updated tax treatment of nuclear decommissioning trust funds. 
Before the Energy Policy Act of 2005, there were two types of funds: non-qualified and 
qualified. The main difference between the two types of fund was related to the tax-deductibility of 
contributions: contributions to non-qualified funds were not deductible, while contributions to qualified 
funds were a deductible business expense, and earnings on qualified funds were taxed at a lower rate. 
Until the new energy legislation, only regulated companies subject to cost-of-service regulation could 
establish qualified funds. 
The change from the EPAct of 2005 is the repeal of that requirement. All power companies can 
now establish qualified funds and deduct contributions to those funds, whether they are regulated or not. 
This has some effect for unregulated companies constructing merchant nuclear power plants. 
Moreover, non-qualified funds will be liquidated to constitute qualified funds. Companies will be 
allowed to deduct those amounts from taxable income over the remaining lifetime of the plant. 
In a nutshell, the change in tax rules eliminates the difference between unregulated and regulated 
companies' contribution to decommissioning funds. 
7.6.2.6. Significant commitment to nuclear power 
The new energy legislation also creates a substantial R&D portfolio of almost $3 billion. The 
funding will go to new developments of advanced designs and testing of the new licensing process, as 
well as research and development for hydrogen production and next-generation plant designs. 
In addition to research, development, demonstration and commercialization funding, the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 creates a position of Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy. 
7.6.3.Impacts for the US nuclear industry 
7.6.3.1. Anticipated implications for the US nuclear industry 
The R&D provisions applying to nuclear power in the Energy Policy Act of 2005 clearly show 
the commitment of the US government to the construction of next-generation nuclear power facilities. 
The combination of the production tax credits, the standby support for delays due to litigation and 
regulatory approval process, the loan guarantee and the extension of the Price Anderson Act liability 
protection is likely to play an important role in improving the competitiveness of new nuclear power 
plants, in mitigating the financial risks inherent to construction, thereby facilitating the financing of new 
projects. UtiliPoint believes there should be several new facilities constructed in the next ten years. 
According to ~ t i l i~o in t :~  the Energy Bill also favors first movers in the advanced reactor market. 
The APlOOO Westinghouse design has been approved and certified, which makes it well-positioned, and 
the ESBWR from GE will enter the certification process very soon. This can explain why both consortia 
involving Westinghouse and GE are preparing applications in the near future. 
The Act does not have any provision related to long-term storage of radioactive waste or to the 
Yucca Mountain project. However, the federal government is still committed to provide a waste storage 
facility to take on the waste from existing nuclear plants. 
7.6.3.2. Quantitative impacts on nuclear power competitiveness 
The following graph shows a comparison of the levelized costs of electricity for nuclear power, 
natural gas and coal. The assumptions are still those used in the MIT study. 
For coal-fired power plants, two technologies are considered, Pulverized Coal and Integrated 
Gasification Combined Cycle. 
For natural-gas-fired power plants, the technology considered is still combined cycle. Several 
scenarios are considered, depending on the assumption on the price of natural gas. As was stated earlier in 
this study, long-term natural gas prices should be 5 $/MMBtu. The range considered in the levelized cost 
calculations is from 4 to 6 $/MMBtu. 
*' UtiliPoint, 2005 (UtiliPoint International, Inc. provides independent research-based information, analysis, and 
consulting to energy companies, utilities, investors, regulators, and industry service providers) 
For nuclear power plants, two dimensions vary in the calculations. The first one is the assumption 
on capital costs, similarly to the calculations previously displayed, ranging from 1,000 $/kW to 2,000 
$/kW. The other dimension is the set of policies considered. Four cases are analyzed: 
Base-case with no policy; 
Production tax credit; 
Loan guarantee; 
Production tax credit and loan guarantee. 
Moreover, three options are considered for the cash-flow calculations: 
Stand-alone project without carry-forward of the unused tax credit: no "banking" of the 
credit is possible; 
Stand-alone project with carry-forward of the unused tax credit: "banking" of the credit is 
possible; 
Project within a large company: The maximum tax credit is used every year, on the 
nuclear project or other projects within the company. 
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Figure 41 - Nuclear power competitiveness - Stand-alone project without tax credit carry-forward 
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Figure 42 - Nuclear power competitiveness - Stand-alone project with tax credit carry-forward 
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Figure 43 - Nuclear power competitiveness - Project within a company 
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Figure 44 - Nuclear power competitiveness - Summary chart 
As in the MIT study, we see that nuclear is not competitive with natural gas or coal in the base 
case scenario, without the investment stimulus from the new legislation. In very specific cases where 
natural gas prices are high and capital costs are low, nuclear power is competitive with natural gas, but for 
first constructions, the optimistic assumptions on capital costs are rather unlikely. 
When considering the two policy items from the EPAct of 2005, levelized costs of electricity are 
significantly reduced. From a range of 44 to 69 $/MWh in the no policy scenario, the EPAct reaches a 
range of 38 to 58 $/MWh in the stand-alone without carry-forward case to a range of 28 to 52$/MWh. 
Nuclear power then becomes cost competitive, except for very low natural gas prices or very high capital 
costs. 
As a conclusion, the economics of nuclear power are considerably improved by the Energy Policy 
Act provisions. If the economics were the only element holding new nuclear power construction back, 
then it is likely new nuclear power plants will be built in the corning years. 
7.6.4.Nuclear industry response to new nuclear investments 
The Energy Bill should provide regulatory certainty, possible risk insurance for the first few 
plants, and other incentives. For NEI representatives, the industry was on the brink of acting as soon as 
the bill was final. 
Indeed, after the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the number of COL applications expected has 
increased, and a growing number of companies are considering application in a near future. The following 
sections briefly go over each of the projects. 
7.6.4.1. UniStar Nuclear 
In September 2005 Areva and Constellation Energy formed a joint venture - UniStar Nuclear - 
Joint initiative by Constellation and Areva to develop projects on own account, or in partnership with 
other companies. 
The joint venture is aimed at providing a business framework to build at least four of Areva's 
advanced 1600 MWe Generation-3+ EPR nuclear units in the USA. The US EPR (US Evolutionary 
Power Reactor) from Framatome-ANP is the US version of the European Pressurized Reactor being built 
in Finland, planned for France and that has been bid for China. Areva Inc. is currently making 
modifications to the EPR design for conditions in the USA - the main difference being the need to output 
at 60Hz instead of 50Hz. Bechtel Power Corporation will support the joint venture with engineering and 
construction expertise. 
Constellation is part of the NuStart consortium, and to accommodate the new EPRs it withdrew 
two sites from consideration for NuStart COL. The UniStar COL timetable would be much the same as 
Nustart's, with application in 2008, construction start in 2010 and operation 2015. 
On October 27, 2005, Constellation Energy announced yesterday its intention to file for an Early 
Site Permit (ESP) in 2007 and a combined construction and operating license (COL) in 2008. 
Sites currently under evaluation include Constellation's Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant and 
the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station. Constellation expects to complete its evaluation and select a site by 
early next year. The development and deployment will be pursued by UniStar Nuclear. 
The announcement from Constellation follows similar announcements this month from Duke 
Power and Progress Energy. 
7.6.4.2. Duke Power 
Duke Power, a business unit of Duke Energy, plans to submit the application to the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) within the next 24-30 months. 
Duke plans to use Westinghouse Electric Co.'s Advanced Passive 1000 (AP 1000) reactors, which 
are each able to generate 1,100 MW of electricity. 
The utility said it will await the outcome of the NRC's review, expected around 2010, before 
deciding whether to build the reactors, which would then come on line by 2015. Duke is still evaluating 
potential sites for the new reactors, but they will be located within the utility's North and South Carolina 
service territory. 
Duke officials also told reporters they also would be considering potential partners for a new 
reactor project, though they did not elaborate. 
7.6.4.3. Progress Energy 
On November 1st 2005, Progress Energy announced that it plans to seek licenses to build up to 
four nuclear reactors at two locations, with one site in Florida and another in the Carolinas. 
The company plans to submit applications for both sites to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) by 2008. Construction would begin two years later, with operations beginning as 
early as 20 15. 
On August 29, 2005, Progress Energy had previously notified NRC that its plans could result in 
its submittal of a COL application for a new nuclear power plant in Florida. At that time, Progress Energy 
had also notified NRC that it expected to select a potential site and reactor vendor by the end of 2005. 
The plants would be built primarily to meet demand for baseload generation needs in both of its 
service areas. Progress has not added new baseload generating plants since the mid-1980s, but its total 
number of customers has risen by a million, say company officials. 
7.6.4.4. Southern Nuclear 
Southern Nuclear Operating Company announced in August 2005 that it had selected its Vogtle 
Nuclear Station in Georgia for consideration as a site for new nuclear units. In 2006, Southern Nuclear 
plans to file an ESP application or preliminary data for the COL application. 
7.6.4.5. South Carolina Electric and Gas Co 
SCANA, the parent company of South Carolina Electric and Gas Co., and Santee Cooper 
announced in August that they are considering extending an existing nuclear generation joint ownership 
agreement so that they can study construction of a new nuclear generation facility. The two companies 
currently co-own the V.C. Summer Nuclear Station near Jenkinsville, South Carolina. 
Any plant would be intended to meet forecast needs in 2015. This evaluation process will involve 
consideration of various types of baseload generation, including natural gas-fired plants, coal-fired plants 
and nuclear plants. 
7.6.4.6. Entergy 
Entergy's River Bend site in Louisiana was on Nustart's list of six semifinalist sites. NuStart 
praised the strong showing of state and local community support for the River Bend proposal. 
In its September 22 announcement, NuStart stated River Bend and the other five sites are 
"excellent locations for an advanced nuclear unit from a financial and technical standpoint." 
In late 2007 or early 2008, Entergy will decide whether to submit its COL applications for Grand 
Gulf and River Bend to the NRC. 
8. Unresolved uncertainties 
8.1. Environmental constraints on C 0 2  emissions 
This study has not gone into details about the potential regulatory changes regarding greenhouse 
gas emissions in the United States. 
There is no doubt that imposing a carbon tax, or implementing a C 0 2  cap-and-trade system 
would be very beneficial to nuclear power, especially if the carbon tax was to be set at a high price, or if 
the carbon cap was chosen stringently. 
Yet, the MIT study shows that, absent the new energy legislation, the amount of the tax required 
to make nuclear power competitive under pessimistic capital cost assumptions would be above 100 $/ton 
of C 0 2  emitted.84 Although it is a relevant academic exercise to consider the impact of a large span of 
policies, it seems rather unrealistic that, should a tax be implemented its level would be as high as 100 to 
200 $/ton of C02. The prices of C 0 2  allowances in the EUTS (European Union Trading System) suggest 
that the cost of compliance to C 0 2  regulations is one order of magnitude below (although the cap is not 
excessively stringent in the European Union). 
The pricing model used in the Texas Institute for the Advancement of Chemical Technology 
(TIACT) reportg5 on the economics of the potential nuclear power plant contains a feature for the possible 
imposition of emissions regulation, and the resulting increase in electricity prices. Yet they argue that a 
nuclear power plant project should not rely on increased pricing from environmental legislation, as it is 
only one possible future, rather distant in their opinion. Besides, with the level of uncertainty and political 
controversy related to global climate change, relying on US potential emissions legislation would be an 
unreasonable basis for an investment. 
Although nuclear is advocated as a pollution-free technology, the argument appears to be more 
powerful to win public opinion than to shape financial investment analysis. In various interviews, reports 
and studies where industry executives are asked about major drivers of investment in nuclear power, they 
did not appear to be factoring in the probability of C02  regulations in the United States. 
In a nutshell, while C 0 2  emissions regulations may become an element in assessing profitability, 
in the current situation, the possibility of a change in the legislative environment with stringent emissions 
constraints is not a key driver to rely on when considering potential investments in new nuclear power 
plants in the United States. 
84 MIT, 2003 
85 TIACT, 2005 
8.2. Uncertain capital costs 
According to ~ o s k o w , ~ ~  vendors are generally optimistic about capital costs, and them is an 
incentive to underestimate cost contingencies to advertise the cost-competitiveness of a design. Yet this 
poses the problem of how to evaluate a nuclear power plant project with a high level of uncertainty on 
capital costs (which account for a large share of the cost of electricity generation). 
According to Geoffrey ~othwell," cost contingencies closely approximate one standard deviation 
of the lognormal probability distribution of actual costs. From that theory, the TIACT report draws 
conclusions about the contingencies placed on projects by capital cost estimators. 
The upper bound of the cost estimates is evidently what is of the highest interest if one chooses to 
mistrust vendor's cost estimates. Eventually too, the supplier will bid sufficiently high to avoid 
accounting losses. With Rothwell's contingency cost theory, The TIACI' report develops an upper bound 
of the actual costs for a number of technologies. The results of this cost uncertainty analysis are shown in 
the following figure. The capital cost estimates represent a confidence interval of 95%. Q.e. there is a 
2.5% probability of receiving quotes that are higher than the upper bound). 
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Figure 45 - Capital cost uncertainty 
Source: TIACT, 2005 
The figure above displays capital cost range for the designs most likely to be used for the 
potential new builds. The upper bound is generally substantially different from the capital costs quoted by 
Joskow, 2005 
'' Rothwell, 2004 
vendors or from the average value. Also, more mature designs achieve a much lower upper bound than 
the ones in less developed stages. 
As newest designs are built, the level of uncertainty will evidently decrease, and first-of-a-kind 
engineering costs will be paid, so that the range will be both narrower and lower. The question is now 
whether under today's degree of certainty and level of capital costs, projects will have a positive NPV. 
8.3. Appropriateness of decommissioning funds 
8.3.1 .Decommissioning after permanent shutdown 
After a nuclear power plant is permanently shut down, it must be decommissioned. This entails 
two steps:88 
The company operating the plant decontaminates or removes contaminated equipment 
and materials; places spent fuel in dry storage until final disposal. 
The company deals with the small amount of radioactivity remaining in the plant, which 
must be reduced to harmless levels through a cleanup phase-decontamination. 
8.3.2.Decommissioning funds in competitive markets 
Competition in electricity markets should impose the same financial risks on both nuclear and 
other power generators: the essential difference is the degree of these risks, which may be affected by the 
size of investment. Nuclear power, however, has some specific liabilities and associated risks due to 
political and regulatory uncertainties regarding plant decommissioning costs. The specificity of the risks 
associated with decommissioning is the uncertainty about the magnitude of these costs, for which there is 
limited commercial experience. 
Concerns associated with decommissioning and waste disposal include: 
The adequacy of funding provisions to meet current estimated target costs; 
The accuracy of the target costs themselves; 
The adequacy of regulatory requirements for ensuring sufficient funding. 
Decommissioning of nuclear power plants is expected to be a costly process. Since 
decommissioning begins after the plant stops generating revenue, utility management is required to set 
aside funds for this work while the plant is operating. 
According to NEA,~' some OECD countries require an initial endowment and annual 
contributions from nuclear generators - a fixed amount per kwh of generation - while others require 
nuclear generators to include funding for decommissioning costs in their financial plans. 
Power generators are supposed to anticipate the costs of decommissioning and accumulate the 
funds over the life of the plant. The uncertainty about the accuracy of the cost estimates brings uncertainty 
88 NEI, 2002 
89 NEA, 2000 
over the adequacy of funds accumulated. This concern is greater in competitive markets: contributions to 
decommissioning funds are predicted on assumed electricity sales volumes, and fund contribution per 
kwh of sales; since sales volumes are not certain, this method could lead to a shortfall in fund 
contributions. 
Early closures of nuclear power plants are also an issue since the decommissioning funds are 
accumulated throughout the lifetime of the plant. An early closure will result in insufficient funds to cover 
decommissioning costs. Assessing and allocating financial responsibility for the potential shortfalls is 
problematic. With market competition, there will be strong pressure from investors and shareholders to 
identify, quantify and secure all liabilities as soon as possible. The lack of experience in decommissioning 
may hamper new investments if liabilities are not more accurately identified. 
In the United States, NRC has established regulations and associated guidance on nuclear power 
plant decommissioning. Each plant must file a post-shutdown activities report with the NRC prior to the 
expiration of its operating license or within two years after the plant has permanently shut down. 
In 1998, the NRC approved a new decommissioning funding rule for nuclear power plants "to 
reflect conditions expected from rate deregulation of the electric power industry". Nuclear power plants 
are required to put aside funds for their decommissioning during operations. Federal and state regulators 
help companies ensure that enough money is set aside, so the funds are not under the direct control of the 
companies: power generators cannot be used for purposes other than decommissioning. 
The funding of decommissioning costs is factored into current rate structures over the life of the 
nuclear plants. As of 2001, $23.7 billion of the total estimated cost of decommissioning the nation's 
nuclear power plants had been collected. Assuming an average decommissioning cost of about $320 
million per unit, this leaves an unfunded liability of approximately $1 1.6 billion, which companies must 
be allowed to recover over their plants' remaining operating lives.90 
8.3.3.US Experience to date 
Since 1960, more than 70 test, demonstration and power reactors have been retired throughout the 
United States. These include more than 40 research reactors ranging in size from less than a watt to two 
megawatts, four demonstration nuclear power reactors (the largest, 256 MW), as well as a number of 
large commercial nuclear power plants. 
NEI, 2002 
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The U.S. nuclear industry has gained much experience in decommissioning from Shippingport, 
Pathfinder, and the prematurely shutdown Shoreham plant91. The industry also has gained experience 
from the more recent decommissioning of the Yankee Rowe and Fort St. Vrain plants. 
However, those reactors were relatively small (except for Shoreharn, 800 MWe), and there is still 
some uncertainty on decommissioning costs for commercial-size nuclear power reactors. This issue is not 
cited as a major hurdle for new investments by industry executives. 
91 Shoreham completed its 5% power testing but was never put into commercial operation 
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PART 111: Financing options for new nuclear 
investments 
9. Evolution of the nuclear industry structure 
9.1. Expected industry trends from the introduction of market competition 
As earlier stated, electricity market competition is generally expected to concentrate efforts by 
plant owners to reduce expenditure on generation and to maximize returns. In addition to the 
improvements in plant performance and operation mentioned above, competition has brought 
improvements to the management and business arrangements of nuclear utilities. In the United States, a 
diverse group of nuclear utilities is seeking ways to improve the organization of nuclear generation 
businesses as competition develops. 
Varley and Paffenbarger were right as early as 1998 when forecasting the likelihood of 
reorganization and conso~idation.~~ According to them, consolidation of nuclear power activities was 
likely. Single-unit nuclear power installations generally have higher fixed operating costs per unit of 
electrical output because of the specialized infrastructure, staff, and regulatory activities required for 
nuclear installations, regardless of size. A likely strategy for owners of single-unit nuclear power plants 
was to consolidate the business operations of their units with other plants through mergers. Some utilities 
were also to sell their nuclear plants or shares in nuclear units. 
Two strategies were to compete among nuclear power owners:93 
Some companies with good records of nuclear plant operation can seek opportunities to 
expand their activities through operating agreements or acquisitions of nuclear generation 
and related companies. For these companies, the basic strategy is to develop and take 
advantage of their strengths in nuclear power. 
A contrasting strategy is to diversify activities into other types of generation or entirely 
new business area.. Utilities who consider that their activities are too highly concentrated 
in nuclear power generation, or those with poor records of nuclear plant management, 
may favor this strategy. 
92 Varley & Paffenbarger, 1998 
93 Varley & Paffenbarger, 1998 
9.2. Consolidation in the nuclear industry 
9.2.1 .Ownership Consolidation 
At the end of 1991, the number of individual utilities (including minority owners) that had some 
ownership interest in operable nuclear power plants was 101. At the end of 1999, the number of such 
utilities had dropped to 87, and the largest 12 of them owned 54% of the capacity, slightly up on 1991. By 
mid-2002, the largest 12 owned as much as 68% of total nuclear capacity, due to many acquisitions and 
mergers in 2000 and 200 1. 
Net Plant Sale 
Buyer Reactors MWe price ($ Completed Price Remaining valueg4 
sold million) (expected) ($/kW) life(yr) ($lkW.yr) 
Entergy Pilgrim 670 14 July-99 21 13.1 1.6 
Three Mile 786 23 December- 29 AmerGen Island 99 15.3 1.9 
924 20 22 27.5 0.8 December- AmerGen Clinton 99 
AmerGen Oyster Creek 6 19 10 August-00 16 8.9 1.8 
PECO Peach January & Bottom, (Exelon) et 714 20 October 28 18.7 1.5 Hope Creek, 
al. Salem 200 1 
Fitzpatrick 
1743 636 November- Entergy & Indian 280 15.2 18.4 00 Point 3 
Entergy Indian Point 2 
September- 
01 
Dominion Millstone 1947 1193 March-01 Resources 613 
NineMile 1536 675 November- Constellation Point 01 439 
Entergy Vermont Yankee 
FPL Energy Seabrook 1024 749 November- 73 02 
Clinton, 
Exelon TMI, Oyster 1210 276 October-03 228 12.7 18 
Creek 
Constellation R E Ginna 495 408 June-04 810 26.1 31 
Genco & 
CPSE South Texas 
Dominion Kewaunee 540 192 July-05 355 9.1 39 
FPL Energy Duane 419 300 (early 2006) 716 9.0 80 
94 Value is defined as price per kilowatt divided by the number of remaining years on the license 
Arnold 
Figure 46 - US Nuclear Plant Sales 
Source: World Nuclear Association, 2005 
New investment has occurred only in States which have opened their retail electricity markets to 
competition. There has been no sale of plants in states with traditional US cost-plus pricing. The World 
Nuclear Association gives the following information on nuclear power plant sales since 1 9 9 8 . ~ ~  
- In mid-1999, the 670 MWe Pilgrim plant was sold to Entergy, by Boston Edison, for $14 million 
plus $67 million for fuel. 
- In late 1999, AmerGen, the joint venture of British Energy and PECO Energy (now Exelon), 
completed its purchase of the 930 MWe Clinton nuclear plant and the 790 MWe Three Mile 
Island plant in 1999. However, its plan to acquire control of the two-unit Nine Mile Point nuclear 
power station (614 & 1140 MWe) was derailed by a minor shareholder exercising its veto. Later, 
Constellation bid successfully for the units. 
- In March 2000, Entergy Corporation reached agreement to buy the New York Power Authority's 
Indian Point-3 (965 MWe) and Fitzpatrick (778 MWe) nuclear power plants for US$ 967 million, 
topping a bid by Dominion Resources. The sale closed in November 2000. 
- In November 2000 Entergy became the successful bidder for ConEd's 939 MWe Indian Point-2 
unit (including the shut down unit 1 and 76 MWe of gas turbine capacity). The price was $502 
million plus $100 million for fuel. ConEd will purchase the output at an average of 3.9 
cents1kWh. The price per kilowatt is very much higher than earlier nuclear plant transactions. 
- In June 2000 Ameffien received approval to purchase the elderly 650 MWe Oyster Creek plant 
for US$ 10 million, and the 522 MWe Vermont Yankee plant for $61 million. However, the latter 
deal was vetoed by state regulators and the plant was auctioned. 
- In August 2000 Dominion Resources agreed to pay US$ 1.3 billion in cash for the Millstone 
nuclear plant, about $600kW capacity. The Northeast Utilities plant comprises the 1150 MWe 
unit 3 and the 858 MWe unit 2, respectively 14 and 25 years old. Unit 1, which is being 
decommissioned, is also included. The price includes $105 million for fuel, but only 93.5% of 
unit 3, since minority shareholders wished to remain. 
- In November 2000, Public Service Co. of New Mexico agreed to purchase two Kansas utilities 
owning 94% of the 1170 MWe Wolf Creek nuclear plant. 
- In December 2000 Constellation Energy, owner of Calvert Cliffs nuclear power plant, agreed to 
buy Nine Mile Point for US$ 815 million, including fuel. The deal takes in unit 1 (609 MWe, 
started in 1969) and 82% of unit 2 (I 148 MWe, started 1988) for $737 million, plus $78 million 
for fuel. This is about 3.5 times the price which had been agreed with AmerGen for the plant in 
1999. Constellation has agreed to sell 90% of its output to the vendors for 10 years at about 3.5 
cents1kWh. Some $450 million in decommissioning funds will be transferred to Constellation. 
- In 2001 PECO (now Exelon) and PSEG concluded the purchase of minor shares in five large 
reactors from Connectiv. 
- In August 2001 Entergy Corporation became the successful bidder for the 29-year old Vermont 
Yankee power station. Entergy paid $180 million for the 522 MWe plant, $35 million of this for 
fuel. It will take over both the decommissioning liability and the existing fund for this. Power will 
be sold to local utilities (former owners) for 3.9 to 4.5 centskWh to 2012. Entergy paid almost 
three times the price which had been agreed in 2000 with AmerGen. 
L 
95 WNA, 2005b 
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- In April 2002 FPL Energy became the successful bidder for 88.2% of the 12 year old Seabrook 
plant. The utility will pay six utility vendors US$ 836.6 million for the 1161 MWe PWR reactor, 
being $749.1 million for the plant (including decommissioning trust fund), $61.9 million for fuel 
and the balance for components of an uncompleted second unit. 
- In September 2003 British Energy (BE) agreed to sell its most profitable asset - the half share of 
US utility Arneffien, to FPL Energy for US$276.5 million. The proposed deal was the result of 
its plan to realize the value of its AmerGen equity independently of Exelon - its joint venture 
partner. Exelon then exercised its right of first refusal and bought the share, subject to regulatory 
and other approvals. The sale was required by the UK government's restructuring provisions for 
BE. 
- In November 2003 Dominion agreed to pay $220 million cash for Kewaunee, a 540 MWe 
Wisconsin reactor, the figure including $36.5 million for fuel. The sale was finalized in July 
2005. Some $392 million in decommissioning funds will be transferred. 
- Also in November 2003, Constellation Energy agreed to buy the R E Ginna nuclear power plant 
for $401 million plus $21.6 million for fuel. The 495 MWe PWR started up in 1969 and is among 
the best-performing in USA. The sale was contingent upon the license extension taking its life to 
2029. A planned uprate enabled by 1996 steam generator replacement will increase capacity to 
580 MWe. A sales contract commits 90% of ten years output to RG&E at 4.4 cents/kWh average. 
- In March 2004 Cameco Corp. agreed to buy 25.2% of the South Texas Project - two 1250 MWe 
PWRs which started up 1988-89 - for $279 million plus fuel, but two of the owners then 
exercised right of first refusal, leaving Cameco with a $7 million consolation fee. 
- In July 2005 FPL Energy agreed to pay $380 million for 70% of newly-uprated Duane Arnold 
BWR from an Alliant Energy subsidiary, which will continue to buy the power. The plant is run 
by Nuclear Management Co. 
Figure 47 - US Nuclear Plant Sales, detailed summary 
Source: World Nuclear Association, 2005 
Acquisitions have mostly taken place in regions where electricity rates are higher, due to the 
potential for higher profit margins if the plants' production costs can be reduced. 
Of the 5,900 MWe involved to mid 2000, half was associated with plants having 1998 production 
costs above 2.0 cents per kwh. The reason is that sellers tended to consider the higher-cost plants as 
potential liabilities and were willing to get rid of them for a fraction of their book value. Conversely, the 
larger utility buyers considered the plants to be potential assets, depending only on their ability to lower 
the production costs. 
9.2.2.Consolidation and market liberalization 
The map below was extracted from a paper by Bruce ~ a c ~ . %  It displays the status of plant sales 
and of state liberalization on the same figure. There are various symbols for sales of plants: 
96 Lacy, 2004 
Plants that have been part of corporate mergers or ownership consolidation of plants that 
have had multiple owners 
Plants that are part of an expanded fleet ownership based on purchase of other plants 
Plants for which their ownership is essentially unchanged. 
The string correlation between liberalization and nuclear plant sales, mergers and consolidations 
is quite obvious on the map. 
Flalrrol I 
L 
status of US Market ~lbewbstfon i 
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Figure 48 - Status of US Market Liberalization and Nuclear Plant Ownership Changes 
Source: Bruce Lacy, 2004 
The graph below shows another type of relationship between timing of retail competition and 
plant sales in those states. Vermont aside, all the transactions have occurred only after state liberalization, 
as was already suggested by the map above. There seems to be a strong correlation between advent of 
liberalization and nuclear plant sales in individual states. 
This would suggest or confirm that deregulation and restructuring in the electric power sector has 
triggered nuclear power plant sales, driven by competitive pressures. 
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Company 
Exelon Corp. 
Entergy Corp. 
Tennessee Valley Authority 
Dominion Resources, Inc. 
Duke Energy Corp. 
FPL Group, Inc. 
FirstEnergy Corp. 
Constellation Energy Group, Inc. 
Southern Co. 
Progress Energy, Inc. 
All Others 
Total Nameplate Recent Acquisitions 
Capacity (MW) (MW) 
15,557 2,515 
9,010 3,966 
39,090 
Figure 50 - Top US nuclear owners, May 2005 
Source: Nuclear Energy Institute, 2005" 
Percent of 
US Total 
16 
9 
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9.2.4.Prospect for consolidation 
9.2.4.1. Merger of Exelon and PSEG 
In late December of 2004, Exelon announced its desire to acquire PSEG. This would be the 
industry's first truly strategic merger in several years. The first motivation for the alliance, according to 
the Edison Electric ~nstitute:~ is the ability to create efficiencies at all levels of the combined company, 
including generation, transmission, distribution and power marketing 
Exelon is the industry's largest operator, with 17 units and 18 GW of capacity. PSEG's three 
nuclear plants would receive Exelon's economies of scale and operating expertise. PSEG credit quality, 
having suffered from nuclear plant outages, should be improved. 
According to Edison Electricity Institute, if the deal is approved, the combined company will 
have approximately $27 billion in annual revenues, $3.2 billion in net income, 52,000 MW of generation 
capacity, nearly $80 billion in assets, and will serve approximately 7 million electric and 2 million gas 
customers in Illinois, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. 
On June 30,2005, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved the deal. In July 
2005, shareholders of both companies approved the transaction. The merger also received approval from 
'' NEI, 2005e 
'' EEI, 2005 
regulatory agencies in New York and Connecticut. The proposed merger still requires approval from New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania and Illinois state regulators, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and an anti-trust 
review by the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission. 
9.2.4.2. Outlook for Consolidation 
According to the WNA?' concentration of ownership seems set to continue where deregulation of 
power markets occurs, because the management of aging plants and license renewals will further induce 
single-unit owners to sell their plants. 
With the high prices achieved in the most recent transactions, other utilities are expected to decide 
to follow the auction route as well. The auctions and increased competition among more buyers are likely 
to push acquisition prices, which have moved even higher since the Clinton, Pilgrim and Three Mile 
Island purchases. The prices per kilowatt for decades-old US nuclear plants have increased more than ten- 
fold since mid- 1998. 
In 2000 and 2001 one third of US nuclear capacity was consolidated through mergers, purchases, 
and alliances. From 1990 to 2004 the number of operating companies/organizations halved, and 
eventually there could be only 10 to 12 US nuclear utility operators. 
According to Scully capital,lM the concentration and consolidation process has brought 
improvement in operations and financial health of the utilities. Moreover, larger owners tend to manage a 
portfolio of units that is not exclusively nuclear. As a result, they consider financing new units based on 
the total asset value of their larger balance sheets, not necessarily with a project-based approach. 
99 WNA, 200% 
'" Scully Capital, 2002 
9.3. New form of consolidation: contract operators 
The Nuclear Management Company is a joint venture formed in 1999 by four Midwest utilities 
for the purpose of operating the nuclear plants that they owned and operated - seven nuclear plants at five 
sites and in three different US states. The venture was approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
as a nuclear operating company. 
The contract operator took over operation, fuel procurement, and maintenance of eight nuclear 
units at six sites for a total of 4500 MWe. The nuclear units continue to be owned by the utilities, each 
with 20% of NMC. The utilities remain responsible for spent fuel and decommissioning. 
The main drivers of contract operators such as NMC, as with mergers, are cost reductions and 
streamlined operations. According to Bruce Lacy (2002), with NMC, the nuclear plant owners are 
positioned to act more quickly and more confidently when liberalization opportunities present themselves. 
For new investors, the contract operated plant should represent a better-understood, more stable and more 
reliable operation, with greater financial certainty. 
In September 2003, Entergy Nuclear signed an agreement to take over management of Nebraska's 
Cooper nuclear power plant, an 800 MWe boiling water reactor with a poor operating record. Entergy will 
be paid a fee and will be eligible for up to 50 percent more in incentive payments for improved safety and 
regulatory performance. It will be reimbursed for all employee-related expenses. Nebraska Public Power 
District will retain ownership, will be the sole operator and licensee and will take all power produced. 
Entergy, the second largest US nuclear operator, sees such arrangements as a potential growth area. 
10. Financing new nuclear power plants in the United States 
10.1. Why financing nuclear power plants is an issue 
The financing issue of nuclear power isn't exclusively related to the competitiveness of the 
technology with other sources of electric power. Even if the expected NPV of the project is positive, and 
even it is greater than that of all other power generation projects, the sheer size of the investment in a 
nuclear power plant, on the order of $2 billion per unit, represents a significant challenge to overcome. 
The Enron collapse also affected the approach to power plant projects. Investors have become 
more conservative, and would require a higher percentage of equity investment. Absent loan guarantees 
provisions included in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, if 50% of equity capital is required, owners will 
need to provide about $1 billion: as a consequence, the company's stock valuation will be affected. 
Besides, the capital is at risk: losing $1 billion would jeopardize the financial health of most companies. 
However, new nuclear plants are not uniquely large capital projects. Multi-billion dollar projects 
are not uncommon elsewhere in the energy industry. Richard ~ ~ e r s l ' l  gives the example of the Hibernia 
oil platform offshore Newfoundland, which was a $6 billion project. He mentions that the costs of LNG 
projects can be significantly higher than new nuclear plants. In order to manage the risk associated with 
these projects, the petroleum industry typically uses shared ownership of production facilities. 
Therefore, in theory, an investment in nuclear power should not be different from any other large- 
scale investment, provided risk is properly characterized and mitigated. Issues would arise if some risk 
items had high perceived expectations of occurrence and no mitigation strategy associated. 
The TIACT reportlo2 carries out an extensive analysis of the ways to overcome the financing 
obstacle through ownership arrangements to spread the equity investment and risk among a selection of 
parties. The report puts forward two key elements that are likely to play a major role in potential nuclear 
investments: the involvement of large industrial electricity users and the deregulation of wholesale and 
retail electricity markets. 
For large industry users, taking an equity position in a new nuclear plant is a way to secure a long 
term supply of electricity characterized by cheaper and relatively certain costs. Moreover, in a deregulated 
electricity market, the private financing of the plant, as opposed to a situation in a regulated state, would 
make shareholders' capital at risk for the costs. Even if there are long term power purchase agreements to 
offset some risk, private financing of a $2 billion project represents a large investment and risk for a 
single owner to undertake. 
lo' Myers, 2005 
lo* TIACT, 2005 
10.2. Financing a new nuclear power plant 
Overview of Financing and Construction for a New Nuclear Power PIant 
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Figure 51 - Overview of Financing and construction for a new Nuclear Power Plant 
Source: Scully Capital, 2002 
10.2.1. Corporate financing structure 
The power generating company is the borrower with the backing of the parent company of the 
integrated entity (Combination of a power generation company and an electric distribution company). 
Power generation assets are treated as being on-balance sheet for accounting purposes. 
Capital structure is generally comprised of 50% debt capital and 50% equity capital (in book 
value). 
10.2.2. Project financing structure 
A special purpose vehicle (SPV) is the borrower, rather than the corporate parent. The transaction 
is supported by contractual arrangements between the SPV and various other parties, which typically 
include the engineering and construction (E&C) contractor, the equipment vendor, and the power 
purchaser: no recourse to the parent companies. Lenders are secured by the assets and cash flows 
generated by the facility being constructed. 
The power generation asset is often treated for accounting purposes as off the balance sheet of the 
power generation company, and on the balance sheet of the SPV. 
This approach, classical to fossil-fired power generation, has become much less attractive. 
Decreases in corporate borrowing spreads (i.e., the margin that lenders require over and above the bank's 
cost of funds) and increases in project finance borrowing spreads (due to declines in credit quality among 
deregulated generation companies) has widened the spread differential between these financing options. 
Consequently, "off-balance sheet" financing has become much more expensive relative to corporate 
financing. Additionally, rating agencies have begun to view project financings as "on-credit" (i.e., on the 
balance sheet of the corporate parent) despite the off-balance sheet financing structure. 
As a result, corporate financings, carrying the credit of the corporate entity, are in many cases a 
favored financing alternative. 
10.2.3. Recent Financing Experience 
High capital costs for new nuclear power plants are expected to continue to be in favor of external 
borrowing, whatever financial structure, since it is unlikely any utility would have sufficient liquidity 
from internally generated cash flow to support cash needs of such projects. Moreover, even if the utility 
did have adequate liquidity, it would still resort to debt financing to reduce the average cost of capital. 
In the past 12 months, corporate acquisition financings for existing power generation assets with 
nuclear-related risks have been successful (e.g. Exelon Generating with a portfolio including nuclear 
plants generated a strong cash flow) 
Recent financing experience for existing nuclear generating facilities on a non-recourse basis 
demonstrated that lenders are not yet ready to accept exposure to risks that have a nuclear element as their 
central focus. Entergy's acquisition of three existing nuclear power plants resulted in a structure in which 
the parent company was asked to provide a guarantee against the operating performance of the plants. 
Lenders appear unwilling to accept this risk even with the track performance record. They are only 
willing to accept dispatch and energy demand risk on a non-recourse basis. 
10.3. Nuclear power and Wall Street 
For Caren ~ ~ r d , ' "  Executive Director at Morgan Stanley, nuclear power has been out of the 
headlines for some time, and investors today really spend little time thinking about nuclear issues or 
operations. Nuclear power has demonstrated its ability for good nuclear operations, the economics of 
nuclear are improving, and nuclear regulatory issues have remained rare. 
The average years of utility investment experience is only about 8 years (since the restructuring of 
the electricity sector). As a result, investors and analysts of nuclear companies were not involved when 
nuclear power was coming of age. In a survey conducted among top analysts of the nuclear industry, all 
respondents considered nuclear generation to be positive from an investment point of view. For some of 
the analysts, nuclear concentration increases the perceived risk a company faces 
10.3.1. Nuclear Compared With Other Fuels 
Environmental compliance issues for coal have clearly made nuclear generation more attractive. 
Nuclear is sometimes viewed as a natural hedge against environmental burdens on coal. In fact, when the 
value of coal generation goes down, the value of nuclear generation goes up, showing the importance of a 
balanced generation portfolio. This relative attractiveness is expected to widen in the future, as 
environmental requirements increase, affecting the cost and risks of coal generation. 
Nuclear generation is also attractive with regard to comparisons to gas generation. Its value as an 
investment has been enhanced by the dramatic increases in gas prices. Some analysts see nuclear 
generation as a proxy for gas reserves, and thus a valuable resource. Provided nuclear runs well, 
especially in markets where gas is on the margin, it can prove a profitable investment. Although nuclear 
generation would be notably less attractive if gas prices were to decline to historically more normal 
levels, such a drop is not expected for another 3 to 5 years. Moreover, even if gas prices fall, the volatility 
in gas prices increases the value of nuclear for the stability and predictability of its cost structure. 
lo' Byrd, 2004 
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10.3.2. Nuclear Operations 
Investors are interested in the recent track record of strong operations. Investors value that the 
nuclear industry is achieving near-term efficiency without sacrificing long-term operations or safety. 
Capacity factor is the most measurable and easily available statistic for operations. The fact that 
capacity factors have exceeded 90% in the past four years is widely acknowledged. Overall, Byrd says 
investors are confident about the long-term perspective of strong operations. Most analysts assume in 
their investment analysis that the industry will be able to maintain the current high capacity factors, and 
even improve it by some. However, some expect deterioration in capacity factors as existing units age. 
This concern is especially intense for deregulated market operation, since a 1% reduction in capacity 
factor translates directly into millions of dollars of foregone earnings. Consequently, there is a significant 
pressure on financial results and investors' appraisals of nuclear stocks. 
Sustaining high levels of efficient operations is the risk most often cited by investors. Only 50 
percent of Byrd's respondents have high confidence for indefinitely sustained efficient operations without 
some operating issue in the future. 
Moreover, investors realize the serious financial repercussions of an extended nuclear problem, as 
was witnessed for FirstEnergy's Davis-Besse outage. Davis-Besse was a specific event and not an 
industry issue and FirstEnergy was able to sustain the financial impact of that 25 month outage. However, 
for companies where nuclear is fully deregulated, such an occurrence could be a death blow. 
Also, safety is not a major concern for the financial community. The record of safe operations is 
appreciated by investors, and even the recent public opinion polls are telling about the general public's 
confidence. Investors also put a low probability of terrorism being a real risk for the industry. 
10.3.3. Nuclear Ownership Changes 
Overall, investors have embraced the consolidation of nuclear generation by the industry. Over 
time, investors have reacted increasingly positively to nuclear transactions, and each nuclear power plant 
sale has been seen as a value-enhancing event for shareholders on both sides of the transaction: 
Buyers have been considered disciplined in their purchases, and have realized operational 
improvements of purchased units. Investors say nuclear purchases have made buyers 
more attractive as an investment. 
Sellers have generally received attractive terms and in most cases good purchased power 
contracts. They have used the funds received to strengthen their financial positions and 
they have been able to better focus on other parts of their business. 
As long as consolidated companies keep up with efficient operations and appropriate risk 
management, any additional consolidation in the industry will be seen as positive. 
Single site nuclear companies still remain financially attractive. Operating costs are generally 
competitive with those of multi-station companies. Single station nuclear generation seems to generally 
work best when companies are still regulated, because revenues are not interrupted when units are shut 
down. Investors benefit from the nuclear generation with little risk from lack of scale and scope. 
On the other hand, investors especially value scale and scope when nuclear generation is located 
in deregulated markets. Investors tend to worry about the risk of earnings volatility from nuclear 
generation. In a deregulated market, when a company's only nuclear unit is down, replacement power 
must be found. The marginal cost of replacement power can be high, and these costs can't be passed on to 
customers. Shareholders have to bear this risk and a higher return may be required. 
10.3.4. New Nuclear Plants 
The investment community has seen the series of announcements relating to exploring the 
feasibility of new nuclear units. The industry had three separate proposals, and one of the groups 
submitting the proposals has been joined by eight US companies. 
The financial community is aware that the purpose of each consortium is to test the feasibility of 
new nuclear units and specifically to see if the NRC licensing provisions will work to support the 
construction of economically competitive new nuclear generation. However, analysts have very short time 
horizons as opposed to those projects dealing with licenses by 2010 and new units by 2014. 
Analysts are split on whether a commitment to actually build new nuclear will be made by the 
industry within the next 5 years. Investors, as citizens, understand that the country has few alternatives for 
clean, reliable and available energy sources, and see the potential role of nuclear energy in the energy 
future. Yet they are concerned about the economic viability of nuclear. The challenges are the following: 
Public perception about the safety of nuclear; 
Siting and NIMBY issues; 
Qualified work forces (both for construction and operation); 
Storage of spent nuclear fuel; 
Financial issues, the key issues. 
10.3.5. Financing issues 
COL process: The licensing process - Construction and Operation License (COL) process - still 
bears some uncertainties as to whether it will be effective and how expensive it will turn out to be. 
Investors do not wish to put a significant amount of their equity into this pre-construction process. To 
investors, logic recommends that vendors provide the majority of the private funds needed for this 
licensing process, because they have the most to gain financially from it. Construction Process: Investors 
are very leery to say that they will be there to put their money at risk during the construction phases of the 
early mover plants. There is too much uncertainty about whether the COL will work as designed, and 
investors do not want to bear the risk that a plant will be completed and not allowed to operate. Also, the 
market risk of the economics of this generation will be on investors' minds. 
Governmental Assurances: According to Byrd, governmental grants, loan guarantees, production 
tax credits and investment tax credits have advantages and issues, but they will be crucial. 
10.4. Project financing of the EPR reactor in Finland 
The EPR reactor currently being built in Finland is an example of nuclear power investment in a 
Western country with a competitive electricity market, and as such it is relevant to take a close look at its 
structure and business model. 
10.4.1. Nuclear power in Finland 
In 200 1, nuclear power held 3 1 % of electricity generation in Finland. The remaining electricity 
generated came from hydropower (17.8%) and fossil fuels (51.6%). Consequently, nuclear power 
represents almost a third of the electricity produced domestically. 
The Finnish nuclear fleet capacity factor has averaged above 91% over the past ten years - one of 
the highest in the world. The four operating reactors are owned by Fortum and TVO, and are located on 
two sites - Loviisa and Olkiluoto. 
TVO's capital is shared between the Finnish government (43%) and private ownership. Among 
the private shareholders are electricity-intensive industries that require a specific power supply. 
10.4.2. The foundations of the EPR project 
In 2003, after ten years of halt in the European nuclear program in Europe, Finland ordered a new 
nuclear reactor. The electric utility TVO signed the contract with Areva and Siemens for a European 
Pressurized Reactor (EPR). Construction is to begin in 2005 and operation should start some time around 
2010. 
The reactor is a 1,600 MW reactor and the contract has been signed at 3 billion euros. It is 
supposed to have a 60 year lifetime, and will bring the nuclear electricity generation from 27% up to 35%. 
Finland has chosen to build a fifth nuclear power plant as a political choice to meet environmental 
targets. The project, similarly to the potential new builds in the United States, occurs within a 
transitioning European context to competitive electricity markets. 
Finland has chosen to sign the Kyoto protocol, and has committed to maintain its greenhouse gas 
emissions at 1990 levels through 2012. For that purpose, the climate strategy is to promote energy 
efficiency, renewable energy sources and to reduce coal use by an increased use of natural gas and 
nuclear power. 
The industrial sector represents more than half of total electricity consumption in Finland, and the 
largest consumers are the paper, metallurgy and chemical industries. In the face of uncertainty of 
imported fuel and electricity prices, Finnish industrials have supported domestic production with stable 
prices. Moreover, nuclear power provides a source of baseload power that is well adapted to the future 
needs of the country and the load profile of power-intensive industries. 
10.4.3. Financial interest for the paper industry 
StoraEnso, UPM-Kymmene and Metsaliitto are the three main paper makers in Finland, providing 
around a third of paper production in Europe. The forestry and paper industries represent 7% of the GDP 
in Finland, and 25% of exports. 
Because of large baseload electricity needs, the industry has shown strong support for the 
construction of a fifth nuclear reactor in Finland. Since electricity needs are so large, the volatility in 
electricity prices significantly threatens the stability of the industry. Delocalization to regions where 
electricity prices are lower is not an option for the paper industry because of the necessary proximity to 
forested areas. 
10.4.4. Financing options for the Finnish nuclear reactor 
TVO signed a contract of 3 billion euros with Areva and Siemens for the EPR nuclear 
reactor (1,875 UkW, i.e. approximately 2,300 $/kW). In participating in the nuclear reactor project, 
the Finnish paper-makers guarantee there will be electricity supply in the long run and limit the impact of 
price risk. This commitment is materialized by the signature of a long-term fixed price contract. The 
contract has been signed within a project financing structure where TVO is the project developer and the 
papermakers are the equity investors. 
The financing has developed easily due to the fact that the links between actors are strong: TVO 
is joint-venture with six shareholders, including PVO (55%), the number two electric utility in Finland. 
TVO has a 100% power purchase agreement with its shareholders at cost-of-service, any unwanted 
portion being sold by them into the Nordic market. Consequently, TVO makes no profit on electricity 
sales. 
The EPR reactor will receive 25% equity capital from the paper industry. The Finnish paper 
makers have been among the largest contributors to the EPR reactor. However, 75% of the project is 
financed with five and seven year term bank loans, similar to any debt structure. The loans will later be 
refinanced with longer-term bonds. 
The paper makers will take on their share of risk by buying the electricity at cost: if prices 
increase, they will be better off because they won't need to purchase their electric power from the market. 
However, they will incur an opportunity cost if electricity prices drop. In a nutshell, the long-term 
contract has a dual function: it is a hedge against price risk and an investment to secure the electricity 
supply at a stable price. 
UPM-Kymmene (forestry products via PVO energy company) 25.63% 
Stora Enso Oyj (forestry products via PVO energy company) 9.39% 
Others (forestry products via PVO energy company) 25.18% 
Fortum Power & Heat (government controlled power company) 25.00% 
Oy Mankala Ab (City of Helsinki) 8.10% 
Etala-Pohjanmaan Voima Oy (distr cos in NW coast of Finland) 6.50% 
Graninge Suomi Oy (energy co. in forestrylenergy group) 0.10% 
Figure 52 - Ownership of the EPR reactor in Finland 
10.5. Analysis of recent nuclear plant sales conditions 
10.5.1. Price conditions 
We have already mentioned a number of companies have purchased nuclear power plants, with 
the intention of continuing to operate the plant since 1999, to a large extent as a result of the introduction 
of competitive markets. (cf. Figure 46) 
Figure 46 shows not only the time at which each acquisition has taken place, but also the price at 
which the plant has been sold, and the value per kilowatt and per number of remaining years until 
operating license expiration. 
At a glance, there is no pattern on the age of the plants sold: old plants as well as newer plants 
have taken part in the transactions, ranging from 12 year-old units to 31 year-old units. What this tells us 
is that a plant is attractive as long as it has proven good operating performance. Moreover, it seems that 
buyers are confident about the future performance of ageing plants. 
Secondly, prices for nuclear plant sales have been escalating. This is an indication that a nuclear 
unit is a valued corporate asset. The initial buyers were first movers of such difficult transactions, which 
could explain the price increase. A nuclear asset might have been initially perceived as a liability that the 
seller was getting rid of, putting the selling company in a poor bargaining position. As a result, early sales 
were made at a high discount. 
In fact, one can argue that, considering the plants that were sold were in operations and with good 
performance records, the discounts have been extremely high. 
10.5.2. Power purchase agreement conditions 
Sale Completed Value Remaining 
Buyer Reactors (expected) ($/kW .yr) life (yr) 
Power Purchase 
Agreement 
5-year contract at 
3.5 to 4 cents/kWh 
3-year fixed price 
Entergy Pilgrim 
Three Mile AmerGen Island contract 
5-year contract (75% 
of output) 
3-year contract at 
3.4 centskWh 
AmerGen Clinton December-99 0.8 27.5 
AmerGen Oyster Creek August-00 1 .8 8.9 
PECO Peach Bottom, January & 
(Exelon) et Hope Creek, October 200 1 1.5 
a1 . Salem 
3.2 centsfkwh from 
46% to 3 1 % output 
through 2004 and 
500,000 kwh at 2.9 
centskWh 
3.6 centskWh for 
100% output 
through 2004 
100% output at 3.9 
cents1kWh through 
2004 
Fitz~atrick & November-()() 
Indian Point 3 Entergy 
Entergy Indian Point 2 September-0 1 3.8 12.9 
Dominion Millstone 
Resources 
None 
90% output for 10 
years at 3.4 
centskwh 
1 0-year contract 
(100% output) at 3.9 
to 4.5 centskWh 
Nine Mile Constellation Point 
Vermont 
Yankee Entergy 
Seabrook November-02 26 28.1 FPL Energy 
Clinton, TMI, October-03 Oyster Creek Exelon 
90% of plant output 
for 10 years R E Ginna June-04 31 26.1 Constellation 
Genco & 
CPSE 
Dominion 
FPL Energy 
South Texas May-05 18 24.6 
Kew aunee July-05 39 9.1 
Duane Arnold (early 2006) 80 9.0 
Figure 53 - US nuclear plant sales - Price conditions 
Source: Nuclear Energy Institute, 2005'" 
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Some of the nuclear power plant sales have also had power purchase agreements (PPAs) 
contingent to the specific unit sold. A power purchase agreement is an off-take contract to buy part or all 
of the power generated by a power plant. 
No clear pattern can be drawn from the conditions of the PPAs. Some transactions have occurred 
without any power purchase agreement, while others provide off-take agreements for 10 years and the 
entire output of the unit. There are also a variety of arrangements between those two extremes. 
Moreover, one can notice that the duration of the PPAs is far exceeded by the remaining lifetime 
of the plant in all cases where off-take contract go together with the transaction. Although dispatching is 
an important concern for a utility, it seems that buyers were sufficiently confident in the markets in the 
service area of the sold plants that they didn't need the degree of certainty of off-take provided by PPAs. 
Of course, this last remark does not hold for new power plants. Indeed, nuclear power plants 
being of rather large capacity, their introduction in a market would immediately occasion a drop in prices 
due to the excess supply. A power purchase agreement would then help mitigate the risk of not being able 
to sell power above marginal costs of production. 
10.6. Business model and potential financing options for new investments 
10.6.1. Ownership structure options 
The TIACT report puts forward three ownership options for a nuclear power plant project in the 
Gulf Coast region, where the potential owners are:'05 
Option 1 : End users 
Option 2: End users, municipal utilities, power companies 
Option 3: End users, municipal utilities, power companies, nuclear industry investors 
The criteria employed to assess the implications of the ownership structure options are the 
following: 
Organizational issues 
NRC's financial requirements for licensees 
Size of the investment for each potential owner 
Financial issues 
Required rate of return on investment 
10.6.1.1. Option 1 
The business venture representing the new plant is 100% owned by end users, primarily from 
those industries that are energy intensive and sensitive to energy costs, similar to the Finnish case. 
An experienced nuclear operator such as the Nuclear Management Corporation or Entergy 
Nuclear could operate the plant under contract. 
The venture must provide NRC with assurances that it has the resources to ensure safe operation 
of the plant and to decommission it at the end of its life. 
Non-electric utility applicants are required to submit estimates for total construction costs 
and the first five years of annual operating costs and identify the source of funds to cover 
those costs. 
Front payment into a decommissioning trust fund, of around $150 million. 
Large industrial end-users have electricity needs between 125 and 250 MW, i.e. 10-20% of a 
nuclear power plant output. 5 to 10 (or more) end users would be needed for the investment, with an 
'05 TIACT, 2005 
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investment of $100 million to $200 million paid out over 4 years. Such an investment seems reasonable 
for large industrial companies. 
The TIACT report argues that debt will have to remain below 50% and that the cost of this debt is 
uncertain. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 guarantees debt up to 80%, so leverage will likely be higher 
than planned by TIACT, with much less uncertainty on the rate of return on debt. 
According to the report, end users will not be as risk-averse as Investor Owned Utilities: as a 
result, returns on investment will be lower by several points than an IOU, thereby improving the 
economics of the project. 
10.6.1.2. Option 2 
An objection to option 1 is the capacity of the potential new reactor designs, too large for 
exclusively industrial users to use. Adding municipal utilities and power companies brings the project 
closer to the Finnish option. The example taken to illustrate such an arrangement is South Texas Project - 
though without industrial users - with ownership split among two municipal utilities and two investor 
owned utilities: 
Austin Energy, The City of Austin 16% 
AEP Texas Central Company 25% 
City Public Service of San Antonio 28% 
Texas Genco LP 30.8% 
The suggested ownership share for this option is: 
Industrial end users 
The potential organization would be similar to option 1, except for the operational experience of 
some of the owners, which would be put to use instead of contracting an outside operating company. 
Requirements for decommissioning will prove more complicated, because multiple owners will 
never be jointly and severally liable for decommissioning costs. Arrangements would have to be found for 
each owner to meet the NRC requirement in the way most appropriate for its situation. 
The size of the investment will be smaller than in option 1 due to the larger number of parties. 
A consortium is likely to benefit from favorable financing terms. The presence of a municipal 
utility will be a proof of predictability of customer base and stability. 
The group will be diverse in its required return on invested capital. TIACT gives an estimate of 
10% for the aggregate value. 
10.6.1.3. Option 3 
This option adds nuclear industry investors such as reactor suppliers, uranium and enrichment 
services suppliers, and even foreign investors. TIACT believes that it would at least reduce large negative 
cash flows during the last two years of the construction period. 
In terms of organization, NRC financial requirements, size of investment, risks and costs will be 
spread and risk shared across a larger span of parties. 
The presence of a reactor supplier in the consortium is a positive element, for it adds assurances 
to the firmness of the price contract. 
The desired return on investment is very diverse in this group as well. Nuclear ownership not 
being the core business of the industry investors, the required return will be even higher than the 10% of 
option 2. However, the degree of ownership of these nuclear industry investors won't go above 10%: even 
though their required return will be higher than for other participants, the 10% contribution of nuclear 
industry investors will result in an increase in the aggregated required return on investment by no more 
than 0.5%. 
As a conclusion, TIACT recommends that the third option be chosen, considering the success of 
the Finnish utility TVO for its new nuclear plant. 
10.6.2. Risk-management strategy 
10.6.2.1. Quantifying risk for improved risk-management strategy 
Risk-management will be a key factor in allowing for new investments in nuclear power plants in 
the coming years. When considering a potential investment, an investor will essentially look at the 
riskheward balance. 
With the new energy legislation, we have seen that nuclear power was made cost competitive and 
the recent performance achievements in the industry suggest that nuclear power, in normal conditions, 
will be a profitable investment. 
The question is now on how specific projects will deal with the issue of properly accounting for 
the risk items to make it clear to the investor that he will be rewarded for the amount of risk he is willing 
to undertake. 
Two studies have quantified the major risks associated with nuclear power investments. The first 
one, Scully Capital, conducted a survey among industry participants to find out, on a scale fiom 1 to 5, 
how each risk item was evaluated and how those risks were ranked. The more recent one, the TIACT 
report, conducts NPV calculations similar to those presented in this study to assess the contribution of 
each item to the total risk of the investment. The results of the assessment are shown below. 
Delays During 
Construction 
10% 
Electricity Prices 
11% 
Figure 54 - Sources of Variation in Plant NPV 
(EPC = Engineering, Procurement and Construction) 
Source: TIACT, 2005 
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Figure 55 - Average ratings of risks by industry executives 
(10 interviews of senior executives: utilities, vendors, engineering and construction) 
Some: Scully Capital, 2002 
The figures above provide an interesting comparison: one quantifies the impact of risks on NPV, 
and the other gives the perception of senior executives regarding those same risks. 
At a glance, the results seem rather similar. High capital costs, delays in construction and market 
competition account for over 84% of risk and are perceived to be have the highest impact on investment. 
Financing costs are not displayed on the TIACT figure because they haven't chosen it as a variable; 
neither is public perception, for it is not quantified in the NPV calculations. 
The new licensing process should reduce most of construction delays due to regulatory or 
litigation matters. Financing costs have been lowered by the Energy Policy Act of 2005. A good risk- 
management plan will allocate a large amount of energy at resolving at least the following major risk 
items: 
High capital costs 1 long construction (EPC costs) 
Delays in construction 
Market competition (Electricity prices) 
10.6.2.2. The "tollgate approach to investment" 
In order to facilitate the financing of a nuclear project in the Gulf Coast region, the TIACT 
report1" developed a tollgate approach that deconstructs the risks so that they can be addressed separately 
and step-by-step, and that reward can appropriately match risk at every investment stage. The tollgate 
plan is displayed in the following figure. 
Figure 56 - Texas Gulf Coast Nuclear Plant Tollgate Plan 
Source: TIACT, 2005 
J 
2005 
-
Tollgate 1 
EPC Costs 
P/mnrng/Management 
Community Outmad, 
RFQ Prspartdtion 
Totel 5'0525M 
*Resolve €PC Costs 
*Estimate COL Costs 
*Decide whether to 
exercise COL option (#2) 
based on option #1 costs 
and plant value 
Risk is highest at the first tollgate, where the investment is small: such a contribution will be 
found provided it is rewarded with a significant upside. Risks are reduced to a more acceptable level at 
the last tollgate. It will then be easier to find the larger group of investors required to finance the project, 
with much more reasonable terms as risks have been significantly reduced. 
This approach has the crucial benefit of resolving uncertainties when capital outlays are the 
lowest, similar to the new NRC licensing process. The remaining investment may be foregone if 
uncertainties are resolved unsatisfactorily. 
P Exercise *Decide whether to exercise construction 
Abandon (Limit loss) option (#3) based on 
option #2 costs and plant 
' All costs In present 
value $2002 dollars value T 
Abandon (Limit Loss) 
1 
2007 
I 
Tollgate 2 
COL Costs 
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*Resolve construdion 
financing costs and 
construction schedule 
*Put Ownership Structure 
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-Arrange for long term 
financing 
1 
2010 
-
Tollgate 3 
Construction Costs 
Total Rant Construcbo~ Costs 
$2.6 billion 
Exercise 
*Arrange for plant 
operation, management 
and maintenance 
The major risk items that can be controlled are then resolved at the following tollgates: 
10.6.2.3. Engineering, Procurement and Construction costs 
Risk 
Total Overnight Capital Cost 
Delays During Construction 
Electricity Prices Plan 
We have seen earlier that capital costs represent a significant portion of the cost of nuclear power 
generation. Accordingly, the profitability of a project will be highly sensitive to capital costs. 
The EPC costs (Engineering, Procurement and Construction costs) are defined as the costs to 
engineer the plant, procure the components, equipment, material, and labor, and to construct the facilities. 
Solving the uncertainty about EPC costs would offset an important portion of the risk, and this is the main 
motivation for the nuclear provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, and the funding from DOE to the 
various consortia created in the past few years. Reducing risk will require the acquisition of more accurate 
capital cost information to which suppliers could commit. 
According to TI ACT,"^ until a firm price contract for a plant built in the U.S. is signed with a 
supplier, the level of contingency will not go below 5%. Even additional engineering information will not 
bring in more certainty: even with a design 90% close to completion, there will still be substantial risk 
that costs will turn out to be higher than publicly quoted estimates. 
One of the reasons given is that cost items do not take into account commercial terms and 
conditions at the pre-proposal stage. Moreover, vendors would rather provide the lowest possible cost 
estimates than be perceived as non-competitive. Finally, the TIACT report mentions the designs of the 
turbine islands are out of date and that cost information is not detailed. 
In order to offset the risk of the supplier bids, The TIACT report suggests going out for bids at the 
very beginning of the process, even before the COL application has been submitted, in order to secure the 
commercial terms and conditions. The bids would be on a fixed-price fixed-schedule basis, thereby 
shifting the risk to the EPC supplier. This would allow submitting price targets to investors with a much 
more reasonable degree of confidence. 
Finding the $12 million financing for this initial pre-COL step would be a difficult task, but once 
the hurdle is overcome, it would very much facilitate the following stages of the project. 
Management Strategy 
Tollgate # 1 
Tollgate #3 
Tollgate #3 
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10.6.2.4. Early community outreach 
The new NRC licensing process has reduced the opportunity of delays due to public opposition to 
the stage at completion of construction and before the ITAAC tests are run. Even though the public 
appears to favor new nuclear power plants, there is still a chance that anti-nuclear lobbies might take the 
opportunity of a time where all capital has been invested and the plant is standing idle. 
Reaching out to the public at early stages is a way to address construction delay risk that TIACT 
suggests in its report. Confronting the public before any key decision is made, like site selection, is a 
better method to reduce delays than insisting that the NRC resist pressure during construction. 
The early public outreach program could begin as soon as the project starts, i.e. when the 
ownership consortium is decided. The consortium would provide information and address all sources of 
concern so as to build support across the community. Opposition could also be neutralized early on from 
anti-nuclear groups. 
10.6.2.5. Power purchase agreements 
Due to the large scale of nuclear units, installing a nuclear power plant in a certain region will 
substantially affect supply for electricity, thereby affecting prices downwards. Power purchase 
agreements are a method for coping with the market imperfection that nuclear capacity cannot be added in 
marginal amounts. 
The experience from the nuclear power plant sales in the United States shows that power 
purchase agreements have not constituted an indispensable tool to help transactions. There are chances 
that if they can be avoided, i.e. in case where there will be a sufficient amount of certainty on baseload 
demand, they will be avoided. Otherwise, the conditions will be on the shortest possible terms and on 
price formulas as flexible as can be. 
However, in situations where uncertainty in demand is most intense, consumers will play a key 
role in financing, particularly large industrial users and electric distribution utilities. New nuclear plant 
financing may require long-term off-take arrangements to produce more reliable information about future 
demand. PPAs evoke a commitment from the customers, and will support the creditworthiness and the 
terms of financing of new nuclear plant construction in the United States. 
10.6.3. Anticipated characteristics of new investments 
By way of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the government will help offsetting the first-time 
design and engineering costs and mitigating the risks associated with new nuclear plants. In spite of the 
new regulatory process, until the first few new plants are built, investors will inevitably perceive nuclear 
construction as riskier than other forms of generating capacity, thereby increasing required returns on debt 
and equity capital. 
However, there is a financing challenge to the first few plants of any series of new capital- 
intensive baseload power plants. As capital costs decline, and they are likely to do, and as the licensing 
process proves efficient and predictable, future builds will be financed without the support provided for 
the first few projects by the recently voted energy legislation. 
NEI expects to see a spectrum of project and financing arrangements.lo8 Construction will be 
financed like any other large-scale construction project. There will be regulated and merchant projects, 
with varying degrees of leverage, many sources of equity capital. The projects will be built by single 
companies, by consortia for risk-sharing purposes, by companies on behalf of others. Arrangements may 
involve project financing structures, and either be full-recourse or non-recourse to the project developers' 
balance sheets. Other structures like the Finnish TVO model may also be used. 
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PART IV: Analytic investment model in 
power generation 
11. Evaluation of the impact of regulatory delays on the future potential builds in nuclear capacity in the 
case of cost competitiveness 
In studies about the relative competitiveness of power generating technologies, the most popular 
metric against which projects are compared is the levelized cost of electricity: the minimum price of 
electricity for the project to break even at the end of its economic life. A project will be considered 
cheaper and better if its LCOE is lower. 
This method has a number of weaknesses, most of them related to the necessity of simplifying 
assumptions in a financial model. A number of characteristics are assumed to remain constant throughout 
the lifetime of the power plant, while most of the actual values are highly variable, and average values are 
chosen. The rationale is that the variability of certain components of electricity generation technology 
valuation will have low impact on the lifetime value of the project, impact which is taken care of through 
the use of a risk-adjusted discount rate. 
Moreover, the variability of load is generally not properly taken into account. Depending on the 
marginal cost of production of a technology, the merit-order will impose that the production of some units 
will not be dispatched, or that some units will be temporarily shutdown at certain times where demand for 
electricity is lower than supply. In fact, the purpose of reserve margins is that there always exists excess 
production capacity for peak loads. The peaking units will otherwise remain shut-down. Thus, the LCOE 
method is only valid for baseload units that would dispatch all of their output, or for peaking units if the 
uncertainty on load is accurately accounted for. Uncertainty undermines the accuracy of the LCOE 
analysis, and even if effort is placed in estimating the average annual load, there will inevitably be 
residual omitted uncertainty. 
Along the same line, the LCOE method is a static analysis of the investment decision. It does not 
explicitly consider the unit of capacity as part of a dynamic environment with parameters external to the 
project itself but relevant to the investment decision in a given technology. The evolution of demand for 
electricity, the capacity currently being built, the rate at which capacity has been built in the past few 
years are not a base to decision-making, By renouncing the market context and its dynamics, the LCOE 
method misses information that could have great effect on the decision between several projects. 
Also, when the time dimension is added, temporality features are added in. A very important one 
is the construction time of the project. On first impression, it seems that construction time is accounted for 
by the LCOE model: the longer the construction time, the longer the period between the sinking of the 
initial outlay and the start-up time. We have commented in this study on the fact that construction time is 
a key factor for capital-intensive projects like nuclear power plants. Yet, if demand and prices evolve 
through time, the length of the construction period carries another aspect related to uncertainty. Not only 
does the investor face uncertainty about demand and prices for electricity from the moment the plant is 
built, but there also is an additional period during which the situation may evolve - favorably or 
unfavorably - before the first positive cash flow of the project, namely the construction period. 
This study is ultimately aimed at analyzing the impact of this additional uncertainty on investment 
in power generation. Construction time is a feature that places generation technologies like nuclear power 
and gas-fired power in very different positions, for it takes much less time to build a combine cycle gas 
turbine power plant than a nuclear power plant. The two technologies will compete in some areas for 
baseload power generation. The following analytical model will intend to analyze how the economics of 
each technology in addition to their differing construction time will place them relatively to each other in 
a given region. The overall impact on prices for electricity will also be carefully examined. 
The first section will lay the basis of the investment model developed for this study, and the 
quantitative assumptions used for simulations. Simulations will then be run in the second section so as to 
gain practical insight on the investment dynamics in electricity generation. 
1 1.1. Investment model 
In this section, the ultimate investment model will be reached in three steps by progressively 
taking new elements into account. 
The first step will be the presentation of a model of dynamic investment where there is only one 
generation technology and where construction is assumed to be instantaneous. The addition from the 
LCOE model is the effort to take uncertainty of demand and the resulting price process into account. The 
model was developed by ~ e a h ~ ' ' ~  in 1993. 
The second step will be to incorporate time-to-build into the investment decision. There will still 
be only one generation technology, and the model will straightforwardly implement the work of 
~renadier. ' lo 
The third and final step in the development of the model will be to introduce two competing 
technologies with different characteristics. Although this study does not derive a closed form solution in 
competitive equilibrium, assumptions are made to approximate the solution and gain the insight from the 
modeled situation. 
1 1.1.1. The Leahy model 
1 1.1.1.1. General principle - deterministic case 
The Leahy model is a model of investment in a competitive equilibrium, where the price of the 
traded good clears the market (i.e. equates aggregate supply and demand for the good). In our situation, 
an instantaneous equilibrium will determine the price of electricity according to the installed electric 
capacity and the demand for electricity function. 
The industry considered will consist of a continuum of homogeneous firms. Thus, each unit of 
installed capacity will have identical characteristics in all respects. Moreover, the continuum assumption 
means that units of capacity will be considered infinitely divisible. 
All firms are assumed to be risk-neutral. This can mean that risk has already been accounted for 
in other parameters of the technology, but that the discount rate at which cash flows will be discounted is 
the risk-free discount rate. 
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Another strong assumption Leahy makes in this model is the perfect competitiveness of the 
industry. The number of potential entrants is infinite, so it is assumed that they are all price takers: 
infinitesimal investments have no effect on the market. 
All incumbents and potential entrants produce with the same technology at constant returns-to- 
scale with a constant production cost of c . 
The firms' assets will be referred to as its installed capacity (in our case electric capacity). The 
firm's output is considered non-storable and is produced in proportion to the installed capacity. To keep 
the following assertions as general as possible, we will not refer to the output as electricity. 
We also assume that capital is infinitely divisible. One unit of capital produces one unit of output. 
At any point in time, a firm may invest in a unit of capacity at a cost of k . The investment is irreversible 
and all firms discount their cash flows at a discount rate of r , taken to be the risk-free interest rate. 
The time horizon considered in this investment problem is infinite. The assumption is therefore 
that a unit of installed capacity will be capable of producing one unit of output indefinitely. 
Since the firms are price takers, too small relative to a market to affect its price, it is convenient to 
think of each infinitesimal unit of capacity as a separate firm. The advantage of this assumption is to keep 
expected profits of the firm finite in the case of constant returns-to-scale. 
The firms' output may be sold in a competitive market at timet at the market clearing price p, . 
Under the assumptions above, the total market capacity can be seen as equal to the market supply q, at 
time t . 
Also, in order to carry uncertainty in our investment problem, we introduce a potential exogenous 
demand shock that may either rise or fall over time, and is noted x, at time t . For now, the demand shock 
will be treated as deterministic. 
The relationship of the market price of the good p, , the market supply q, , and the demand 
shockx, is summarized in the following time-invariant inverse demand 
~ u r v e ~ , = D ( ~ , , x , ) ,  D  <0 ,  D, > O .  
For any value of installed capacity g, the profits accruing for each unit of capacity are finite, i.e. 
1 1.1.1.2. The assumption of myopic behavior 
We now introduce the key concept of Leahy's model: the myopic firm. A myopic firm is a firm 
which completely ignores the effect of the investment of other firms on the price process. The myopic 
firm will make the assumption that the industry-wide capacity will remained fixed forever and that the 
price process will be driven solely by exogenous shocks. In other words, the price process that the myopic 
firm uses to evaluate an investment opportunity assumes no other firm will invest. 
Hence, the myopic firm has static expectations about industry output, as capacity is expected to 
remain constant forever. On the other hand, it has rational expectations regarding other factors influencing 
the market clearing price. 
The implications of the myopic assumption are that the firm will treat q, as fixed forever at its 
value q . The entry time T at which the firms decides on an additional unit of capacity is chosen so as to 
maximize the net present value of profits, according to the following maximization program: 
max, k e - "  (D(& x, ) - c)di - eVr'k ~ ( q ,  x, )dt - ewrT 
In this case, the first order condition for the choice ofT is p,  = c + rk . In other words, the 
myopic firm will always choose to invest at a point when price equals the annuity value of capital, also 
known as the long-term marginal cost of production. 
The second order condition states that the price process is such that before the investment is 
triggered, the price is below c + rk . For that reason, c + rk is known as the trigger price for investment. 
In principle, there can be many choices ofT that would satisfy the first and second order 
condition. As a result, the myopic firm will choose the one that maximizes profits. 
1 1.1.1.3. The optimality of myopic behavior 
In the following sections of his paper, Leahy proves that myopic behavior will yield a competitive 
equilibrium. 
First, it is assumed that competitive firms will follow myopic investment policies. We need to 
prove that this behavior will induce a situation where the NPV of an investment at any time of entry will 
C be equal to the discounted present cost of entry- + k . 
r 
As we said earlier, with myopic behavior, at the time of investment the price is equal to c + rk . 
Let us now determine the NPV between investment times. We assume that investment is triggered at 
time t, andt, but that no investment is triggered in the interval It,, t, [. Since no investment takes place in 
that period, capacity will be constant at the level oft, during that interval. 
The NPV on this interval is necessarily smaller than - + k (1 - e-r(t2-t1'), which is exactly the (: 1 
gain from delaying the cost of entry from t, tot, , or else a myopic firm would not wait until t, to invest. 
Conversely, revenues can be no less than - + k  (I - e-r('2-t1)), or some firms that invested at (f 1 
time t ,  would find it optimal to postpone investment until t, . 
As a result of the considerations above, the NVP over the interval It,, t, [ is 
exactly(: + k ) ( l  e r 2 )  Under a myopic behavior, a firm invests when price is a tc  + rk . 
Therefore, if in the interval It,, t, [ the firm invests continuously, the NPV will be - + k (I - e-r(t2-4')) (f 1 
C 
too. By integrating over all intervals, we get an NPV of - + k  . 
r 
C Consequently, since- + k is the optimal NPV in a competitive equilibrium, myopic behavior is 
r 
optimal in competitive equilibrium. 
1 1.1.1.4. Myopic behavior with uncertainty in demand shocks 
So far, the demand shock had been treated as deterministic. The demand shock will now be 
treated as a diffusion process. 
Uncertainty will necessarily affect the behavior of both competitive and myopic firms in this case. 
In competitive equilibrium, since price generally declines following capacity addition, the cost of 
uncertainty in this investment situation will be that the trigger price will be higher than the annuity value 
of capacity. There is also a value for myopic firms in remaining uncommitted in an uncertain 
environment, which also cause the price trigger to increase above annuity value of capital. 
The rest of the model remains unchanged, and now the demand shocks follow a price diffusion 
process of the following formdx = p(x)dt + ~ ( x ) d w ,  where dw is a Wiener process. One could choose, 
as is often done in the investment literature, a geometric Brownian motion w i t h p ( x ) = p  
and ~ ( x )  = a . 
Leahy proves that the increase in the trigger price is the same in both myopic and competitive 
firms. The proof is the main body of Leahy's paper and I will refer the reader to it for further details on 
the proof. 
He also proves that the solution to the social planner's problem is equivalent to the behavior of 
myopic firms. Indeed, the optimum in the social planner's maximization program maximizes the 
contribution of each unit of capacity to the social welfare, which is what is being done by the myopic firm 
when choosing the optimal entry time. The social planner will therefore follow myopic policies as well. 
1 1.1.1.5. Price process 
We have assumed earlier that firms were price takers. Yet, firms will decide on investment at the 
same instant, and as they install capacity together, the price will be affected. Consequently, in figuring the 
competitive equilibrium investment rule, the price process has to be derived endogenously. 
Let us write  the price trigger strategy. In competitive equilibrium, Leahy shows that this 
level of price acts as a reflecting barrier, a price ceiling that reflects the price from above, and prevents 
further price growth. In the stochastic equilibrium, the price is allowed to decrease below the trigger level. 
It can then climb back to it and entrants prevent it from ever growing above again. Consequently, the 
uncertain price will evolve below the trigger level, and as soon as the level is hit, the price will remain 
constant at that level during a window of time and go back to a lower level. The same phenomenon will 
reproduce when the trigger is reached again. 
It is now possible to derive the price trigger explicitly in particular cases that are easy to solve, 
from that solution we will derive the competitive equilibrium. Other papers inspired by the Leahy model 
have conducted similar work, like Murto who compared two types of technologies under a competitive 
equilibrium context, one with infinitely divisible capacity and one with large-scale non-divisible 
capacity. ' 
' ' Murto, 2003 
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1 1.1.1.6. Example - Dixit and Pindyck, 1994 
In order to get an explicit solution to the competitive equilibrium, we will use assumptions 
common to many investment models. 
1 
-- 
First, we will choose an explicit inverse demand function that has the form D ( ~ ,  X )  = xq ' , 
where is the price elasticity of demand. 
Secondly, we will also assume that the demand shock follows a geometric Brownian 
motion ah = p d t  + m d w  , where we have written dw the underlying Wiener process. 
Dixit and ~ i n d ~ c k " ~  find a derivation of the price trigger using the method of contingent claims 
analysis or dynamic programming, and give the investment trigger for a myopic firm, which is 
P independent of the industry installed capacity. P * = - (r - p )(: + k ) , 
P - 1  
2 2r 
where,8=--- 1 + ( - I) + - is the positive root of the equation - o2 s(s - I) + ps - r = 0. 
2 cr2 o2 2 
An important assumption in the derivation of the price trigger is that r - p > 0 ,  i.e. the demand 
shock grows at a greater rate than the risk-free interest rate. Indeed, if it were not the case, the firm would 
never invest and would always be better off waiting and simply keeping open the option to invest in a 
new unit of capacity. For our investment problem, r is the expected rate of return of owning the 
completed project. It is the risk-free equilibrium rate. If we have r - p > 0 ,  the expected rate of capital 
gain on the project is less thanr. The quantity r - p is seen as an opportunity cost of delaying 
investment and instead keeping the option to invest. If we had r - p < 0 ,  there would an opportunity 
benefit in keeping the option alive, and firms would never invest. The opportunity benefit would come 
from the fact that it would always be profitable to wait to invest because the asset was going to be 
growing in value. This would result in an asset of infinitely large value. This assumption is not realistic, 
hence the assumption of r - p > 0. 
1 1 
~ i n c e - a ~ p @ - l ) + p f l - r = o ,  we have that - 0 2 p ( B - l ) + r ( B - l ) + p P - r f i o  
2 2 
Consequently, we can Say 
'I2 Dixit & Pindyck, 1994 
that P * = 1 + -- p (C + rk ) > c + rk . This result confirms that there is a positive cost associated ( :9' ) 
with the uncertainty in the demand shock process. 
The uncertainty premium can be quantified as the ratio of trigger prices with and without 
goes to zero, i.e. when uncertainty is infinitely reduced, the ratio evidently goes to 1 and the premium 
goes to 0. 
This could be understood in the following way: the true cost of the technology depends upon the 
volatility of the demand in the market where the technology is to be employed. In the face of uncertainty, 
the traditional LCOE is not correct, because it does not accurately measure the true cost given the demand 
uncertainty. The LCOE method in our case would give a trigger price for investment of P * = c + rk at 
the level necessary to break even taking the discounting into account. However the method does not at all 
account for the price uncertainty generated by demand uncertainty. The LCOE method omits the 
uncertainty from the market environment in which the technology is built. 
1 a* 
Uncertainty induces a premium of -- ,8(c + rk)  which is the direct effect of demand volatility. 
2 r  
1 a* 
The cost of uncertainty will be defined as the price ratio 1 + --,8. The price trigger will be an 
2 r  
uncertainty-adjusted LCOE: Price Trigger = LCOE * Cost of Uncertainty. 
It is an assumption of the model that once installed, a unit of capacity will produce one unit of 
output. Therefore, production costs will always be incurred by the firm in every period. The equilibrium 
will not here depend on the relative importance of investment cost to production cost. From now on, 
lifetime costs will be noted K = k + c / r  . 
1 1.1.2. The Grenadier model 
In this section, we will be adding another element to our investment problem. So far, capacity was 
built instantaneously. There was no lag between the moment at which the decision to add capacity was 
made and the moment when the capacity effectively became operational to produce the good. The new 
feature of the investment model is that in the subsequent paragraph, all characteristics will remain, except 
that there will be a time-to-build for capacity. There will be a constant delay between the instant of the 
decision and the instant of installation. 
1 1.1.2.1. General principle of the model 
All the assumptions of the Leahy model remain. We are also placing ourselves in the particular 
case of a geometric Brownian motion from now on, and the market inverse demand function is still of 
constant elasticity in the following form pt= xtq,-". 
Firms can add units of capacity at a lifetime cost of K per unit comprising a sunk cost of k and a 
production cost of c . 
We now introduce a lag between the time at which a new unit is purchased and the time at which 
this unit can be used in production. This lag can be seen as a time-to-build the new unit of capacity or 
include any form of regulatory delay. We note the investment lag 6 2 0. A unit of capacity purchased at 
time t will be ready for operation at time t + 6. However, the cost of installing a unit of capacity will be 
incurred immediately. 
In that sense, let us consider two technologies which have identical LCOEs. Another way to see 
this is the two technologies have identical long-term marginal costs at start-up ( c  + kr is the same for 
both technologies). The only difference between the two technologies is that they have different 
construction times: one has time-to-build 6 and one doesn't. Then, the t = 0 present value of the LCOE of 
the technology with time to build will be (c + kr)e-" and thet = 0 present value of the LCOE of the 
technology without time-to-build will simply bec + kr . As a result, the technology with time-to-build 
will be "cheaper" at the investment decision than the technology without time-to-build. Of course, the 
consumer surplus will be smaller since demand is served starting at a later date. 
We define qcom the amount of committed capacity, that is the existing capacity plus the capacity 
currently being built. We also define qc0,, the amount of capacity currently under construction - i.e. 
capacity that initiated construction in the interval (t - 6 ,  t]. We have the 
following: qco,(t) = q(t)+ qc*,,(t) andq(t + 6) = qcom(t)+ 
The aim of the model is to construct a competitive equilibrium in which firms have rational 
expectations. Such an equilibrium will determine prices and entry strategies simultaneously, and 
strategies, prices and expectations must be mutually consistent. Also, a competitive equilibrium will have 
the characteristic that the present discounted value of profits will equal the construction costs at the time 
of investment. 
The equilibrium evolves as if to maximize the expected present value of social welfare in the 
form of consumer surplus. The rate of consumer surplus is the area below the demand 
The maximization problem facing the social planner is reduced to the following optimal control 
problem: J (a, ) = max 1, E e-" s (x(t ), qCom (t - 6)dt) - Ke -" A ~ ~ ~ , ,  (t )/Q(o) = a, 
f 
We noted Aqco,, (t) the increment in capacity at instantt , n ( t )  the current state of the industry, 
anda ,  the initial state of the industry. The current state of the industry is fully known by the knowledge 
of demand, existing capacity, capacity in construction and the times at which capacity construction started 
for the capacity still being built and can be written n ( t )  = {x(t ), q(t), q, (t ), ~ ( t ) } ,  where 
~ ( t )  = {r E (t - 6 9  tl, q, (4 > q, (r- )I. 
In appearance, it seems that the introduction of a time to build makes the investment decision far 
more complicated, because the solution to the investment problem requires more information, information 
about all initiation times of all the units that are currently under construction. 
To handle the complexity arising from the new information, we will use and outline the procedure 
outlined in Grenadier. 
For more details on the derivation of the competitive equilibrium solution, see Grenadier.'13 
11.1.2.2. Grenadier'ssolution 
To solve the central planner's problem, Grenadier simplifies the state space. Knowledge only 
about x(t) and qCom (t) is sufficient for determining equilibrium new entry. 
First, the maximization problem can be rewritten as follows: 
' I 3  Grenadier, 2000 
We can see that the second term does not depend on the path of entry over the period (- 6,0], but 
only on the value of the committed capa~ityq~-,~. Therefore the result of maximization 
with no = (xo , qo, qcomtr,09 A,) is the same as the result with no = (&, qc,o ,o, { 1). The maximization 
can be rewritten as follows: 
It can be rewritten again as follows: 
J ( ~ 0  9 qo 3 q cmtr.0 9 '0 ) = J ('0 9 4 com.0 90, { 1) 
We can write v (x, qc- ) = J (x, qC- ,0, { }) and solve the problem for the artificial economy in 
which all capacity is completed. The problem is now finite-state and much simpler to solve. 
Since there are constant returns to scale, the problem is an optimal instantaneous control problem. 
According to Grenadier, in this case it is optimal for the industry to grow continuously rather than in 
discrete jumps. We will consider qc- (t) continuous, and kc- (t) will be in fact noted d q , ,  (t) . 
Grenadier uses traditional option pricing, like Dixit and Pindyck cited earlier, to solve the 
problem. The ultimate result for ~ ( x ,  qc- ) is given by the following formula: 
The competitive equilibrium strategy is characterized by the trigger function xe(qC,). The 
qComh unit of supply will be initiated the first moment that the demand shock rises to the trigger 
 level^*(^^,). The trigger function is also derived in the paper and can be expressed 
Although the strategy resembles the real options trigger strategy, there are two elements which 
make it fundamentally different: the dependence on the level of committed capacity q,,, and not on 
installed capacity of price, and the consideration given to the time-to-build parameter. 
1 1.1.2.3. Grenadier's strategy 
Let's try to characterize the main difference between the Grenadier situation and the Leahy 
situation. With instantaneous construction, the optimal strategy is to invest the first moment that the price 
process rises to the price trigger P* . We will see that, with time-to-build, the entry strategy will be to 
invest when the discounted expected value of the price in 6 years equals the trigger P* . 
1 1 
Indeed, p(t + 6) = x(t + 6)q(t  + 6)-i = x(t + (t)-? , and when we discount the expected 
1 1 
value, we can write that e " ' ~ ,  ( p ( t  + 6)) = e-"E, (x(t + 6))qcomm (t)-5 = x(t)e-('-~)' qcomm (t)-5 . Then 
P 1 x( t )  = x* ( t )  = - ( r  - p)~e( ' -p)6q ,om;  is equivalent to e-"E, ( p ( t  + 6)) = L!- ( r  - p)K = P* . P-1 P-1 
In Leahy, any positive demand innovations cause a corresponding volume of capacity additions 
such that price does not rise above P*. 
In Grenadier, any positive demand innovations cause a corresponding volume of commitments to 
capacity additions such that expected price at t  + 6 does not rise above P*. As a result, in Grenadier the 
price can rise above P*, and will generally be brought down after t  + 6. 
Therefore, the impact of time-to-build is a change of the strategy by replacing the current price by 
the discounted expected price in 6 years. If one was to compare the same technology with equal costs at 
start-up (identical c + rk ), it would be necessary to discount the capital costs 6 years back in the time-to- 
build context. Consequently, as you vary time-to-build keeping other things constant, the present value of 
LCOE is brought down from c + kr to ( c  + kr)edrs , or aggregate costs from K to ~e-" . As a result, the 
price trigger is formally lowered from P* to P*e-". What is really occurring is that the price trigger 
remains, but the construction time imposes that the decision be made sooner because of the time value of 
money: this explains thee"' factor. The difference between the Grenadier solution and the Leahy 
solution is that in the case of Grenadier, the producers need to consider an investment 6 periods in 
P I P 6  - advance. The impact on the demand trigger will likewise become x* = -(r  - p)Ke-  qcomv . P-1 
Let's calculate the ratio of demand triggers in the Grenadier and in the Leahy case, without and 
x* (6) with time-to-build for technologies of identical long-term marginal costs at s t a r t - u p 7  = e-". This 
x (0) 
value is a measure of the true cost of time-to-build. We will choose to define e-@ as the cost of time-to- 
build. The cost of time-to-build seems to be independent of the risk-free interest rate, and more 
importantly independent of the volatility of demand. 
The price process will equally change in the presence of time-to-build and compared to the Leahy 
situation. Instead of committing capacity in order to maintain the current price below the trigger, capacity 
will be committed so as to maintain the discounted expected price below that same trigger. In fact the 
process forqcom will evolve as follows: at the first instant thatx(t) reaches the trigger 
value x* (qcom + dqcom ) , qcom will rise to the level q, + dqcom . 
At the limit where 6 would converge towards zero, we find ourselves in the Leahy situation with 
instantaneous construction. Indeed, investment is triggered when the demand shock reached the demand 
x* (6) trigger, andT = e-~ '  converges to 1 whens goes to zero. Also, q,, converges towards the 
x (0) 
installed capacity as time-to-build tends to zero. 
1 1.1.2.4. Grenadier's asset values 
The final component of the description of the competitive equilibrium in Grenadier is the 
valuation of existing assets. ~ e t  w (a,) denote the value of a completed asset. The value of a completed 
asset is the discounted expected value of future equilibrium output 
The result of the integral above is given in Grenadier by the following 
expression 
The intuition for the formula above is the following: the first term is the present value of the 
future stream of cash flows from time 0 to a .  The second term is the present value of the future stream of 
cash flows from t imes tooo, assuming that supply remains constant over that period. The third term 
subtracts out the loss of value from future increase in market supply from time 6 tom . 
Given the value of a completed asset, the value of an asset beginning construction is derived as 
follows. The asset does not receive any cash flow in the period of construction between0 and 6 .  A 
construction cost is subtracted from the option value. If we noteG(x,q) the value of the asset just 
beginning construction 
1 
-- 
q e - ( r - ~ ) &  P 
that ~ ( x ,  q )  = ~e-(~-')' - n - K . 
- Pk-P) I" 
Entry occurs at the trigger valuex*(q), where the equilibrium value of the unit of capacity 
installed is ~ ( x *  (q), q). The optimality condition of the equilibrium imposes that for all q , 
G(xe(q), q)  = 0 (which can be verified). By pursuing an optimal entry strategy, the best the firm can do 
is a zero-NPV project. If the firm invests at any other time, it will lose value. 
This result can be extended to the Leahy case, where 6 = 0, and the value of an asset just being 
4 " installed is ~ ( x ,  q)  = x - - 
r-P 
K ]  x8q - K , which can be rewritten 
1 1.1.3. The two-technology model 
This section will describe the third and final step of the models considered in this study. The 
general context is the same as the one considered in the Leahy model and in the Grenadier model. 
1 1.1.3.1. General principle of the model 
The new feature of the two-technology model is the possibility to invest in two different types of 
technology which we will write G and N . A unit of capacity in both technologies will produce one unit of 
the same output at every period forever. The two technologies are similar in all respects, except for the 
following attributes: 
Technologies G and N have different costs noted KG and K, ; 
Technology G has no time-to-build: there is instantaneous construction of G capacity; 
Technology N has a strictly positive time-to-build: whenever capacity addition is 
decided, it takes 6 years for the new capacity to become available for production. 
The introduction of two technologies, in combination with time-to-build makes the problem 
infinitely more complicated to resolve. 
In Grenadier with only one technology and time-to-build, the apparent issue stemming from the 
additional information needed was solved by a trick that proved that the optimization problem was 
equivalent to the same one with no capacity in the supply pipeline. The solution was made possible by the 
fact that the cash flows generated during the first 6 years were independent of the pattern with which 
construction had been previously decided. 
However, the situation features two different pipelines of different lengths (in the case we have 
chosen here, one of the pipelines has an infinitely small length). The cash flows generated during the6 
first years now depends, not on the pattern of capacity addition of technology N , but on the investment 
pattern of technology G , which directly affects the current price. 
1 1.1.3.2. Solving the model analytically 
We will write q (t ) , q, (t ) and q, (t ) respectively the committed capacity of technology N , 
the installed capacity of technology N and the installed capacity of technologyG . We will also write 
q(t) = q, (t) + q, (t) and q,, (t) = q,,cmm (t) + qc (t). Like in Grenadier, we have 
Moreover, the competitive situation between the two types of capacity will be seen as two 
different and separate groups of firms capable of building either one of the technologies. All firms have 
the characteristics described in the previous sections, including their being price takers. Thus, for each 
firm, the strategy is not a choice between investing or not on either one of the technologies but a choice in 
when to invest in a unit of capacity of their given technology. Consequently, what we are looking for is 
not one but two separate entry strategies. 
The rationale for this assumption is to introduce competition, not only between the individual 
firms, but between the two technologies. Each strategy will be similar to the strategy in the one- 
technology equilibriums described earlier. 
If we consider q,,, (t), q, (t) andq, (t) continuous, there are two maximization problems 
being solved simultaneously: the maximization problem of technology N and the maximization problem 
of technology G , both optimal control problems: 
The solution used by Grenadier cannot be used here because the sequence of prices in the 
firstsperiods will depend on theG capacity being installed, and the early cash flow from 
capacity N depends on the current price pattern. Therefore, it is not possible to modify the terms of the 
problem in a way that would reduce the information to consider in the investment decision. 
There is now an infinitely long vector of committed capacity to take into account in elaborating 
the strategy. It seems it is not possible impossible to solve the equilibrium analytically in order to reach a 
closed form. 
1 1.1.3.3. Simplifying assumptions 
The option that will be chosen in the following section is to approximate the optimum and to find 
a measure of how close the approximation from the optimal competitive equilibrium. 
So far, in the Leahy model and in the Grenadier model, we have used the concept of a myopic 
behavior of firms. Leahy proved that taking into account only existing capacity in fashioning expectations 
of future cash flows was equivalent to a competitive equilibrium strategy and achieved optimality. 
Similarly, the optimal strategy in Grenadier only considers information on installed capacity and capacity 
in building, without forming future expectations on capacity additions that would affect cash flows. 
I will now introduce a new form of myopic behavior, that I will call extended myopia. When 
choosing to invest in either one of the technologies, the firms will form expectations on capacity 
throughout the next 6 years, for both technologies and only for that period. In other words, in order to 
make an investment decision at time t , firms will take into account (qNVc- (t - s ) , ~  5 s < 8) 
and {E, (q, (t + s ) ) , ~  Is < S} . 
What we  note{^, (q, (t + s ) ) , ~  I s < S} is the expectation one can make based on the form of the 
demand behavior and the strategy of all actors. Within the time frame between time t and time t + 6 , the 
producer knows the amount of capacity of type N that will come online, and can anticipate the strategy 
of G based on simulated paths for demand. The only relevant information will be the average value of the 
capacity at time t + 6 . 
1 1.1.3.3.1. Strategy for technology G 
For technology G , we have seen that investment occurred in the Leahy case when the value of the 
asset at installation reached zero, i.e. in case of a possible zero-NPV investment. The expression of the 
The first possible strategy for producers of technology G would be to use the same decision 
criterion as if there was no committed capacity, and to install additional capacity as soon 
B I-B -- 
KG 1 xBq 'l - KG is positive. This strategy, though 
probably not far from the optimum in some cases, is sub-optimal. Indeed, it does not take into account the 
- 
committed capacity that is not installed yet. Since ~ ( n , )  is greater than the actual value of the asset, it 
will reach zero "too soon", thereby leading to suboptimal overinvestment. By using this strategy, the 
actual NPV of an investment will always be negative. 
The second possible strategy for producers of technologyG would be to use the same decision 
criterion as if all the committed capacity was going to come online at the next instant, i.e. to install 
1 
-- 
'l 
additional capacity as soon as ~(n,) = x h  - - KG is positive. 
This situation is not optimal either, for it assumes that the capacity will immediately increase and that the 
price will be brought down instantly instead of progressively between time t and time t + 6. Therefore, 
there will be underinvestment, investment will occur too late, at a time when the value of the asset is 
strictly positive. 
Under the first strategy, one can verify that the decision criterion is equivalent to a demand trigger 
I 
- P - 
strategy with a demand trigger of x* = - ( r  - p ) K G q v  . This means that investment will occur when P-1 
the demand shock reached the above trigger. Therefore, the quantity installed will be chosen so as to 
increase the demand trigger to the new level of the demand shock. 
Under the second strategy, the decision criterion is equivalent to a demand trigger strategy with a 
1 
- 
demand trigger of< = L ( r  - , ~ ) ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t t .  The quantity installed will be chosen so as to increase 
P-1 
the demand trigger to the new level of the demand shock. 
- P P - 1 * We can notice that x* = ---- ( r  - p ) K G  4' < - ( r  - p)KGqCom v = x . The two strategies 
P-1 P-1 
above being two extremes, it is certain that the equilibrium optimum will lead to investment when the 
demand shock is between those two values. This corresponds to the intuition that in the first strategy, the 
trigger will be too low and lead to overinvestment, and with the second strategy, the trigger will be too 
high and lead to underinvestment. 
Moreover, it has the following feature: if there is no capacity in construction at a certain time, 
then the two demand triggers will be the same, and we will know the optimal strategy at that time for 
certain. 
For the first strategy, similarly to the Leahy case, at the first instant that x(t) reaches the trigger 
value n* (q + dq), q, will rise to the level q, + dq . 
For the second strategy, similarly to the Grenadier case, at the first instant thatx(t) reaches the 
trigger value Z(q,,, + dq) , q, will rise to the level q, + dq . 
There is no way to achieve a closed form for the quantity of investment in the optimal strategy. 
The only thing we know is that the quantity invested will be bound by the quantity that would be invested 
in the two other strategies. 
11.1.3.3.2. Technology N 
For technology N , we have seen that investment occurred in the Grenadier case when the value 
of the asset at installation reached zero, i.e. in case of a possible zero-NPV investment. The expression of 
the value of the asset was G(Q,) = xe-('-~)' - 
r - P  
Keeping this strategy for the producers of technology N would lead to overinvestment as the 
investment rule does not take into account the potential additional capacity of technologyG coming 
online in the next 6 years. 
For technology N ,  we need to make a simplifying assumption in order to approximate the 
solution. The entry strategy is the one developed in Grenadier, where investment is triggered when the 
demand shock hits a demand trigger. The only difference now is that the value of the asset really 
B 
xBq(t+8)?-K, .  What 
1 
makes this decision rule non-obvious is the presence ofq(t + s)?, which takes into account the 
expectations of capacity addition for the other technology. The demand shock trigger is no longer 
exclusively a function of committed capacity as in the Grenadier case, but of function of expected 
P 1 installed capacity. It is equal to- (r - p ) ~ e - ~ ' ~ ,  (q(t + 6));. 
P-1 
Once the trigger is hit, the strategy is to maintain the discounted expected price below the trigger 
level. 
Although we have not found a closed form to describe the optimal strategies, the strategies 
developed above have the advantage of being easily implemented in simulations. The following section 
will be devoted to simulations. 
1 1.1.3.4. Evaluation of the approximate solution 
For the strategy used by the producers of technology G , we have managed to construct a lower 
and an upper bound that will allow us to evaluate how close the approximate solution is from the 
optimum. Indeed, the NPV foregone in the suboptimal investment rule will necessarily be smaller than 
the difference of NPV in the upper and lower strategy. 
However, we do not have such an opportunity to evaluate the quality of the strategy of producers 
of technology N , except to calculate the value of an asset at any point in time and to check where it is 
compared to the cost of installing one unit of capacity. 
1 1.1.4. Numerical example 
In order to better understand the properties of the three models, we will go through a short 
numerical example with various initial situations for demand shock and capacity. 
We will adopt the following numerical values for the example: 
r = S % I y e a r ,  p = 2 . 5 % 1 y e a r ,  o = 1 0 % ,  7 = 1 . 2 ,  6 = 2 4 m o n t h s  
q,,, = 0.55 in the Grenadier and two-technology cases, with no capacity to come in 
the next period 
x=1.6 
11.1.4.1. Leahy 
In the Leahy case, the price trigger for technologiesG andN will 
P P be P; = - (r - p ) ~ ,  = 1.56 and P,' = - (r  - ,u)K, = 1.04. For technology (? , given the 
P-1 P-1 
1 
* - previous capacity, the demand trigger will be x i  = PC q , ~  =0.88 . For technology N , given the 
1 
- 
previous capacity, the demand trigger will be x i  = P; . q, a = 0.58 . 
Since the realized demand shock is above both values, additional capacity will be committed to 
1 
maintain the price at the trigger level. Consequently, it will be such that P: = x i  . (qG + Aq,)? 
1 
and P; = x; (qN + AqN)-;. 
1 
The additional committed capacity for technology G will be Aq, = 
additional committed capacity for technology N will beAqN = = 1.17 . Since the price 
trigger for technology N is lower, more capacity will be needed to maintain the price at that level. 
1 1.1.4.2. Grenadier 
In the Grenadier case, the demand trigger for technologyN will 
Since the realized demand shock is above both values, additional capacity will be committed. 
However, the additional capacity will have no effect on the current price level. The new price will 
1 
be P = x . qN< = 2.85. We can notice that the price is above the price trigger derived in the Leahy case. 
In the Grenadier case, the current price in not capped by a trigger price. 
The additional capacity committed will be such that the demand trigger is raised exactly to the 
1 
- 
level of the demand shock. Since the demand trigger is x i  = P,' e-" . q, a , the new committed 
capacity will be such 
1 
that x = pie-" . (q,,,,, + Aq,,,,,);, 
In the two technology case, the price trigger for the technologyG 
P is P; = - ( r  - p ) ~ ,  = 1.56. Demand triggers for technology G' for the upper and the lower bounds 
P - 1  
- I I 
are now xt = P: . (q, + q ,  )? = 1.56 and xi = P,' . (q, + q,,,,,); = 1.63. Since the demand shock is 
- 
below x i  , there will be no capacity addition in this case. There will be capacity addition in the upper 
- 
- 
bound strategy because the demand shock is higher thanxi . The amount of the capacity addition of 
I 
/ \ -  
technology G in this case will be AqG = - - q,  - q ,  = 0.03. (ijo 
I 
Demand trigger for technology N is x; = P; e-" E ( ~ , , ,  )? , 
with ~ ( q , , ,  ) = qN,comm + E,+6 (qG ) . The value ~ , + ~ ( q ,  ) is calculated by simulating a large number of 
demand shock paths for the next 6 periods, which entail potential new capacity addition for technology G 
(and not for technology N because of the 6 -month long construction time), and by taking the average 
value. If we assume in our case that, for the lower bound, the expected new gas capacity committed is 
close to zero, and for the upper bound there will be only one capacity addition of 0.03 at this period, then 
- 1 1 
the demand triggers will be x i  = pie-'' . E(qC0,,)n = 1.06 andx; - = Pie-" . E ( ~ , , , ) ;  = 1.03. 
The additional capacity committed will be such that the demand trigger is raised exactly to the 
I 
level of the demand shock. In this case, since the demand trigger is x; = ~;e-'' . ~(q , , , )n  , the new 
1 
committed capacity will be such that x = pi e -" '6 ( ~ ( g , , , , ,  ) + ~ q ,  ,,,, )n , 
The additional capacity will have no effect on the current price level. The new price will 
In the two-technology case, we can notice that in the upper bound case, more capacity of 
technology G is added, while less capacity of technology N is added. This phenomenon corresponds to 
the intuition that we had initially about the two strategies: the upper strategy builds too much capacity of 
technology G while the lower strategy builds too little. The optimum capacity addition of technology G 
is between 0 and 0.03. 
Also, the total capacity addition in both cases is0.73. This is consistent with the intuition that 
ultimately, the total amount of capacity online will be the same. Time-to-build will result in a shift from a 
cheaper capacity to a more expensive capacity without time-to-build. 
1 1.2. Simulations and discussion of the results 
Whereas the models previously discussed were rather general, mentioning only a non-storable 
good, the following sections will explicitly deal with electricity and electric capacity. When two 
generation technologies will be compared, N will be nuclear power and G will be gas-fired power. 
In the subsequent sections, we will place ourselves in a variety of different contexts relevant to 
the models described before. The goal will be to gain insight from the simulations. 
Ultimately, the purpose of the model is to assess the additional cost from the differences in 
construction time from different power generation technologies. 
1 1.2.1. Numerical assumptions 
We have chosen to place ourselves in the context of electricity generation. Therefore, we will 
need to choose numerical assumptions that are consistent with the characteristics of the technologies 
considered. 
1 1.2.1.1. Units of time, capacity and output and time frame 
The time frame used for the simulations is 360 months or 30 years. In our simulations, the unit of 
time will be the month, the unit of capacity will be the kW, and the unit of output will be the MWh. The 
choice is consistent with the levelized costs calculations that have been made throughout this study. 
In the theoretical model, at every period, one unit of output is produced by each unit of capacity. 
If we wish to use the formulas in the model, we have to adjust it to have prices not in $/ (output produced 
in a period), but $/MWh. The output produced in a month will 
be CapacityFactor . Hours l Month l(MW I kW) (this includes the conversion from kW to MW). The 
assumptions on the capacity factor for both technologies will be the same as previously used in this study, 
85%. 
1 1.2.1.2. Risk-free interest rate and initial values 
The annual risk-free interest rate assumption made to run the simulations is 5%. The initial value 
for regional capacity will be 1 kW. It will be evenly split among technologies in the case of two 
technologies. The demand shock will start so that the price would be exactly at the nuclear trigger price. 
11.2.1.3. Costs 
We have already mentioned that when a unit of capacity is installed, it produces one unit of 
output indefinitely. While this is obviously not the case for electric power generation, we have to 
remember this model has more of an explicatory purpose than a predictive purpose, and that a model 
requires simplifying assumptions. 
As a result, production costs will be incurred indefinitely at every period. Since our models do not 
depend on the ratio of capital costs to production costs, we only need to make an assumption on present 
lifetime cost that would include both capital and production costs. 
For nuclear power, a spreadsheet calculation with assumptions of capital costs at 1,350 $/kW and 
production costs of 23 $/MWh gives a present lifetime cost of 4,800 $/kW. For gas-fired power, the same 
spreadsheet calculation with assumptions of capital costs at 500 $kW and production costs of 45 $/MWh 
gives a present lifetime cost of 7,200 $/kW. The ratio of those two present lifetime costs comes out to be 
312. Clearly, the underlying assumption is that, in the long run, after a number of units of advanced 
nuclear power designs are built in a standardized manner, nuclear power will end up being cheaper than 
gas-fired power, like is the case in France. 
We can also calculate the equivalent of a levelized cost of electricity for both technologies, which 
is the equivalent of the present lifetime cost, but with the assumption that there is no initial capital outlay, 
and only production costs. The levelized cost of electricity in the case of nuclear power is 32.07 $/MWh. 
The levelized cost of electricity in the case of gas-fired power is 48.38 $/MWh. Those results are of an 
order of magnitude that is consistent with the figures given by previous levelized cost of electricity. 
1 1.2.1.4. Inverse-demand function and demand shock process 
For the inverse demand function, the price elasticity of demand 77 was taken to be 1.2. 
The geometric Brownian motion describing the demand shock will grow at an annual rate of 
2.5%. This drift corresponds to the drift of electricity consumption in developed countries. The volatility 
is a parameter which will vary in the simulations. Although a figure of 10% could be considered more 
reasonable, it appears in the simulation that interesting trends appear in the vicinity of 25% to 30%. We 
will discuss relevant phenomena with 30% volatility but show simulations with a 10% volatility as well to 
properly assess the actual impact of our conclusions. 
11.2.2. Understanding the general features of the various models 
1 1.2.2.1. Impact of uncertainty on investment 
The situation we are placing ourselves in during most of the simulations is a context of 
uncertainty. 
However, in order to get a better understanding of the phenomena at hand, we will choose to start 
with a situation without uncertainty on the demand shock. This will translate intoo = 0 in the 
simulations. 
Here are the results that we get with the nuclear technology characteristics. 
Figure 57 - Leahy - Demand shock - Gas - No uncertainty 
Figure 58 - Leahy - Price - Gas - No uncertainty 
Figure 59 - Leahy - Capacity - Gas - No uncertainty 
We see that under certainty conditions, when the price for electricity is at the trigger price (which 
happens to be exactly the levelized cost of electricity), investment starts at a rate that maintains the price 
at the trigger level indefinitely. Consequently, after the trigger is hit (if the price is initially below the 
trigger), the price remains constant forever. 
Capacity grows smoothly and predictably at a constant rate, following the pattern of demand 
growing exponentially. 
As price will always equal the LCOE, the zero-NPV is clearly shown in this specific case. 
11.2.2.2. Impact of cost characteristics on investment 
The first simulations will be done under the Leahy model. What we first want to do is understand 
how nuclear power and gas-fired power compare in terms of costs, should there be no time to build for 
either of them. 
The results from the simulations that are displayed below are the path of the demand shock, the 
path of prices and the path of capacity. The following simulation features uncertainty with a volatility 
of a = 30%. Gas and Nuclear technologies are places in the exact same situation for the demand shock. 
The only difference is the initial outlay required to install one unit of capacity. 
Figure 60 - Leahy - Demand shock - Uncertainty ( 0 = 30% ) 
Figure 61 - Leahy - Price - Nuclear and Gas - Uncertainty ( 0 = 30% ) 
Figure 62 - Leahy - Distribution of prices- Nuclear and Gas - Uncertainty ( 0 = 30% ) 
Figure 63 - Leahy - Capacity - Nudmr and Gas - UnmWnty ( 0 = 30% ) 
We have added a line representing the values the demand path would take if there was no 
uncertainty and if the first and last points were the same, i.e. for a certain demand growing at the same 
compound average growth rate. The compound growth rate that we obtain is 2.75%, which is above the 
instantaneous growth rate. 
The trigger prices are 395.14$/MWh for Nuclear and 592.71 $/MWh for Gas. We can see that the 
trigger prices are at levels much higher than the levelized cost of electricity. This phenomenon is due to 
the cost of uncertainty, the premium that the power generation technologies have to pay for uncertainty in 
demand. For both technologies in this case the ratio of the trigger price to the LCOE is 12.26. The LCOE 
for the two technologies are the following: 32 $IMWh for nuclear and 48 $IMWh for gas. 
The first impression is that, quite predictably, prices have the same general behavior: They follow 
the demand shock until they hit a trigger level. When they rise to their trigger, capacity is instantly added, 
and after some time the price drops down to a lower level. The operation is repeated. 
Capacity in both cases follows a stepwise increase. During the periods when the price is below 
the trigger level, the capacity remains constant until the trigger is hit again. 
The shape of the price path is similar for some intervals of time. This can be explained by the fact 
that, when neither gas nor nuclear is investing, the price is simply proportional to the demand parameter. 
Consequently, prices are proportional for those intervals too. 
The difference in costs induces a difference in the level of the trigger. Since the gas price trigger 
is 1.5 times higher than the nuclear trigger, price will be allowed to reach higher level before new 
capacity is installed. As a result, the level of prices will on average be lower in the case of nuclear than in 
the case of gas, while nuclear capacity will grow to a higher level than gas capacity. 
For a few months, prices are equal in both cases as the price level has not reached a level at which 
any investment will be initiated. Then the nuclear trigger is hit, causing the nuclear case to install 
capacity, while no additional gas capacity comes online. It is only at a later instant that gas capacity starts 
increasing. 
Another notable element is the average discounted price. Although the time period used for the 
simulation is not infinite, we can see that on average, the price sits at 217 $/MWh for nuclear and 326 
$/MWh for gas. Those values are higher than their respective LCOE. 
Prices in both cases seem to be proportional. The reason is the initial price is at the trigger price in 
both cases. From that point onwards, the situations for nuclear and gas will just be proportional as well. 
As a result, the coefficient of variation of prices is the same in both cases: 44.84%. 
A calculation of the actualized lifetime consumer surplus indicates a value of $769,031 for 
nuclear and $740,658 for gas. This is not surprising: by maintaining the price at lower levels and bringing 
capacity to higher levels, nuclear manages to serve more demand than gas. Elasticity beingq > 1, nuclear 
achieves a higher consumer surplus than gas. 
The social welfare is here defined as the actualized consumer surplus minus the actualized costs 
of installing capacity. When computing the values in our simulation, we get $748,545 for nuclear and 
$693,856 for gas. It is therefore socially preferable to build a cheaper than a more expensive technology. 
We could use the ratio of the two values to assess a social cost to using a more expensive technology. We 
would get a value of 93%. This is a measure of the share of social surplus that is sacrificed by using a 
more expensive technology. 
11.2.2.3. Impact of time to build on investment 
This section will feature a comparison of the behavior of the nuclear technology with and without 
time-to-build. The same elements as the previous section will be considered in the analysis. 
Displayed below are the path of the demand shock, the path of prices and the path of capacity 
from the simulations. The volatility is still 0 = 30%. The two parallel cases of nuclear with and without 
instantaneous construction are in the exact same situation in all respect except for time to build: the time- 
to-build chosen in this case will be 24 months. 
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Figure 64 - Leahy and Grenadier - Demand shock - Uncertainty ( 0 = 30% ) 
Figure 65 - Lesuhy and Grenadier - Price - Nuclear with and without time-to-build 
Figure 66 - Leahy and Grenadier - Distribution of prices - Nuclear with and without time-to-build 
FSgrve 67 - Lcrhy and Grenadier - Capadty - Nuclear with and wtthswt tinrefslbuild 
The trigger price is always 395.14$/MWh for both technologies. However, time-to-build affects 
the investment optimal strategy. Without time-to-build, investment starts when the current price hits the 
trigger, whereas with time to build, investment starts when the discounted expected price at the end of 
potential construction (in 6 months) hits the same trigger. 
Comparatively, prices seem to behave in a very different manner. Fluctuations are similar in 
direction and relative magnitude, but the price path is fundamentally different. The reason for the 
difference is the absence in the case of time-to-build of a price ceiling. Theoretically, the price is not 
bound by any limit. Although the probability that the price will grow to very high levels is low, it is 
strictly positive. 
Also, even though the current price with time-to-build is allowed to fluctuate more, fluctuations 
never exceed a short period of time. This phenomenon is also easily understood: if at a certain point, 
demand rises sharply due to a shock, while nuclear can react instantly when there is no time-to-build, 
when a delay in construction is present, the reaction is also immediate, but the effect of that reaction 
happens 24 months later. Instead of retaining the price instantly, the price is brought back down at the end 
of construction when the new capacity comes online. 
Overall, the process is the same however: when demand rises, some investment may be triggered, 
and then prices eventually decrease. During times when prices decrease, there is no new investment 
triggered and the capacity remains flat. This is true of the time-to-build case with a 24 months lag. As a 
result, in both situations, capacity in both cases follows a stepwise increase. 
The shape of the price path is similar for some intervals of time. This can be explained by the fact 
that, when neither technology has been investing for more than 24 months, the price is simply 
proportional to the demand shock. Consequently, prices are proportional for those intervals too. 
Since the price is not capped when there is time-to-build, the level of prices will be allowed to 
grow higher. As a result, the level of prices will on average be lower in the case of nuclear without time- 
to-build than in the case of nuclear with time-to-build. On the other hand, capacity without time-to build 
will grow slower than capacity with time to build. A graph of discounted expected prices would be more 
similar to cases without time-to-build, as the strategy is to maintain the discounted expected price below 
the trigger level. For a few months, prices are equal in both cases as the price level has not reached a level 
at which any investment will be initiated. Then the nuclear trigger is hit, causing the nuclear case to install 
capacity, while no additional delayed capacity comes online. It is only at a later instant that delayed 
capacity starts increasing, although the decision might have been made at the same time. 
In fact, in the time-to-build case, when no capacity has been built for more than 24 months, there 
is no capacity in construction. Then, until the next investment is triggered, the technology with delay will 
have the same strategy as the no delay technology: they will commit capacity as soon as the nuclear 
trigger is reached. 
We have already commented on the level of prices. This remark confirmed by the average 
discounted price displayed the graph. Although the time period used for the simulation is not infinite, we 
can see that on average, the price sits at 217 $/MWh for nuclear without time-to-build, and 276 $/MWh 
for nuclear with time-to-build. Those values are still reassuringly higher than the nuclear LCOE, 
preserving the expectation of a positive-NPV investment. 
Prices in the case of nuclear with time-to-build vary on a larger interval since the current price is 
not capped. However, it is notable that price volatilities are very similar, lower without time-to build 
(44.84%) than with time-to-build (52.29%). It is difficult to interpret the way the coefficients of variation 
are ordered. Moreover, if we look at the same demand shock path with different values of demand 
volatility (the Wiener process is the same, but the volatility is different), they are always in the opposite 
order. This is probably the effect of one simulation and the short time frame that does not allow for 
adjustments. It would be expected that volatility with time-to-build is higher for similar reasons exposed 
in the previous paragraph. The nuclear with time-to-build PDF is less skewed to the left than the nuclear 
without time-to-build PDF. This is also explained by the fact that the ratio of the average discounted price 
over the trigger is larger with than without time-to-build. 
A calculation of the actualized lifetime consumer surplus indicates a value of $769,031 for 
nuclear with no construction delay, and $709,985 for nuclear with construction delay. This is still not a 
surprise. By maintaining the price at lower levels and bringing capacity to higher levels when it is needed, 
nuclear without time-to-build manages to serve more demand than nuclear with time-to-build. Elasticity 
being 7 > 1 ,  the consumer surplus is higher without time-to-build. 
The social welfare for each situation gives $748,545 for nuclear with no time-to-build and 
$723,452 with time-to-build. At equal capital costs, there is a welfare loss with time-to-build from the 
instantaneous investment case. We could use the ratio of the two values to assess a social cost to using a 
more expensive technology. We would get a value of 97%. 
Subsequent sections will feature variations in time to build. What we can already predict is that 
the effects described above will be amplified as time to build increases. The costs of time-to-build will 
prove larger as delays lengthen. 
1 1.2.2.4. Impact of the presence of two technologies on investment 
The purpose of the corning section is to understand the difference in outcome between the two 
technology case and the case where there is only one technology on the market. The insight we will get 
will allow us to assess to what extent it is socially beneficial to have two technologies in competition 
instead of one. The section will analyze the impact of introducing the gas technology in a "delayed 
nuclear" market. 
Displayed below are the path of the demand shock, the path of prices and the path of capacity 
from the simulations. The volatility is still a = 30%. The cost characteristics and other assumptions are 
not altered from the previous sections. 
Figure 68 - Two-technology and Grenadier - Demand shock 
Figure 69 - Two-technology and Grenadier - Price - Two technologies vs. Nuclear with time-to-build 
Figure 70 - Two-technology and Grenadier - Distribution of prices - Two technologies vs. Nuclear with time- 
to-build 
Similarly to the previous cases, the trigger prices are still 395.14$/MWh for nuclear and 592.71 
$/MWh for gas. 
In this case we are facing two options where prices tend to fluctuate substantially, because the 
cheaper (in one case the only) technology has a construction delay. As a result, the price appears to be 
very volatile. 
Yet the difference is the presence of gas capacity in one case. The difference that gas will induce 
is an effective capping of prices. On the graph, it is apparent that the price hits the price trigger for gas 
several times. When the price reaches the gas price trigger, gas takes the advantage of an opportunity to 
invest and brings capacity online, thereby maintaining prices below the ceiling. The consequence will also 
be to prevent nuclear capacity from making the optimal pattern it would follow if it were alone. In a way, 
the presence of gas will discourage the installation of nuclear capacity, despite the fact that it is cheaper. 
This is a common feature of certain types of games: gas gains the advantage of pre-commitment. 
Capacity in both cases follows stepwise increases. Some price spikes trigger nuclear investment. 
In the two-technology case, we can see investment at times when current price is at trigger. Investment 
periods and fixed capacity periods follow each other repeatedly. 
Similarly to previous cases, the shape of the price path is similar for some intervals of time when 
there is no investment. 
The average discounted prices are of course different in this case. The presence of gas technology 
in the two-technology case maintains the price below a certain level, prevents it from rising. 
Consequently, the average discounted price for the two-technology case is lower than in the nuclear with 
time-to-build case (267 $/MWh for the upper bound and 273 $/MWh for the lower bound compared to 
276 $/MWh for nuclear with time-to-build). The prices are of the same order of magnitude: nuclear power 
being cheaper, it shapes the investment profile to a larger extent. Gas has a small influence on the level of 
prices for that reason. We will see later that gas has a larger influence as the construction delay increases. 
Price patterns are extremely similar in the two cases, and their volatility are very close (52.29% 
for nuclear alone and 5 1.1 1% and 51.15% for the upper and the lower bound of the two-technology 
situation). Several simulations with different time-to-build will allow us to confirm whether the order of 
the volatilities is consistent with intuition or is the result of a specific simulation. The same can be said of 
the PDF in both cases. 
Another notable fact is that total capacity and prices end at the same value. This suggests that, 
despite capacity additions of gas technology, the ultimate target capacity may be the same given a 
demand shock process. This could also be a consequence of a single simulation, but it seems rather 
unlikely. 
Also, it seems that the lower bound of the two-technology model gives very similar results as the 
nuclear with time-to-build case. The reason for that is that in the upper bound, gas producers will build 
less capacity than would be optimal, in fact almost none. When they build none, the situation is that of 
nuclear alone with time-to-build. 
A calculation of the actualized lifetime consumer surplus indicates a value of $709,985 for 
nuclear with time-to-build and $744,841 and $741,205 for the two technologies. The reason for this is that 
the total amount of capacity is greater in both of the two-technology strategies, and this compensates the 
11-1 
lower level of prices (because q >  1, since s (x, , q, ) = x, q,? ). When gas technology caps the 
77-1 
price, it prevents some early investment in nuclear, but keeps the price down. This would tend to argue 
for a beneficial effect of adding gas technology to the market. 
Last, social welfare is higher in the two-technology case than in the one-technology case 
($723,452 for one technology and $725,733 and $723,794 for the upper and the lower bound with two 
technologies). This was to be expected: the two technology case installs more expensive capacity than the 
nuclear alone case, but the increased capacity brings the price to lower levels. The consumer benefits 
from earlier capacity addition despite the extra cost. If we wanted to calculate the ratio of the two values 
to assess a social cost, we would get a value of around 97% (almost the same value for the upper and the 
lower bound of the two-technology case). 
In order to evaluate the quality of the approximation of the upper and the lower bound to the 
value of the asset, we can calculate w (ao) = E[ 1 e-" ~(r)dtlS2(0) = no] in both cases. For the upper 
bound, we get $64,039. For the lower bound we get $65,558. The error made is lower than 2%. 
1 1.2.3. Impact of volatility on the comparative investment decision 
It is a relevant question to ask wonder about the sensitivity of the results to the volatility of the 
demand shock. The following graphs stem from the similar demand shock paths. The only difference 
between the paths is the volatility of the process, or the magnitude of the stochastic jumps. 
Figure 72 - Prices and capacities - 0 = 10% 
Figure 73- Prices and capacities - 0 = 20% 
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Ffgure 74 - Prim and capadties - o = 30% 
Figure 75 - Prices and capacities - d = 40% 
The purpose of this section is not to go into detail on the comparisons between situations. This is 
intended to illustrate the effect of volatility on the price and capacity patterns. 
It seems that demand volatility has a direct effect on price volatility: the more volatile demand is 
the more volatile prices are. This needs no explanation; it is simply a consequence of the chosen inverse 
demand function. 
The capacity path is also smoother when demand is less volatile. This is consistent with intuition: 
the more predictable demand is, the easier it gets to have a regular capacity path. 
Moreover, as volatility increases, the two-technology case progressively becomes closer to the 
gas without time-to-build. Obviously, when prices fluctuate more, it becomes increasingly profitable to 
install gas capacity. We will not reach as all-gas situation because high price variations also favor nuclear 
with time-to-build. 
Nuclear with no time-to-build is evidently the situation where prices are lowest and capacity is 
highest in all volatility assumptions. 
Let's consider the share of nuclear capacity in the two-technology case. It is displayed in the 
figure below. 
Figure 76 - Nuclear Capacity Share - d = 0%, 10%,20%,30%, 40% 
The nuclear share continuously increases towards 100% when volatility is low. In cases of higher 
volatility though, it seems that the share of nuclear capacity will ultimately stop at a level lower than 
100%. This is explained by the fact that high volatilities are profitable to gas power too, and that gas 
capacity will also constantly be installed. Therefore, there will be a non-zero portion of gas capacity when 
volatility of demand is high. This is one way of explaining the cost of time-to-build. Nuclear power loses 
market share even though it is cheaper, because of the construction delay. 
The following chart summarizes the results analyzed in the preceding sections for various values 
of volatility. 
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Figure 77 - Summary Chart - 0 = 0%, lo%, 20%, 30%, 40% 
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1 1.2.4. Impact of time-to-build on the comparative investment decision 
This section will exclusively consider models featuring time-to-build: the model with nuclear 
with time-to-build alone, and the two technologies. For a given initial demand path with 30% volatility, 
we will assess the impact of increasing time-to-build on a number of relevant metrics. 
An initial remark is necessary concerning the capital cost assumptions under time-to-build 
conditions. We have already stressed the fact that in case of a construction delay, the cost was incurred at 
entry i.e. at the moment the investment decision is made, not at start-up. In order to compare the various 
alternatives for construction lag, we need to make sure costs are consistent. It is necessary that levelized 
costs of electricity be equal at start-up for comparison purposes. Therefore, the capital cost at start-up will 
be discounted to the time of the decision. Consequently, with a longer time-to-build, nuclear capacity will 
be cheaper. 
The following simulations will consider the following time-to-build values: 0, 12, 24, 36,48 and 
60 months. The time-to-build considered is comparative with the construction time for gas-fired capacity. 
Thus, a 12 months time delay means that it is 12 months longer to build a nuclear plant than a gas-fired 
plant. 
In the figures below, 1, 2, 3 ,4 ,5  refer to the situation with q time-to-build of respectively 12, 24, 
36,48 and 60 months. 0 is represented by nuclear with no time-to-build. 
Figure 78 - Demand Shock 
Elasticity 1.2 1.2 
sigma 0.3 0.3 
Mu 2.50% 2.50% 
r 5.00% 5.00% 
Construction time 12 24 
Knuclear 5046 4800 
Kgas 7200 7200 
LCOE - Nuclear $32.23 $32.23 
LCOE - Gas $48.35 $48.35 
Trigger - Nuclear $415.41 $395.15 
Trigger - Gas $592.7 1 $592.7 1 
Average Discounted Price - Nuclear - No TTB $105.31 $105.31 
Average Discounted Price - Nuclear - 'ITB $172.96 $182.72 
Average Discounted Price - Gas - No TTB $216.80 $216.80 
Average Discounted Price - Nuclear and Gas - Up $170.92 $178.35 
Average Discounted Price - Nuclear and Gas - Down $172.70 $182.40 
Ratio Average Discounted Price - Nuclear TTB - Mean 
.& Nuclear No TTB 1.74 
Ratio Average Discounted Price - Gas NoTTB - Mean 
Nuclear No TTB 2.06 2.06 
Ratio Average Discounted Price - Nuclear and Gas - Up - 
.62 Mean Nuclear No TTB 1.69 
Ratio Average Discounted Price - Nuclear and Gas - 
Down - Mean Nuclear No TTB 1.64 1.73 
STD Discounted Price - Nuclear - No TTB 67.42% 67.42% 
STD Discounted Price - Nuclear - TTB 72.18% 72.16% 
STD Discounted Price - Gas - No TTB 67.42% 67.42% 
STD Discounted Price - Nuclear and Gas - Up 72.34% 73.01% 
STD Discounted Price - Nuclear and Gas - Down 72.07% 72.00% 
Total Surplus - Nuclear - No TTB $345,282 $345,282 
Total Surplus - Nuclear - TTB $300,129 $300,129 
Total Surplus - Gas - No TTB $3 14,579 $3 10,99 1 
Total Surplus - Nuclear and Gas - Up $3 15,67 1 $3 13,340 
Total Surplus - Nuclear and Gas - Down $3 14,652 $3 1 1,049 
Surplus Ratio - Nuclear TTBMuclear NoTTB 86.92% 86.92% 
Surplus Ratio - Gas NoTTB/Nuclear NoTTB 91.1 1% 90.07% 
Surplus Ratio - Nuclear and Gas UpMuclear NoTTB 91.42% 90.75% 
Surplus Ratio - Nuclear and Gas Down/Nuclear NoTTB 9 1.13% 90.09% 
Total Capital Costs - Nuclear - No TTB $24,542 $23,345 
Total Capital Costs - Nuclear - TTB $12,798 $12,065 
Total Capital Costs - Gas - No TTB $10,566 $10,566 
Total Capital Costs - Nuclear and Gas - Up $13,906 $13,763 
Total Capital Costs - Nuclear and Gas - Down $12,859 $12,091 
SWF - Nuclear - No TTB $320,739 $32 1,936 
SWF - Nuclear - TTB $301,78 1 $298,926 
SWF - Gas - No TTB $289,563 $289,563 
SWF - Nuclear and Gas - Up $301,766 $299,578 
SWF - Nuclear and Gas - Down $301,794 $298,957 
SWF Ratio - Nuclear TTBMuclear NoTTB 94.09% 92.85% 
SWF Ratio - Gas NoTTBMuclear NoTTB 90.28% 89.94% 
SWF Ratio - Nuclear and Gas UpMuclear NoTTB 94.08% 93.05% 
SWF Ratio - Nuclear and Gas Down/Nuclear NoTTB 94.09% 92.86% 
Value of Asset - Nuclear and Gas - Up $4 1,022 $42,804 
Value of Asset - Nuclear and Gas - Down $4 1,447 $43,776 
Value of Asset - (Down-Up) $426 $972 
% decrease in Asset Value 1% 2% 
Figure 79 - Simulation Summary Chart 
Figure 80 - Grenadier - Price 
Figure 81 - Two-technology - bound - Price 
Figure 82 - Two-technology - Lower b o d  - Mce 
Figure 83 - Grenadier - Nuclear Capacity 
Figure 84 - Two-technology - Upper bound - Nuclear Capacity 
Figure 85 - Two-technology - Lower bound - Nuclear Capacity 
Figure 86 - Two-technology - Upper bound - Gas Capacity 
Figure 87 - Two-technology - Lower bound - Gas Capacity 
Figure 88 - Two-technology - Upper bound - Total Capacity 
Figure 89 - Two-technology - Lower bound - Total Capacity 
Figure 90 - Two-technology - Upper bound - Nuclear Capacity Share 
Figure 91 - Two~technology - Lower bound - Nordear Capaciby Share 
Figure 92 - Grenadier - Consumer Surplus 
Figure 93 - T w ~ ~ t d i m k g y  - Upper baud - Comumer Surplus 
Analysis of general trends 
First, it seems that the remarks made earlier about time-to-build are confirmed by this set of 
simulations. 
When looking at the market with nuclear capacity only, it appears that time-to-build allows the 
price to reach higher values because it is not bound by an upper cap. It has an obvious impact on the 
volatility of prices which increases as time-to-build increases. For the same reason, the average 
discounted price sits higher for higher values of the construction time. This is already one step towards 
assessing the cost of time-to-build in a nuclear-only environment. 
In the two-technology market situation, for the upper bound, the price is capped by the presence 
of gas capacity which has no construction lag. Therefore, prices are always below the gas trigger. In this 
situation and except for short periods, when one considers two price paths for two time-to-build values, 
the price will always be higher in the case of the highest time to build. The consequence of this is that the 
average discounted prices are ordered likewise. The presence of a cap does not allow reaching any 
satisfactory conclusion as to the impact of time-to-build on price volatility. Intuition would suggest that 
time-to-build increases volatility, yet the higher the time-to-build, the higher the gas response to volatility: 
those two conflicting effects seem to almost compensate. 
In the Grenadier situation, time-to-build causes less capacity construction. The phenomenon is not 
simply that capacity is built at a later time: less capacity is built overall because of demand uncertainty. 
This is consistent with prices being higher for longer construction delays. 
In the two-technology situation, an increase in construction delay results in less nuclear capacity 
to be built and of course more gas capacity to be built. This phenomenon is the opportunity given to gas 
producers to build capacity as new nuclear capacity is slowed down by the construction lag. It is more and 
more important as the window given to gas producers increases. Ultimately, the installation of more 
expensive capacity will result in social welfare losses. Overall, an equal amount of capacity is being built, 
but capacity is being built at later times. As a result, on average, at any point in time there is less capacity 
when nuclear takes longer to come online. This is also the reason for the average discounted price to be 
higher for longer construction lags. 
In terms of capacity share, obviously the opportunity given to gas producers to build more 
capacity while less nuclear capacity is being installed results is a lower share of nuclear capacity on the 
market. As time to build goes to infinity, the share of nuclear power will go to zero. 
As far as consumer surplus, in both cases, the impact of time-to-build is to cause a surplus loss. 
This loss is carried to social welfare and amplified, because consumer surplus is lower and the cost of 
building capacity is larger. 
If we consider the calculation of the value of the asset, it appears that a larger time-to-build 
introduces more uncertainty in the approximation we are making between the lower and the upper bound. 
However, the uncertainty remains at level below lo%, which induces that the upper and lower bounds 
capture most of the information in spite of the absence of an exact solution. 
All the remarks that have been made so far describe general trends about the effect of time-to- 
build on key metrics. It is however relevant to conduct a more quantitative analysis 
11.2.4.2. Quantitative analysis of the impact of time-to-build 
Construction time 
- ~ d  
Ratio - Average Discounted Price Nuclear with 
time-to-build I Average Discounted Price Nuclear 
without time-to-build 
Ratio - Average Discounted Price Nuclear and 
Gas - Down I Average Discounted Price Nuclear 
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Ratio - Average Discounted Price Nuclear and 
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Ratio - Social Welfare Nuclear with time-to-build 
I Social Welfare Nuclear without time-to-build 
Ratio - Social Welfare Nuclear and Gas - Up I 
Social Welfare Nuclear without time-to-build 
Figure 95 - Ratio comparisons 
12 
0.98 
Ratio - Social Welfare Nuclear and Gas - Down 1 
Social Welfare Nuclear without time-to-build 
The table above displays the calculation of a number of ratios that are relevant measures of the 
164% 
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94% 
94% 
investment model. 
24 
0.95 
94% 
In order to quantify the effect of time-to-build, it is useful to remember an element previously 
36 
0.93 
174% 
169% 
173% 
93% 
93% 
mentioned: when no nuclear capacity is being constructed, the investment decision is equivalent to a no 
182% 
174% 
182% 
92% 
92% 
93% 
time-to-build decision with a price trigger multiplied by a factor of e('-~)'. Moreover, the demand trigger 
92% 
is multiplied by a factor of e - @ .  This can be assimilated as the cost of time-to-build, like the trigger 
premium over the levelized cost of electricity. 
To confirm the idea that e-@is a measure of the cost of time-to-build in our model, we are 
plotting it versus a number of ratios: ratios of average discounted prices over average discounted prices 
without time-to-build, and ratios of social welfare over social welfare without time-to-build. 
F'igure 96 - Impact of Time-to-build on Avehge Discounted Price 
Figure 97 - Impact of Time-tolbuild on Social Welfare 
The curves in the graphs above appear to be polynomial, which would suggest that both in the 
nuclear-alone case and in the two-technology case, the impact of time-to-build on price and social welfare 
is a polynomial function of the quantitye-@. These trends are not absolutely obvious with such a small 
set of data. More data would be required in order to assess the exact shape of the curve. 
11.2.5. A closer look at the impact of time-to-build 
Figure 98 - Impact of Time-to-build on Average Discounted Price - 1 5 8 5 100 
Figure 99 - Impact of Time-to-build on Surplus - 1 S 6 5 100 
The figure above confirms a number of remarks elaborated in the previous section. There is a 
polynomial relationship between what has been identified as the cost of time-to-build and the ratios in the 
both the Grenadier context and the two-technology context. 
Another remark is that the lower bound for the two-technology case has a cost of time-to-build 
very close to the nuclear alone case. The reason is still that very little gas capacity is being constructed in 
the lower bound case. 
In any case, we have managed to identify the cost of time-to-build as the quantity eB, and the 
relationship between that time-to-build and various metrics of evaluation of an investment strategy given 
a set of market conditions. 
Conclusions and recommendations for future work 
In this study, we have analyzed the main factors driving potential new investment in nuclear 
power. Some factors are general to electricity generation and some are specific to nuclear power. 
The conclusion is that the new NRC licensing process and the nuclear provisions of the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 should allow for new investments in nuclear power. By the time the financial support 
from the federal government has been used, new nuclear reactor designs should be cost-competitive with 
other sources of baseload generation. The introduction of environmental constraints on emissions of 
greenhouse gases would confirm the comparative economics of nuclear power. 
Financing options will not be an easy undertaking, but this arduous task will be undertaken by a 
number of multi-utilities consortia, and the Finnish example suggests that financing nuclear power is 
possible in a competitive electricity market. 
The financial investment model developed also shows that the long construction time for nuclear 
power has other implications than the temporal value of money. In a context of uncertain demand for 
electricity, there is an additional cost in not being able to react instantly to evolution of demand. Average 
prices for electricity increase as the construction delay becomes more important, and social welfare incurs 
losses by a few percent depending on the length of construction time. Traditional financial analysis fails 
to account for this impact of construction time, though it appears to have a significant effect according to 
the model calculations. 
This study starts with a very broad analysis of the nuclear industry, and of the factors that directly 
impact investments in nuclear power plants. Yet each of the items analyzed would deserve a separate 
study, especially the issues classified as "unresolved". It would be useful to develop an investment model 
that would factor in elements such as environmental constraints over C02 emissions. A closer look at 
capital costs and operating costs for new designs, and for the most recent nuclear investments in Asia 
would prove valuable to gain in the accuracy of the investment model. 
In the investment mode, we have chosen to analyze the impact of time-to-build on the 
competitiveness of nuclear power. I recommend the study of other relevant items in the model, such as 
the impact of the ratio of investment costs to production costs. The model does not allow interruption of 
service for power plants. Adding such a feature would be a better approximation of the functioning of the 
electric power sector, and would also contribute in explaining regional choices in electricity mix. 
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